77 pages • 2 hours read
Adam GrantA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more. For select classroom titles, we also provide Teaching Guides with discussion and quiz questions to prompt student engagement.
Grant begins with an anecdote about a group of elite firefighters in the 1940s. In 1949, 15 smokejumpers parachuted into Mann Gulch to extinguish a forest fire started by lightning the day before. The fire soon became uncontainable, and the foreman, Wagner Dodge, ordered them to retreat. When escape seemed unlikely, Dodge began burning the grass in front of them and called his crew toward his fire. Thinking he was crazy, they continued trying to outrun the fire.
What his crew didn’t realize was that Dodge had created an escape fire. He burned out a small area, which deprived the fire of fuel, and huddled in the clearing while the fire passed over him. Of the remaining smokejumpers, only two managed to outrun the fire. Dodge hadn’t been taught how to create an escape fire—it was pure improvisation. The method was so strange to his crew that they were unable to rethink their assumptions.
Grant argues that Dodge survived due to his mental fitness. He distinguishes this from intelligence, suggesting that mental fitness includes not only the ability to think and learn, but the ability to rethink and unlearn. For example, common wisdom suggests that changing your answers on a test will likely hurt your score; however, studies show that students are more likely to change their answers from wrong to right. He argues that just being willing to consider changing your answers leads to higher scores.
Grant points to another moment in Mann Gulch that also shows a missed opportunity to rethink. The smokejumpers did not discard their heavy equipment as they tried to escape. While lightening your load might seem obvious, Grant points out that firefighters rely on their equipment; hence, it was harder for them to realize they could discard it as they fled because as a firefighter, your equipment is part of your identity.
Finally, Grant notes that the most tragic part of Mann Gulch is that the fire didn’t need to be fought in the first place. We’ve known since the 1880s, at least, that wildfires are healthy for forests; however, it was only in 1978 that the Forest Service ended its policy that all fires must be extinguished. The Mann Gulch fire was in a remote, uninhabited location and could have simply run its course—an inability to rethink policy based on updated science ultimately cost Dodge’s smokejumpers their lives.
Grant acknowledges that most of our decisions and opinions are not life or death. However, he argues that we frequently make our opinions our identities in the same way, and thus fail to rethink things in ways that would ultimately help us.
Grant begins this chapter with the story of Mike Lazaridis, the founder of Blackberry. Lazaridis was a technological wiz from a young age, developing innovative products in a variety of fields, but the Blackberry smartphone was his crowning achievement, accounting for nearly half of the US smartphone market by 2009 (16). However, Blackberry soon took a nosedive. Grant argues that we anthropomorphize companies in situations like this, claiming that they failed to adapt, but he suggests that we should instead think of adaptation as something people do. In this case, Lazaridis was unable to rethink.
Grant claims that “we need to question our beliefs more readily than ever before” (16); however, beliefs tend to become entrenched over time, even when we can recognize when others may need to rethink their assumptions.
According to Phil Tetlock, Grant writes, when we think and talk, we tend to alternately adopt the mindsets of preachers, prosecutors, and politicians--preacher mode when we try to protect and promote our ideals, prosecutor mode when we try to prove others wrong, and politician mode when we lobby for others’ approval. However, we become so wrapped up in these modes that we don’t rethink our own ideas in the process.
In contrast, Grant suggests that we should adopt the mindset of scientists. Scientists must doubt what they know, be curious about what they don’t know, and update their views based on new data. Grant argues that being a scientist can also be a frame of mind through which we analyze and rethink our own ideas in order to make better decisions.
In one study, a group of European researchers took a group of struggling entrepreneurs and trained some of them to think about their startups like scientists. The entrepreneurs in the group that had been taught to think like scientists pivoted from their original ideas more than twice as often, and as a result, averaged more than $12,000 in revenue over the next year, compared to the control group’s average of less than $300 in revenue (20).
Grant notes that these findings run counter to what we usually believe to be hallmarks of strong leadership. We believe good leaders are strong-minded, clear-sighted, decisive, and firm. However, research suggests that the best strategists tend to be slow to make final decisions, preferring to take their time and weigh all the evidence first.
Further, he points out that even scientists often do not think like scientists, instead choosing to preach, prosecute, or politick for their own pet ideas. One case in point was Mike Lazaridis, who was thinking like an innovative scientist when he created the Blackberry. However, even as the iPhone gained popularity in the late 2000s, Lazaridis stuck with his conviction that consumers didn’t want to carry a computer in their pockets, leading to Blackberry’s downfall.
Evidence suggests that the smarter someone is, counterintuitively, the more difficult it might be for them to update their beliefs. Mental dexterity requires not just the ability to rethink your beliefs, but the willingness to do so. Grant chalks this up to confirmation bias, or the tendency to see what we expect to see in the data; and desirability bias, or the tendency to see what we want to see in the data. Grant also proposes the “I’m not biased” bias, in which people believe they’re more objective than others, something that smart people are more likely to believe. “The brighter you are,” Grant writes, “the harder it can be to see your own limitations” (25).
To think like a scientist, Grant claims we need to be actively open-minded. We need to search for reasons why we might be wrong, and we must actively revise our beliefs based on what we learn. In other modes of thinking, changing one’s mind is a mark of weakness rather than strength. He acknowledges that there are times when it might be beneficial to preach, prosecute, or politick, but that in scientist mode, we gain mental agility.
Grant believes that rethinking happens in cycles. First we recognize what we don’t know, which opens us up to doubt. We then become curious about what we’re missing, which leads us to new discoveries—which reinforces just how much we don’t know. This process is in contrast to the “overconfidence cycle,” which works in much the same way, only to entrench already held beliefs rather than open us up to new ones.
To Grant, Mike Lazaridis was trapped in an overconfidence cycle. Because he had been so successful, he was unable to recognize where his limitations might be. However, Grant notes that similar limitations existed in Apple, as well. Steve Jobs was initially against the iPhone, and it was his employees who convinced him to develop it (29). The key to their success was that they were able to demonstrate to Jobs that they could develop a phone his way, thereby retaining Apple’s identity in the process. Grant posits that reinforcing such similarities helps to overcome resistance to change and wonders what the smartphone market might look like if Lazaridis’s employees had ultimately been able to convince him of the same.
The Prologue and first chapter establish the core principles of the book as well as the four key modes that will serve as a larger framework for Grants arguments and analyses. Grant makes his argument through two main methods: first, through archetypes that describe modes of thinking and being that are either helpful or detrimental; and second, through framing anecdotes that illustrate those archetypes in action. Each chapter includes several smaller anecdotes that help illustrate more specific concepts, but the figures that frame the chapters serve as touchstones that he continually returns to, and as such are important to be familiar with.
The Prologue is framed through the anecdote of the Mann Gulch wildfire. While tragic, the wildfire demonstrates three different kinds of rethinking that we’ll see throughout the text. First, Dodge’s escape fire demonstrates a kind of rethinking that emphasizes on-the-spot innovation; for Grant, this shows that we can’t always slow down, but must sometimes accelerate our thinking in order to overcome obstacles. Second, the firefighters’ inability to discard their equipment is an example of entrenched thinking. In theory, the firefighters should have already known that they’d be able to run faster without their heavy equipment and yet couldn’t make that connection on the spot. Finally, the late policy change demonstrates how entrenched thinking acts on a societal level, as Grant notes that we had known for at least a century prior that wildfires like the Mann Gulch fire can simply burn. As a result, the Mann Gulch anecdote encapsulates a variety of kinds of entrenched thinking in one tragic example.
While the Prologue emphasizes the larger themes of the book, the first chapter introduces the four archetypes that will recur throughout. If there are four key terms to take away from Think Again, they are the four modes of thinking introduced here: preaching, prosecuting, politicking, and scientific analyzing. While Grant places scientific thinking in opposition to the first three, which for his purposes here are detrimental, it’s important to note that Grant himself claims that all three can be beneficial at different times. His claim is that we typically do these to the exclusion of scientific thinking, which in turn prevents us from avoiding easily avoidable mistakes that might seem obvious from the outside.
The example that drives this chapter is Blackberry’s founder, Mike Lazaridis. Grant is careful to note that even very smart people—even scientists—often do not think like scientists. Lazaridis not only demonstrated technological brilliance from a young age but turned that into a company so successful that at one point, it represented the entire smartphone market. However, in a few short years, Blackberry imploded so spectacularly that it became a warning rather than a success story. Grant argues that Lazaridis is a prime example of the dangers of sticking too rigidly to our beliefs rather than being willing to rethink those beliefs—even though Lazaridis saw early on that the iPhone was the first truly innovative competitor to the Blackberry and despite his employees’ arguments for many of the iPhone’s features stretching as far back as the early 1990s, Lazaridis insisted that his understanding of the smartphone market was the correct one.
However, Grant notes that Apple’s Steve Jobs, despite his reputation for innovation, was almost as stubborn, making for an interesting juxtaposition. Jobs notoriously hated phones, and like Lazaridis, didn’t understand why Apple would do anything to undermine the success of the iPod. Ultimately, Jobs’s employees were able to convince him that developing a phone would be a smart bet, and Grant argues that they were successful because they were able to show Jobs that they could do so without fundamentally changing Apple’s identity—i.e., instead of creating a phone first, they would put a Mac into a phone, keeping Apple’s identity as a computer company first. By keeping Apple’s core identity at the fore, they convinced Jobs to rethink his earlier assumptions and ultimately take a chance on the iPhone.
By Adam Grant
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