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ThucydidesA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
“Since we are not to address the people at large, presumably so that we do not have the chance to bamboozle the masses with a single uninterrupted presentation of seductive and unchallenged arguments… [w]e suggest that neither of us make set speeches, but we invite you at any point to criticize and answer any proposition with which you are not happy.”
The Athenian representative begins by suggesting that a direct address to the “masses” would be a foregone victory. Thucydides uses the Athenians’ opening remarks to set the stage for the dramatized dialogue that follows, placing it apart from the larger work from which the excerpt is taken. The ground rules are proposed, and assertion and concession will follow, in a back-and-forth test of logic.
“We have no objection to the reasonable principle of a calm exchange of views, but your military presence… seems at odds with it. In our view you have come to your own preconceived judgement of this discussion. The result is likely to be that if we win the moral argument and so do not submit, we face war; and if we grant your argument, we face servitude.”
“You know as well as we do that when we are talking on the human plane questions of justice only arise when there is equal power to compel: in terms of practicality the dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they must.”
This statement underpins the basic premise of the Political Realism expressed in the dialogue: might makes right. Just prior, the Athenians allude to their defeat of the Persians, or to some slight they might avenge, which would give some credence to the justice of their request. However, they claim that none of these justifications is needed. They are simply acting in their own self-interest.
“(… [S]ince you have put justice to one side and made expediency the basis of discussion)—there is advantage in your preserving the principle of the common good… This principle is proportionately in your interest much more than ours, given the massive retaliation you would face as an example to others should you fall from power.”
Here the Melians, acknowledging that the Athenians are not predisposed to act justly, appeal to their self-interest should they wind up on the receiving end of justice. The Greeks viewed what we call the Golden Rule as a prohibitive. Isocrates, an Athenian rhetorician born just before the outbreak of the war, would later put it thus: “Do not do to others that which angers you when they do it to you.”
“Even if our empire is brought to an end, we are not anxious about the consequences. It is not ruling powers like the Spartans who are vindictive to their defeated enemies… the greater cause for fear is if our own subjects turn on their previous rulers and gain control.”
The Athenians, having been instrumental in the defeat of the Persian empire, have now established one of their own. Athenian imperialism has taken on a life of its own as they vie with Sparta for the leadership of the Greek world: They must continue to expand, as much to secure resources as to demonstrate strength, for their greatest fear is to appear vulnerable to their subjects. Conceding that they may ultimately fall, they therefore seek not to fall from within.
“Since you have diverted us from talk of justice and want us to follow your
doctrine of expediency, we must try again by another route and state our own
interest, which might convince you if it happens to coincide with yours. At present
there are several neutrals: do you want to make enemies of them all?”
Shifting from appeals to a sense of justice, the Melians try to use the Athenians’ own self-interest against them. Not all Greek polities had chosen to side with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League or the Athenians’ Delian League, and it was important that the Athenians did not scare them into the arms of their enemy.
“Surely, then, if such desperate measures are taken by you to preserve your empire, and by your subject slaves to escape it, it would be complete dishonour and cowardice if we who are still free do not go to any lengths rather than submit to slavery.”
Having exhausted all avenues in the recourse to justice (appealing to better nature, warning of the tables turning), and failing to dissuade them from creating more enemies, the Melians here pivot to their own character and assert they must defy Athens out of a sense of honor. Freedom is paramount in their eyes, a sentiment common among the Greek city-states, and ironically what impelled Athens to risk destruction in defying the Persians, rather than peacefully submit.
“You are not in an equal contest, so questions of honour maintained or shame avoided have no relevance. You should be thinking more of your survival, and that means not resisting a force much stronger than you.”
As they asserted earlier in the dialogue, the Athenians see ideals like justice and honor as valid only between equals. In the presence of overwhelming force, the laws of nature supersede those of man, i.e., political realism. However, this belies the Athenians’ own resistance to Persia, as Thucydides no doubt expects the audience to be aware.
“Hope counsels risk. When men with other resources besides hope employ her, she can harm but not destroy. But those who stake their all (and hope is a spendthrift) only recognize her for what she is when they are ruined and she has left them no further chance to act on their realization.”
Justice and honor having been dismissed at this point in the dialogue, the Melians propose to take their chances and resist—a choice the Athenians characterize as foolish. They group fortune together with false hope in divination and oracles as “other such sources of disastrous optimism” (103).
“We believe it of the gods, and we know it for sure of men, that under some permanent compulsion of nature wherever they can rule, they will. We did not make this law; it is already laid down, and we are not the first to follow it; we inherited it as fact, and we shall pass it on as a fact to remain true for ever [sic]; and we follow it in the knowledge that you and anyone else given the same power as us would do the same.”
“But what strikes us is that, though you agreed that this would be a negotiation for your survival, at no point in this long discussion have you said anything which people might take as grounds for thinking that you will survive. Your strongest arguments are all in the future and no more than hopes...”
The Athenians begin their closing arguments by questioning the underlying logic of the Melian assertions. They call attention to the immediacy of the moment to further undercut the Melians’ resolve.
“Often enough men with their eyes still open to what they are in for are lured on by the seductive power of what they call ‘honour’: Victims of a mere word, they deliberately bring on themselves a real and irretrievable disaster, and through their own foolhardiness incur a more shameful loss of honour than pure misfortune would have inflicted.”
Thucydides would have recognized that being impelled to act on behalf of one’s freedom, or “honor” as earlier asserted by the Melians, would be the most compelling argument on their behalf, given the fierce independence of Greek city-states and the Athenians’ own war against Persia. In this instance, however, the Athenians take a different meaning of honor: that which clings to the victor, versus the shame and dishonor of the victim.
“The general rule of success is to stand up to equals, respect superiors, and treat inferiors with moderation.”
The Athenians end their closing arguments by presenting a rule of thumb that frames the entire dialogue. Justice and honor exist only between equals, i.e., Athens and Sparta. The doctrine of political realism therefore dictates that the Melians should defer to the superior force and submit. The entire dialogue was a concession to the Melians, and the end was a foregone conclusion, as stated initially by the Melians themselves.
“Athenians, our original decision has not changed, and we shall not consent in this short time to lose the freedom of a city which has been inhabited for seven hundred years. We shall put our trust in the good fortune from the gods… and for human help we shall look especially to the Spartans, and we shall thus try to save ourselves.”
“Well then, to judge by these deliberations of yours you must be the only men, it seems to us, who think the future is more certain than the evidence of your own eyes, and regard speculation as present fact, as if mere wishing will make it so.”
The Athenians’ final statement is an indictment of the arguments laid out by the Melians, ultimately describing them as lacking all reason and logic.
By Thucydides