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John Lewis, Mike D'OrsoA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
SNCC and CORE helped organize the 1964 voter registration drive in Mississippi. This campaign, known as Freedom Summer or the Mississippi Summer Project, aimed to increase the number of registered Black voters in the state. The groups spent a week training mostly White student volunteers about the ugliness and dangers they would face that summer, including the high probability that the volunteers would face beatings and arrests. The SNCC and CORE leaders also emphasized that they would not change Mississippi in one summer, but that the campaign was the start of a long, protracted battle to end segregation in the state. Lewis, like many others, felt fear. He did not know how the Black and White workers would get along or how locals, especially those living in rural areas, would treat them.
Two White students from New York, Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman, and a local Black Mississippian, James Chaney, were among the first wave of Mississippi Summer volunteers. The three men disappeared on June 21, 1964, after investigating the burning of a church in Philadelphia, Mississippi. The authorities in Philadelphia refused to cooperate with Lewis and other SNCC members. An attorney claimed that the boys went on a short vacation and would be coming back soon. But this was a lie—the Ku Klux Klan had killed the three men, and authorities took six weeks to find their bodies.
After the murder of their colleagues, the Mississippi Project took even greater measures to keep their volunteers and SNCC staffers safe, including installing two-way radios in all staff cars and making trips at night. The project also established Freedom Schools, which taught reading, African American history, typing, arithmetic, foreign languages, and civics classes—subjects not typically available to Black Mississippians. The project also set up a network of Freedom Clinics, which provided healthcare to local children and adults.
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that summer too, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national origin, sex, religion, race, and color. President Johnson followed through on the vow he had made to the Black community after Kennedy’s assassination. Lewis was heartened by the new law, but he was also worried that its passage would lead many to believe that the work to desegregate the South was over. His fear turned out to be correct. After the summer of 1964, the number of volunteers attracted to the SNCC’s efforts dropped off. The Ku Klux Klan also ramped up attacks on civil rights workers.
The turning point for the civil rights movement and for SNCC was the refusal to seat the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP). Founded in April 1964, the MFDP was open to all Mississippians regardless of race, with the goal of encouraging Black Mississippians to participate in the political process while simultaneously challenging Mississippi’s all-White Democratic delegation.
After the election, however, the Mississippi Democratic Party illegally barred the MFDP from the state’s due political process. Nevertheless, 48 MFDP delegates, the majority of whom were Black men and women, arrived at the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, believing they stood a chance at taking over some of Mississippi’s Democratic seats. To Lewis, the 48 delegates “represented the very best of American democracy” (283) because they showed the power of grassroots politics.
When the convention refused to seat MFDP delegates, the MFDP, Lewis, and the broader Black and civil rights community challenged the seating of the Democratic state party, believing the law and convention were on their side. Aided by civil rights lawyers, including Joe Rauh, who helped draft legal briefs and gain commitments from other Democratic Party delegations across the US, MFDP delegates presented their case to the National Democratic Party’s Credentials Committee. Rauh introduced MFDP’s case by telling “committee members that they would hear that day the ‘story of tragedy and terror in Mississippi’” (287). Fannie Lou Hamer gave the most powerful testimony, describing her experience as a Black woman in Mississippi. Her testimony brought some to tears.
Fearful that the controversial convention would cost him the whole South in the upcoming election, President Johnson cut into the broadcast of Fannie Lou’s testimony with a spur-of-the-moment live address. He then appointed an emergency subcommittee chaired by Minnesota Attorney General Walter Mondale to address the situation. The subcommittee, under Johnson’s instruction, proposed a compromise: two “at-large” seats for MFDP and the full seating of the Mississippi Democratic Party. The MFDP refused to accept this compromise.
By the end of 1964, the “SNCC was shaking at its very roots, fragmenting and threatening to fall apart under its own weight” (300). Lewis believed the biggest problems for the organization were the loss of a guiding principle (i.e., unity around nonviolence) and the loss of faith that members had in one another. Infighting, rumors, and suspicion now embroiled the organization. Lewis no longer trusted all SNCC members, believing that some, like Stokely Carmichael, were stirring up things behind Lewis’s back. In December 1964, Lewis wrote an open letter to the SNCC membership attempting to clear the air, ending his letter with “Uhuru” (309), which means freedom in Swahili.
To unify SNCC, “and turn our energy and passions not on one another but on a deserving target” (312), Lewis turned their attention to Selma. He traveled to the city to participate in a protest for voting rights and was subsequently arrested. His arrest led a local judge to issue an injunction, which forbade public gatherings of more than three people in the city. The injunction clearly meant to prevent Lewis and the SNCC from holding protests and voter registration drives. Their lawyers spent the rest of 1964 trying to dissolve the injunction.
Around this time, Dr. King’s SCLC was choosing its next target. Since voting rights were now the focus of the entire CRM, the SCLS decided to also turn their sights on Selma despite the fact that the SNCC had strong feelings against the SCLC getting involved. Because the SNCC had been working in the city for over a year to register its residents, they felt the SCLC was once again swooping in after the SNCC had worked hard to lay the groundwork. Lewis understood these frustrations. However, he did not believe that SNCC should stand in the way of SCLC because the residents of Selma had asked Dr. King for help.
The civil rights protests in Selma began on January 18, 1965. Dr. King and Lewis led 400 residents from Brown’s Chapel to the city’s courthouse steps. At the courthouse, a mob confronted them, including the founder and chairman of the American Nazi Party. The protestors waited. Lewis reminisces that people often forget that “during the civil rights era were the days and days of uneventful protests that took place outside these courtrooms and jails” (320). After the first day of relative peace, the police began making arrests during subsequent protests. After Dr. King was eventually arrested, he wrote his famous “Letters from the Selma Jail” (325) to inspire interest in a federal voting rights bill.
The organizers in Selma planned a night march, which was unusual—the cover of darkness could hide too much. The group of marchers barely left the church when police began beating them. One young Black man, Jimmie Lee Jackson, died after police shot him in the stomach for trying to protect his mother from being beaten. During his funeral procession, James Bevel suggested that the group take Jimmie Lee’s body from Selma to Montgomery to confront Alabama’s governor. While they buried Jimmie Lee, Bevel’s idea of a march to Montgomery took hold.
Several events led activists to a “crisis of spirit, a crisis of faith in the fundamental promises and premises of the American system” (282).
One issue was the continued radicalization of activists. Lewis emphasizes that the brutality of racial violence in Mississippi took a toll on all the field workers who were part of Freedom Summer: “No one who went into Mississippi that summer came out the same” (281). They started the project idealistic and full of hope, but ended it hardened from the hatred they saw and experienced; a psychiatrist “concluded that the symptoms displayed by almost all these young men and women were those of shell-shocked soldiers” (281). However, these experiences created a schism between the Black and White volunteers. For many Black volunteers, it was difficult to not feel hostility toward the White volunteers, equating them in with the racist White community behind the violence. The radical arm of the CRM continued to swell, while more and more people dropped out of the movement altogether.
Another key problem was that many in the Black community lost faith in the American political system after the Democratic National Convention refused to seat the MFDP. The initial electoral success of the MFDP suggested “that the system would work, they system would listen, the system would respond” (291). Yet, the refusal to seat the MFDP delegates showed many Black Americans that the system did not work, at least for them. President Johnson’s intervention, and his proposed compromise increased the growing generational rifts in the Black community. Lewis and other young activists strongly opposed the compromise for “the simple fact that too many people had worked too hard for too long to be told that they would not be treated as honorary guests and nothing more” (289). Yet, older civil rights leaders, including Dr. King, and White allies like Rauh urged the MFDP to support the compromise. Civil rights workers felt cheated and grew radicalized. Mistrust of “White liberals” (292) dramatically increased.
One final problem was movement infighting. Rather than working for common cause, the SNCC now acted out of dislike of Dr. King and SCLC—this was why the SNCC chose not to participate in the Selma-to-Montgomery March. To Lewis, this refusal went against the core of SNCC’s mission, which was to create grassroots movements to fight for justice. Since the people of Selma had organized the march themselves, Lewis believed that all civil rights organizations, and especially the SNCC, should stand with the Selma marchers. By rejecting this march, the SNCC also rejected Lewis, which is something they quite literally would do in the next section when they chose another chairman.
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