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Clayton M. ChristensenA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Over time, companies oversupply the technological improvements demanded by the market, triggering opportunities for customers to reassess their criteria for product preference. This allows entrant firms to leverage disruptive technologies to meet those priorities and become performance-competitive.
In the disk drive industry, when the 5.25-inch and 3.5-inch drives surpassed the market demand for disk capacity, the industry homogenized the two products according to the original criteria for customer preference. The personal computer market turned its attention to a new attribute—physical disk size—which allowed the smaller drive to win over the mainstream product. Later, technology oversupply would trigger another shift in criteria to value drive reliability. Once all of the product attributes have been exhausted, the products are treated as commodities.
Performance oversupply generally has a massive influence on the product life cycle, recalling the product evolution model that tracks the basis of competition across four phases: functionality, reliability, convenience, and price. Every time each phase is satisfied by performance oversupply, it triggers the next phase. Christensen compares this pattern to the industry evolution framework, which sorts customers according to early adopters, early majority, and late majority. These points correspond with the first three phases of product evolution.
The improvements offered by disruptive technologies are characteristically valued by the market in two ways. First, the disruptive product attributes that are rejected by mainstream markets usually create the greatest value in emerging markets. Entrant firms initially see the needs of the established market as a given and fail to see how they are trying to address sustaining technology needs with disruptive components. In this sense, these firms are dealing with a marketing challenge rather than a technological one. Managers must find a market that matches their product attributes, rather than the other way around.
Secondly, disruptive products are naturally more competitive than mainstream products across each phase of the product evolution model. Established firms often overload their products with so many functions that they fail to compete across the other phases of product evolution. Although disruptive innovations are unpredictable by nature, managers can count on these dynamics to guide their strategy design.
Christensen demonstrates his insights by exploring case studies in the accounting software and insulin industries. In the former, software developer Intuit shifted the bulk of its revenue to its small business accounting product. This occurred after the company realized that it had oversupplied on functionality and made its software inconvenient for core users. To overcome established firms in the same market, Intuit improved its product to become more convenient, thereby activating the product’s disruptive capabilities.
As for the insulin industry, industry leader Eli Lilly failed to commercialize their Humulin product because the company’s sustaining improvements on insulin failed to justify the product’s high price point. On the other hand, an entrant firm called Novo developed the disruptive delivery system of insulin pens, which met the market demand for convenience. Lilly was too focused on satisfying their lead customers’ concerns that they failed to realize that they were merely oversupplying on performance demands. This concern, Christensen points out, was embedded in the company’s culture.
He then explores three possible strategies for managing evolving product competition in a multi-tiered market. The first strategy, as previously discussed, is to retreat upmarket at the first sign of disruptive competition, focusing on higher tiers of customers to commercialize a project that has been enhanced with sustaining technologies. The second strategy is to remain in the same market tier, addressing the shifting basis of competition to maintain customer preference. This may be difficult to pursue, however, since the company will have to deliberately target lower-margin goals to compete with entrant firms. The third strategy is to parallel the customer’s demand for functionality with the rate of technological development, thus delaying performance oversupply. This is typically achieved through marketing projects, artificially introducing product circumstances that force customers to prefer sustaining improvements over disruptive ones. Christensen speculates that this strategy may not be sustainable for long, however, since this approach creates an opportunity for other firms to develop more efficient products that trigger the next phase of product evolution. He ultimately concludes that none of these three strategies is necessarily better than the others, since various companies have used each one to their advantage. Generally, these firms maintained a clear sense of where their supply trajectory stood in relation to their customers’ demand trajectories. Hence, they could determine which strategy to employ for success.
Having outlined the market forces that cause corporate failure, Christensen now transposes his framework over the automotive industry to show how he might manage the electric vehicle as a disruptive technology.
After discussing the origins of the electric vehicle, Christensen assesses the opportunities and risks that the technology poses to the established gasoline-powered automobile market. He evaluates the electric vehicle’s capabilities against present market needs, which measure performance trajectory according to minimum cruising range, acceleration power, and variety. He finds that the electric vehicle does not meet market criteria to compete with the established firms, and he turns to the electric vehicle’s trajectory of improvement to find out if it will eventually reach the functionality of gasoline cars. Seeing that this is the case, he concludes that electric vehicles qualify as a disruptive technology.
At the time of the book’s writing, Christensen posits that most established firms will appraise the electric vehicle as being worthless in the current market since they are viewing electric vehicles along the same performance trajectory as gasoline-powered automobiles, rather than plotting the technology out on its own. Christensen searches for a market where electric vehicles will create value, acknowledging once again that this will not be found in the mainstream market segments at first. He moves away from asking market consultants to tell him about the market, precisely because the market doesn’t exist yet. Throughout this process of discovery, he leaves himself open to learning rather than implementation, so that he can learn the right ways to apply the technology in the market as it matures.
Christensen considers two leads for building a new market: families with high school students and the transportation or logistics sectors in dense Southeast Asian cities. Although this conflicts with the ways in which most established firms develop their products, it also deters any of the pessimism that those firms are currently experiencing as they design their products for the mainstream market. The challenge that Christensen’s engineers face is how to tailor their product toward a market that is still being defined. Christensen assumes that because the electric vehicle’s function will eventually overshoot the performance demanded by the market, the engineers can design according to later preferential criteria like simplicity, reliability, and convenience. He also guides the engineers to develop a low-cost capability that enables them to easily change facets of product design, anticipating the possibility of leaving their initial markets if they are not suited to the product. The final market condition he enforces is that the product must be made available to consumers at a low price point in spite of high operating costs.
With these design principles in place, Christensen prevents the engineering team from incorporating any other new technologies, so that the product can drive a unique product with a clear disruptive technology. Mainstream firms, on the other hand, will be caught trying to solve technological issues that cater to the demands of their lead customers. Incidentally, the issues they are trying to resolve will likely be addressed in new value networks like the one Christensen is trying to create. As for distribution, Christensen stresses the need to avoid established distributor networks, preferring a new distribution channel that will benefit from access to novel products like the electric vehicle.
Because he is dealing with a disruptive technology, Christensen sets up an autonomous organization to commercialize the disruptive product, preventing the employees from being diverted according to existing corporate values. Its operations will have minimal impact on the parent company’s capital base while it becomes profitable on its own terms. Any success that the new organization achieves will generate encouragement toward securing further sales success. Meanwhile, failure can be learned from and worked around without incurring any substantial losses. To ensure that the new organization develops a culture that benefits the development of the disruptive technology, Christensen assigns a heavyweight team to execute the project.
Christensen shares his relief upon learning that the innovator’s dilemma cannot be resolved by increasing the intensity of good management practices. However, this doesn’t mean that companies should be willing to abandon the capabilities that made them successful just to chase disruptive technology. What it does suggest is that capabilities are valuable in context, rather than being applicable across an industry’s evolution. Christensen summarizes his insights in seven points for easy review.
First, he asserts that the market demand for performance improvement may differ from the rate of technological improvement. Plotting both trajectories can help managers to understand whether an innovation will eventually find value among mainstream customers. Next, the resource allocation process is directly related to the innovation management process, which means that projects are usually allotted resources according to their expected profitability. Third, it is crucial to find a market whose needs match the functionality of the technology, not the other way around.
Christensen also states that organizational capabilities are developed in the process of leveraging technologies as products and in the context of commercializing them in specific value networks. Once these capabilities are set by resolving operational issues, the organization usually becomes inflexible to new processes and values. He claims that it is impossible to make an accurate forecast for disruptive technologies because the market that informs that forecast doesn’t exist yet. Disruptive technologies are risky investments, but this risk can be managed to minimize impact while yielding critical information about the value network.
Thus, companies should assess whether they stand to gain more from first-mover advantages or from waiting for others to develop the technology. Finally, Christensen maintains that the most powerful barriers for mobility across markets are usually related to resources. Established firms find it difficult to justify moving to lower market tiers simply because it does not meet their business requirements. The best way to overcome these barriers is to understand the context that prevents the company from leveraging these innovations, and then create a new context that aligns their capabilities with managing both sustaining and disruptive technologies.
It is worth discussing that the last of the five principles focuses on a disparity between market supply and customer demand. Since the insight Christensen communicated in Chapter 7 involves the need to identify one’s assumptions, it is safe to say that many companies adopt the underlying assumption that customers always know what they want or expect from the market. This idea could certainly resonate with sustaining innovations, since these types of changes simply improve upon the same thing that customers valued in the first place. However, this stance mistakenly assumes that customers lack any dynamism of their own and will only go on wanting one thing perpetually.
However, when disruptive products finally match mainstream products in terms of functionality, customers come to notice the disruptive feature that eventually sets it apart. They appreciate that disruptive feature’s value in the context of its surrounding familiarity and prefer it for the way it adds value to something they already appreciated. For so many of the success stories examined in this book, this is precisely what happens when the disruptive products make their mark on the mainstream markets. For example, the small disk drives were valued for their size once they became indistinguishable along the usual plane of performance upon which most disk drives were measured. The same goes for the hydraulic excavators once they matched cable-actuated shovels in bucket size and rotation range. These customers didn’t see the value of these features when they were first introduced, but they changed their minds once they were forced to distinguish the new products from market leaders’ products. This dynamism speaks once more to Christensen’s insights in Chapter 7. Just as companies will never be able to predict the features of the market where their products will find value, customers will never be able to predict what kind of value those products might have until the products become performance-competitive. This resonance drives The Influence of Underserved Markets, since mainstream customers become an underserved market once again in the context of a new performance trajectory.
Christensen wraps up the book by consolidating his ideas in a case study that allows him to apply every single insight he has discussed so far. Though it may seem as though he is laying out a formula for other companies to follow, he is actually showing how the principles of his framework demonstrate a critical mindset that enables managers to ask questions and find the necessary answers to make relevant decisions. This approach points to another relevant theme, The Importance of Being Agile, as agile companies do not confirm to a singular solution for every business challenge. Instead, agile companies respond to each business challenge by reorganizing their capabilities to meet the unique conditions of the situation.
Although the last chapter of the book functions as an overall summary of everything that has been discussed, this choice is not an unnecessary redundancy on Christensen’s part. Instead, his reiteration of the thesis statement and key takeaways fulfills his scientific approach toward relaying his findings. In the Introduction to the book, he shares an overview of the same general ideas. However, without the examples that each chapter presents, these ideas remain abstract and lack impact. The reiteration therefore helps to solidify these ideas, allowing readers to review the abstract forms and apply the concrete examples and case studies that demonstrate the ideas in practice. By this point, Christensen has fully explained and supported his seemingly paradoxical statement that good management often leads to bad business results. It is a statement that mirrors one of the overarching arguments of the book, but it only makes sense when the author has presented the full context.
By Clayton M. Christensen