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C. Wright MillsA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Americans subscribe to a belief that political power is balanced, with competing, relatively equal interests reaching political compromises. The economy, it is also assumed, functions automatically with multiple and competitive actors. This model of power does not fit the mid-20th -century US. At most, it is a “recognizable, although a confused, statement of the middle levels of power” (244). Indeed, middle level powers, which include the realm of electoral politics, receive undue attention, obscuring the bigger picture view of the top and bottom layers of power. Interest groups, often called pressure groups, are not equal in bargaining power. Rural and urban business is incorporated into the agencies of government or associated with small and powerful cliques. Large corporations, meanwhile, conceal such associations behind a public-relations front to disguise their power.
Balance of power theory focuses mainly on Congress. Members of Congress represent local interests and attempt to placate competing interests in their constituencies. As a result, the members do not adhere to any firm principles. Mills writes that they tend to be mediocre party professionals who manage to accumulate power via their longevity in office. Their campaigns do not address national issues; instead, they trivialize public life through personal attacks on their opponents. The political parties are very weak at the national level and differ only narrowly from one another. In short, there are not responsible parties organizing elections around a national agenda.
Increasingly, Congress does not decide the fundamental issues. The executive branch is ascendant and makes the critical decisions. The lawmaking function itself is shared with administrative agencies of the executive branch, and representatives who seek power form alliances with administrative heads to exert power over other administrators. The executive branch "relegate[s] legislative action—and inaction—to a subordinate role in the making of policy or bends it to the executive will.” (258) Such executive supremacy results in the declining power of professional politicians and the irrelevance of the theory of balance.
In the 19th century, the US was a middle-class society; small entrepreneurs played a critical role in the economy. In Mills's time of writing, the mid-20th century, a small number of centralized corporations dominate the economy. The heads of these economic entities are allied with top political leaders in the executive branch. What was once an independent middle class with the ability to shape history became politically and economically dependent on the machinery of the state. A newly-dependent middle class of white-collar workers emerged but has no independent base of power and is not united. Organized labor, which was ascendant in the 1930s, is in decline, and its leaders are not participants in major decisions. Therefore, the political theory of the old liberal society that economic actors face countervailing forces and must compromise is no longer valid. Instead, there exists, above this middle level of politics, a top circle of economic, political, and military actors, “few in number and weighty beyond comparison with the dispersed groups on the middle and lower levels of the power structure” (266). There is no countervailing power to this group. As a result, with the executive branch ascendant, “[a]dministration replaces electoral politics; the maneuvering of cliques replaces the clash of parties” (267).
Institutional changes to the political, economic, and military orders alter the American power structure. Mills identifies four prior epochs in US history and writes during a fifth one. The first took place from the period of the American Revolution through the administration of John Adams. In this period, political institutions were critical, and the individuals of the elite moved easily from top roles in one sector, such as the military, to another, such as politics. The second period took place in the early 19th century and ended with the Civil War. The economic order became ascendant over social status and political power, but no set of individuals controlled centralized power. The elite consisted of a plurality of loosely overlapping groups. After the Civil War, corporate economic power assumed supremacy over political and military power. In this “golden era of the American ruling class” (271), corporations controlled political parties and directed lawmaking. In the 1930s, with the New Deal, a new era began. Political powers challenged corporate ones, ultimately prompting the corporate elite to join the government. Lower-class interests and social legislation were part of the reform movement in this period.
At mid-20th century, a new era emerged. There is a decline of public debate about alternative policies. Indeed, the political sector has lost power, and the military sector is ascendant. With a permanent war economy run by private corporations, which he identifies as military capitalism, the role of political leaders is subordinate. In a weakened system of democracy, there is an “uneasy coincidence of economic, military, and political power” (278).
The members of the power elite are similar to one another. While there is not an aristocracy in the US, its members largely come from the upper class. They tend to have similar codes of conduct, given their common social origins and continued associations. They mingle with one another socially and officially and are “able readily to take over one another’s point of view, always in a sympathetic way” (283). They recognize one another and, therefore, have class consciousness. Mills does not deny that these elite players are honorable, but he insists that they have a particular code of honor. They cannot shed their perspective, steeped as it is in the corporate world. He does not recommend judging these individuals based on their origins but holds them accountable for policy decisions and the consequences of their conduct in office.
As the leading individuals across the three sectors became more similar, they increasingly crossed domains and assumed positions in multiple sectors. The inner core of the elite are those who have held commanding roles at the top of two sectors, such as an admiral who also served as a corporate executive. The liaisons between sectors, such as corporate lawyers and investment bankers, are also included in the elite. At the outermost fringe of the power elite are those who matter to decisions and influence them, even if they are not directly involved in the decision-making process. The fringe melts into the middle power tier. Major decisions are made via intercommunication among the members of the top elite. This is not a conspiracy, as it was formed from institutional and psychological forces. Now that this elite is established, though, it makes plans to advance its interests. Its agenda is a pro-business one that seeks reduced taxes, free trade, and reduced governmental programs. Secrecy, given the permanent military threat, aids this group as well. The professional politician, relegated to the middle level of power, has lost it, as has the citizenry.
The mainstream interpretation of American politics in the mid-20th century was known as pluralism. According to this interpretation, citizens had rights of free speech and association, which they could use to form interest groups. Each person had an eclectic set of interests and was, therefore, better served by interest groups than by political parties, which have platforms and ideologies. For example, someone might be economically conservative and socially liberal. The government, with its three branches and state and federal levels, had multiple points of access for citizens to lobby. The role of government was one of mediation or assistance in the formation of compromises in response to the clashing demands of interest groups. For example, automakers and consumer safety advocates might argue over regulations for the production of vehicles. Importantly, this theory assumes that no interests are excluded from consideration: Even unorganized groups, such as labor in many instances, receive consideration. They are given such consideration because businesses would not want to trigger their organization. In other words, businesses would not push to eliminate the minimum wage, because that could cause workers to form a union. If it is sufficiently threatened, any group has the capability to organize politically. This view of American politics is a benign one, because it is inclusive and assumes that compromise rules.
Mills challenges this interpretation. To the extent that there are compromises and debates in American politics, they are over trivial issues. Congress operates at a middle level of power, which is secondary to the top tier, and pluralist decisions overwhelmingly favor wealthy interests. Narrow economic interests, such as those of particular industries, are much more likely to be organized than broad national interests. Interest groups' power derives from money in the form of campaign contributions, which win donors access to lawmakers.
More importantly, though, the decisions of real consequence, such as the structure of the economy, wages, consumer prices, and military strategy and spending, are made by a power elite largely shielded from public view. The most important choices are presented as a given, a necessity. Politics is, thus, hollowed out; there are not substantive political parties with ideological differences articulating rationales for distinct positions. Rational debates are missing. Instead, the elite tier sells its policies in a manner akin to commercial propaganda. Meaningless noise fills the political sphere, testifying to its declining influence in comparison to executive administrators, corporate leaders, and military elites. Political campaigns are characterized by personal attacks and do not provide voters with meaningful options in public policy.