The Prince

The very brief opening chapter begins by stating that “all states, all powers, that have held and hold power over men have been and are either republics or principalities” (1). Those states which classify as principalities are either hereditary or new. Hereditary principalities are ones in which the ruling family has been long established. New principalities can be either entirely new as a whole or newly annexed territories added to an already-established principality. Machiavelli argues that new principalities are acquired either by arms, fortune, or ability and that such dominions are either accustomed to live under the rule of a prince or live in freedom.

At the beginning of Chapter 2, Machiavelli offers the disclaimer that he will leave out all discussion on republics because he has written about them at length in other works. He also describes the focus for his work, indicating that he will discuss “how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved” (3). Traditional hereditary principalities, according to the author, are easier for the prince to maintain because the people are already accustomed to the ruling family, and all that is needed from him is not to transgress the customs of his ancestors. Adding the warning that extraordinary vices can cause him to be hated, Machiavelli argues that the hereditary prince will likely be more loved because he has less cause and less necessity to offend. The expectation that the hereditary prince be loved is important because “the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another” (3).

Whereas hereditary principalities are easy for a prince to hold, difficulties arise with new principalities. Chapter 3 focuses entirely on mixed principalities, meaning territories that are annexed by a prince and added to his existing principality. The primary problem in this scenario comes is that people naturally want to change rulers in hopes of bettering themselves and willingly take up arms against the ruler. Regardless of how strong a prince’s military may be, seizing new territory also requires the goodwill of natives who want a new ruler. If those natives who aided you are not satisfied, they will then be willing to take up arms against the new prince. Therefore, annexing a new territory may result in making enemies of all those harmed in the conquest and all of those who supported it but remain unsatisfied.

Machiavelli points out that annexed territories are easier to hold if they are of the same country and language as the established state. This is especially true when the annexed territory is not accustomed to self-government and the customs are similar to the established state. Two considerations in successfully holding such annexed states are that the family of the previous prince be destroyed completely and that their laws and taxes are not altered. On the other hand, when the annexed state differs in language and customs, great energy is required to hold it. In this case, the prince should begin residing in the annexed state because he can quickly respond to disorder, and it will be easier to protect from invaders. Machiavelli argues that “he who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty” (7).

Another suggestion is to send colonists there rather than armies because it is less costly and offends fewer people. Those in the annexed state who are offended by the colonists are also easier to rule by fear and intimidation. Machiavelli also recommends that the prince protect the less powerful neighbors in the region while weakening the more powerful ones. This is so that the stronger powers do not gain a footing there and are thus welcomed as invaders by the citizens who are unhappy with the prince. Similarly, the prince should be sure to deal with potential future challenges promptly and decisively to his dominance in the same way that he deals with the present challenges because it will be too late otherwise.

Chapter 4 also pertains to the ability of princes to hold states that he has conquered and annexed. Machiavelli stresses that these principalities can be governed in two different ways: “either by a prince, with a body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favor and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince” (13). In the first example, the prince is the supreme ruler who distributes his appointed ministers to other states to assist him in governing. The people remain loyal to the prince rather than his ministers because they are servants to him. In the second example, the prince is still the supreme ruler, but hereditary nobles, or barons, hold power in certain regions and thus have loyalty from their people.

Machiavelli uses two contemporary examples to illustrate these contrasting styles of governance in principalities. The Turks of the Ottoman Empire obey a supreme ruling sultan who delegates authority to administrators located in the various districts, but they answer only to the sultan and hold little power themselves. In contrast, the king of France must deal with districts that are ruled individually by powerful noble families. With the latter example, the noble oligarchy posed a true threat to the king because they had their own power and ambitions and could turn against the king. With the former example, the sultan’s assistants were far less likely to aid a foreign invader because they held little power. According to the author, systems of governance like that of France are easy to enter and conquer but difficult to hold, and the reverse is true for systems of governance like that of the Turks. The historical example of Darius and the Persian Empire, after it was conquered by Alexander, is offered by Machiavelli as one similar to the Turks.

In Chapter 5, Machiavelli explains that in order to successfully hold annexed states that are accustomed to living in freedom under their own laws, three steps must be taken: “the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you” (17). The theory espoused here is based on the premise that states which are accustomed to living under a prince do not know how to govern themselves. They are so used to obedience that all the new ruler must do is extinguish the old ruling family entirely so the people become loyal to him. However, with states that were formerly republics and accustomed to freedom, there is danger to the new ruler because the people never forget the freedoms that they once had and will seek vengeance if great changes are made to laws and customs.

In Chapter 6, Machiavelli focuses on principalities which are entirely new, meaning that they are not of the hereditary or annexed variety. These are states which have been conquered not by a hereditary ruler or by an already-existing ruler, but by a new prince doing so through either his own ability or through fortune. Machiavelli stresses that “he who has relied least on fortune is established the strongest” (19). These new princes who rise up through their own ability—which the author refers to as innovators—typically acquire a principality with difficulty but keep it with ease. This is because people are naturally resistant to change, and the prince “has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new” (20). In other words, even the people who may desire a new ruler are fearful of the changes that a new prince will certainly install. An important aspect concerning such innovators is whether they can rely on themselves, with their own arms, to force people to support the new order. Using Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus as examples, Machiavelli argues that “all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed” (21).

Whereas the private citizen who becomes prince through his own ability and his own arms has difficulty in conquering but ease in holding a state, the reverse is true for the citizen who becomes prince through fortune or through the favor and arms of others. The prince who rises up purely through good fortune does not have the knowledge requisite for the position, and “they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful” (23). Machiavelli uses Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia as examples of these two contrasting paths to becoming prince. Through ability and fortune. Francesco Sforza rose from private citizen to the Duke of Milan. Although he became Duke with great difficulty, he held his principality with little trouble. Cesare Borgia, on the other hand, acquired his state through the influence of his father, Alexander VI, and maintained it well but lost it when his father’s influence declined.

Machiavelli uses the metaphor of rapidly-growing natural things that are only successful by having a solid foundation. This represent the idea that a new prince must also lay his foundations and be prepared. As pointed out, Borgia did lay out his foundations well and prepare himself, but he suffered from extremely bad luck. Although Borgia overcame most of the common pitfalls that come to princes who rise to power through the blessing and arms of others, he came to ruin due to his poor decision in the election of Pope Julius II, who in the past had been an enemy of his family.

Another path to becoming prince is through wickedness, which could mean crime and even outright murder. Machiavelli begins the chapter mentioning two ways that a person can rise from a private citizen to prince, wickedness being one and through the favor of his fellow citizens being the other. He argues that neither can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius and that the latter, resulting in civic principalities, will be discussed later. To illustrate the ways in which wickedness can be used to obtain a principality, Machiavelli provides two examples: Agathocles, who rose from a low and abject position in life to become Praetor of Syracuse and eventually its king, and Oliverotto of Fermo, who was left an orphan at birth but rose to become a military leader and ultimately prince.

Agathocles, who led an infamous life while rising up the military ranks, assembled a meeting with the senate of Syracuse and then gave orders for his soldiers to kill them. With all of the city’s richest elite dead, he seized the city for himself and held it comfortably. Oliverotto of Fermo obtained his principality in much the same way. He ordered his soldiers to kill all the guests, including the uncle who raised him, at a banquet held in his honor. He then made himself the ruler of Fermo and held it until Cesare Borgia ironically murdered him in the exact same scenario. Machiavelli closes the chapter by suggesting that when such evil acts are used to become a prince, the usurper “ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily” (34). He further suggests that the prince should then win the people over with material benefits after committing such atrocities. 

The second way in which a private citizen becomes a prince without the aid of fortune or the arms of others is through the favor of his fellow citizens. These are called civic principalities, and one can become ruler of such a state either through the support of the people or the support of the nobles. Machiavelli states that neither genius nor fortune is required in this case but rather a “happy shrewdness” (35). He points out that two distinct types of people exist in all cities: common people and nobles. From this comes a unique dichotomy because the people do not want to be ruled or oppressed by the nobles, but ruling and oppressing the people is precisely what the nobles want. From these contrasting visions, according to the author, comes three possible results: a principality, self-government, or anarchy.

A principality is created either by the nobles promoting one of their own to be ruler so that they can continue to oppress, or by the people promoting one of their own to rule so that they can resist the oppression. Machiavelli argues that a prince can never satisfy the nobles when he acts honorably and fairly because they have their own ambition and see themselves as equal. But he can satisfy the people because their objective of wanting only to avoid oppression is “more righteous” (35). A prince cannot secure himself against the people as easily as he can against the nobles because the people are greater in number, but he does run the risk of being abandoned by the people. Therefore, if a prince rises through the favor of the people, he should work to keep them friendly to him. When a prince rises through the favor of the nobles, he should seek to win the people over by protecting them. 

In Chapter 10, Machiavelli examines what he considers to be the primary way in which the strength of a principality should be measured. Such a measurement boils down to whether “a prince has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of others” (39). To clarify, Machiavelli writes that he considers a prince who can raise a sufficient army for defense, “either by abundance of men or money,” as one who is able to support himself with his own resources. A prince who is forced to defend himself by sheltering behind walls rather than meeting the enemy in the field of battle is an example of one who is always in need of others. In the case of the latter, Machiavelli advises that such a prince practice due diligence by stocking provisions and fortifying their towns well.

Another major aspect in regard to the prince who depends on others for security is that he must not only fortify his cities and stock them with provisions; he also must not be hated by his people. Machiavelli argues that “a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself odious, will not be attacked, or if anyone should attack he will only be driven off with disgrace” (40).

The final type of principalities that Machiavelli describes are those which “are sustained by the ancient ordinances of religion” (41). Uniquely, these can be held regardless of how the prince behaves. According to Machiavelli, princes of ecclesiastical states “have states and do not defend them; and they have subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves” (41). Machiavelli concludes the chapter with a discussion concerning how it came to be that ecclesiastical states hold such temporal or secular power now but did not previously. The primary reasons are that popes are in place for a short period of time, and the ruling barons of Rome had previously been able to keep the pontificate weak. This all changed with the rise of Pope Alexander VI, who strengthened the church through money and arms.