Tyranny of the Minority: Why American Democracy Reached the Breaking Point

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2023

A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.

Download PDF

Summary

Background

Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Introduction

Chapters 1-2

Chapters 3-4

Chapters 5-6

Chapters 7-8

Key Figures

Themes

Symbols & Motifs

Important Quotes

Essay Topics

Tools

Beta

Discussion Questions

Chapters 1-2Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 1 Summary: “Fear of Losing”

In Chapter 1, Levitsky and Ziblatt focus on one democratic norm: the ability to accept defeat and peacefully relinquish power. This norm is the foundation of modern democracy.

In 1801, the US “became the first republic in history to experience an electoral transfer of power from one political party to another” (15). The first two political parties in the US were the Federalist Party and the Democratic-Republic Party. Both political parties originated during George Washington’s first presidential administration (1789-1793). Alexander Hamilton founded the Federalist Party. Federalists supported a strong federal government. The Democratic-Republic Party emerged as an opposition party believing in state sovereignty and individual rights. Leaders of this party included Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.

Initially, Federalists held power from 1797-1801 under President John Adams, who succeeded George Washington. Federalists believed only they stood as protectors of the still-emerging US. They viewed Democratic-Republicans as traitors. Thomas Jefferson, a Democratic-Republican, beat John Adams in the election of 1800. Levitsky and Ziblatt note that “mutual distrust, fueled by partisan animosity, imperiled prospects for a peaceful transfer of power” (17). Federalists considered subverting the election results to maintain power. After hearing this news, Democratic-Republicans contemplated using state militias to resist. This election nearly triggered a constitutional crisis. Ultimately, the Adams administration transferred power to Jefferson’s administration. Doing so put the US on a path towards democracy because the major political parties at the time learned to lose elections.

Levitsky and Ziblatt underscore that democracy only takes root once political parties peacefully accept election losses. Once this occurs, political power alternates between powers, something which people take for granted in democracies. Two conditions enable the norm of drama-free transfers of power to take hold. The first condition is that political parties accept defeat because they believe they can win future elections. The second condition is the belief that losing elections will not cause calamity.

Levitsky and Ziblatt turn to how political parties turn away from democracy. Fear is a key driver. The authors note that “accepting defeat gets harder when parties are fearful—fearful that they won’t be able to win again in the future or, more fundamentally, that they will lose more than just an election” (23). This existential fear can halt the emergence of democracies, as was the case in early 20th- century Germany. It can also cause political parties in established democracies to turn away from democracy. The authors use Thailand in the 21st century as an example.

Chapter 2 Summary: “The Banality of Authoritarianism”

In Chapter 2, Levitsky and Ziblatt start by exploring three basic things that loyal democrats must always do. Loyal democrats are politicians committed to upholding democratic norms. First, loyal democrats always accept election outcomes, regardless of whether their party wins or loses. Second, loyal democrats must reject violence as a means of staying in power. Finally, loyal democrats must denounce and break with antidemocratic forces, even within their own political party.

When loyal democrats face violent or antidemocratic forces within their own party, they follow four rules. First, they remove the extremists from their political party, even when this upsets their political base. Second, loyal democrats do not maintain public or private connections with previous allies who now engage in antidemocratic behavior. Third, loyal democrats always condone political violence, even when it is committed by allies or members within their ranks. They also hold those responsible before the law. Finally, loyal democrats will join forces with rival political parties to defend democracy, helping defeat extremists.

The authors next contrast loyal democrats with semi-loyal democrats. They define semi-loyal democrats as “political insiders who appear to abide by democracy’s rules but quietly assault them” (41). Semi-loyal democrats are mainstream politicians. They do not uphold any of the four rules outlined above. They tolerate extremists rather than expelling them from their party. Semi-loyalists might distance themselves publicly from antidemocratic extremists, but they maintain private support for them. They do not condemn political violence or hold perpetrators accountable. Finally, they refuse to broaden their coalitions and work with ideological rivals.

There are two ways that semi-loyal democrats kill a democracy. First, they protect and legitimize antidemocratic forces. Second, they use constitutional hardball tactics, which use the law to weaken democracy. There are four ways to do this. First, semi-loyalists exploit unwritten rules or norms. These norms fill in gaps in laws, but are not technically legally-binding themselves. Second, semi-loyalists excessively or unduly use laws “designed to be used sparingly, or only under exceptional circumstances” (52), like presidential pardons or impeachments. Third, semi-loyal democrats selectively enforce laws with the aim of targeting their rivals. Finally, they create new laws. On the surface these laws seem impartial, but they are designed to target opposition. This is a form of “lawfare.”

Chapters 1-2 Analysis

In this section, Levitsky and Ziblatt explore the rise and fall of democracies, which serves as important groundwork for the rest of their argument. Democracies can only emerge when political parties learn to peacefully accept the transfer of power. Political parties’ inability to accept election losses also leads to the weakening of democratic institutions.

Levitsky and Ziblatt support this assertion through both historical and contemporary examples. They first examine how democracy failed to emerge in 20th-century Germany. During this time, a small circle of elite bureaucrats, industrialists, and aristocrats controlled Germany. They maintained political power by using a voting system that gave more votes to wealthy people. The country’s growing middle class demanded political reform. The elite feared losing their dominant position in society. As a result, they routinely blocked efforts to reform the government, preventing Germany from democratizing.

The authors use Thailand in the 21st century to show how fear can weaken democratic institutions in established democracies. Like the historical example, the elite in Thailand feared changes to the status quo. They had enjoyed political power, wealth, and status for many years. As a result, they did not try to improve the lives of those living in rural Thailand, who lived in abject poverty. The political party of these higher-status Thais began to lose elections once the opposition party started to improve the lives of those living in rural Thailand. The rise of a middle class in rural Thailand, who demanded full participation in the country’s political and social life, began to shift the country’s power structure. Fearing this change, since it meant the loss of their own status, the elite Thais turned away from democracy.

Levitsky and Ziblatt use both historical and contemporary examples to underscore how the peaceful transfer of power is a foundational element of democracy. If it was not a democratic norm, then it would not cut across time and space. These examples also show how the inability for political parties to accept election losses is extremely dangerous to a democracy. Many readers, especially in the West, might still believe that old and wealthy democracies are safe from authoritarianism; however, the examples in Chapter 2 show how fear can both prevent the emergence of democracies and turn an established democracy towards authoritarianism. Levitsky and Ziblatt lay the groundwork for the idea that they begin to explore in future chapters: The Republican Party’s inability to accept election losses puts American democracy in grave danger, reflecting The Changing Nature of the Republican Party.

In addition to fear, constitutional hardball also weakens democracies. Constitutional hardball is why democratic backsliding occurs gradually. People do not realize changes are happening, since semi-loyalists couch the changes as legal measures. Levitsky and Ziblatt underscore that “the cumulative effect of these seemingly innocuous measures is to make it harder for opponents of the government to compete—and thereby entrench the incumbents in power” (59).

To support this assertion, the authors discuss the contemporary example of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, arguing that he dismantled the country’s democracy and created an autocracy through constitutional hardball. Beginning in 2010 with the return of the Fidesz party, Orbán and other Fidesz politicians slowly began to follow the constitutional hardball rulebook. As one example, Fidesz used lawfare, including amending the constitution through the “normal” parliamentary process, to remove 274 judges that were not affiliated or supportive of the political party. The parliamentary process was not actually normal since Fidesz had a supermajority, enabling it to change laws at whim. In essence, Orbán purged and packed the courts through legal means, pulling off an unconstitutional coup by couching the act as constitutional.

The authors also continue to explore The Antiquated Elements of American Democracy, in particular the Electoral College. The authors spend a substantial amount of time later in the book detailing how and why the Electoral College is bad for American democracy. However, they start to hint at this idea in Chapter 2. The Electoral College nearly caused a constitutional crisis within just a few years of the birth of the US. In the Election of 1800, the two Democratic-Republican candidates each received the same number of electoral votes. Federalists contemplated how to use this opportunity to stay in power. If they had gone through with their ideas, a civil war likely would have broken out. Levitsky and Ziblatt use this example to demonstrate how the Electoral College has undermined American democracy for over 200 years.