The Subjection of Women

Mill’s The Subjection of Women is a persuasive-argument essay that presents the problem of women’s oppression, undermines the opposition via appeals to logic (logos) and emotion (pathos), and concludes with the benefits his solution (gender equality) would provide. As this text was first printed in the 19th century by a small publisher, Mill’s intended audience would have been men like himself: highly educated, upper class, and possessing the power to make substantial changes in society. His formal, academic tone is in keeping with the philosophical treatises of his time, but his progressive ideas about Nature Versus Society and the Gender Hierarchy were far ahead of those held by most of his peers.

The structure of Mill’s essay is highly logical and methodical, progressing from thesis, to counterargument, and finally to impact of solution. Mill begins with a summation of his core claim:

[T]he principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and […] it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other (2).

This thesis incorporates utilitarian ideals of morality, societal advancement, and individual liberty, arguing not only that patriarchy harms women but also that it impedes societal progress—a much-cherished ideal in Victorian England, despite its frequent traditionalism. Freeing the “Angel in the House” would therefore have practical benefits that extend far beyond women.

Mill identifies his primary opposition as “universal opinion,” the widespread belief in innate temperamental differences between women and men, as well as the support for the “separate spheres”—domestic versus public—that those differences supposedly gave rise to. However, as Mill details, societal institutions construct and impose characteristics such as passivity and submission on women from the time they are young children, even creating laws inhibiting women’s entrance into the public sphere. If these characteristics were indeed “natural,” Mill reasons, societal institutions would not have to work so diligently to ensure women remain in the home.

To support his argument, Mill relies on various allusions to important historical figures and events, providing precedents and examples that readers of the time would have known well. Mill’s most timely allusion is perhaps his comparison of women’s oppression (particularly marriage) to slavery, which England abolished in 1807. While this comparison may be problematic to 21st-century readers, the parallels between the two institutions were obvious to Mill. In each case, people are forced to obey to stay alive and endure labor without financial reward, all while lacking any say in a society that dictates every aspect of their lives. Furthermore, this allusion emphasizes the hypocrisy of Victorian England regarding gender norms: Mill suggests that it is morally incoherent to claim that owning a human being is unjust while treating wives as their husbands’ property.

Mill also alludes to Ancient Greece, Rome, and the Bible—the cultural pillars of a Victorian education. However, Mill argues that while Greece, Rome, and the Bible are the foundations upon which modern Western democracy has been built, that does not mean the work is complete. Rather, society should reflect upon the moral correctness of classical and biblical teachings and institute reforms accordingly. Mill points out, “We are told that St. Paul said, ‘Wives, obey your husbands:’ but he also said, ‘Slaves, obey your masters.’ It was not St. Paul’s business, […] to incite any one to rebellion against existing laws” (85). Mill suggests that it is in keeping with the New Testament’s promulgation of the spirit of the law rather than the letter to reevaluate traditional structures to ensure moral good exists. In the case of women’s status, Mill suggests, consideration of such structures will reveal them to be outdated and unjust. These allusions remind Mill’s Victorian readers that society advances through questioning and reform, not complacency and an overreliance on tradition.

Despite his progressivism, Mill shares some of the biases of his time, including suspicion of non-Christian religions. Mills uses Islam and Hinduism as cautionary tales, arguing, “[Christianity] has been the religion of the progressive portion of mankind, and Islamism, Brahminism, &c., have been those of the stationary portions; or rather (for there is no such thing as a really stationary society) of the declining portions” (85). Here, Mill implies that Christian England represents an objectively superior culture. Essentially, Mill warns that foregoing gender equality makes English society no better than the “inferior” cultures it has colonized—notably, under the guise of spreading (English notions of) civilization. Additionally, while Mill spends much of his essay unpacking stereotypes of women to show that they are the products of social constructs rather than biological imperatives, he nonetheless echoes the Victorian belief that women are morally superior to men. More specifically, he argues that women are less violent, which he attributes to the fact that they themselves are often the victims of violence. In other words, Mill assigns women their traditional role as moral guardians, though he suggests that it is nurture rather than nature that qualifies them for it.

Overall, Mill’s essay represents a persuasive essay grounded in reason and logic that subverts the prevailing biases against women during the Victorian era. Concluding his essay by highlighting the many benefits women’s freedom would bring to society highlights Mill’s commitment to liberal utilitarianism: He seeks the highest moral good for the greatest number of England’s citizens.