The Guns of August

“Edward, the object of this unprecedented gathering of nations, was often called the ‘Uncle of Europe,’ a title which, insofar as Europe’s ruling houses were meant, could be taken literally.”

King Edward VII of England is the uncle of Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany and, through his wife’s sister of Czar Nicholas II. He has numerous nieces and nephews among the ruling houses of Europe, including those of Norway, Spain, Denmark, and Rumania. The title “uncle” here is meant affectionately, as Edward is well-liked among the ruling houses and not just tolerated because of alliances and agreements. His death, and the end of his role as kindly uncle, symbolizes an end to the familial relationships among countries, which is why Tuchman starts the book with his funeral.

“‘We must,’ wrote Friedrich von Bernhardi, the spokesman of militarism, ‘secure to German nationality and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due them […] and has hitherto been withheld from them.’”

The first chapter sets up the causes of the war, some of which occur long before the war begins. This quote shows the militarism rising in Germany. The German people believe that they are disrespected by other countries and, perhaps more importantly, that this respect is due to them. This furthers Tuchman’s contention that War Is Caused by Hubris, Not Inequity. Kaiser Wilhelm has been building a navy to contend with England’s. He has always wanted to visit Paris but has never been invited. All of this contributes to the first shots fired in the war.

“Thus the Germans came to Belgium. Decisive battle dictated envelopment and envelopment dictated the use of Belgian territory. The German General Staff pronounced it ‘necessity’; Kaiser and Chancellor accepted it with more or less equanimity. Whether it was advisable, whether it was even expedient in view of the probable effect on world opinion, especially on neutral opinion, was irrelevant. That it seemed necessary to the triumph of German arms was the only criterion. Germans had imbibed from 1870 the lesson that arms and war were the sole source of German greatness. They had been taught by Field Marshal von der Goltz in his book, The Nation in Arms, that ‘We have won our position through the sharpness of our sword, not the sharpness of our mind.’ The decision to violate Belgium followed easily.”

Tuchman here is pointing out the prevailing mindset in Germany, going back to at least 1883, when Goltz published The Nation in Arms, and probably to its military victory over France in 1870. Since the plan to invade France was laid as early as 1899, she is also outlining how long Germany has intended to start a war. Further, she is foreshadowing the short-sightedness and obstinance of the German military—they saw a plan on paper that could work and assumed, without any testing or even questioning, that it would work.

“For more than forty years the thought of ‘Again’ was the single most fundamental factor of French policy.”

In 1870, the French were defeated by the Germans at Sedan. The terms of surrender included annexation of the Alsace and Lorraine regions, as well as a German victory parade through the streets of Paris. Since that time, the French have lived under “the Shadow of Sedan.” Like Germany, France has its own visions of glory. It also fears another German invasion. Like Germany, France is preparing for war because of its history and its nationalistic visions for the future.

“‘What is the smallest British military force that would be of any practical assistance to you?’ Wilson asked.

Like a rapier flash came Foch’s reply, ‘A single British soldier—and we will see to it that he is killed.’”

Since 1905 Britain and France have been in talks about a coming war with Germany. France wants Britain’s army under French control and leadership. Britain doesn’t want to commit to any war, preferring instead to follow its own war interests, mainly naval. However, in the forming friendship between British General Henry Wilson and French General Ferdinand Foch, both see what it will take to get Britain to commit to the French cause—one dead British soldier and the country will follow any command. This callous calculation is a particularly stark example of the work’s exploration of The Courage of Ordinary Soldiers Versus the Military Machine.

“This was the man who was Russia’s Minister of War from 1908 to 1914. Embodying, as he did, the opinions and enjoying the support of the reactionaries, his preparation for war with Germany, which was the Ministry’s chief task, was something less than whole-hearted.”

Tuchman has previously described the war preparations of Germany, France, and England. Both France and England are planning for Russia to attack Germany on a second front, dividing Germany’s forces. Tuchman’s description of the minister of war embodies all the problems with the Russian army and its preparations for war. This foreshadows the Bolshevik Revolution, which responded in part to such government inefficiency, grafting, and overall laziness. Actors like the minister of war bring about not only a weakened Eastern Front and slower Russian mobilization but also the overthrow of the Russian government, which causes an end to Russian help for France and England.

“More cosmopolitan and more timid than the archetype Prussian, he had never actually wanted a general war. He wanted greater power, greater prestige, above all more authority in the world’s affairs for Germany but he preferred to obtain them by frightening rather than by fighting other nations.”

As the war begins, the kaiser has second thoughts. He attempts to avoid the war by offering an ultimatum to Russia, and he blames Edward for the war. At the last minute, he gives the German chief of the general staff, Field Marshal Moltke, a desperate proposal because he fears what might happen to East Prussia. This underscores that the war might have been avoided at the last minute and the 20th century changed. However, the military planning is too far gone. Germany, and other countries, have been playing politics, and only at the last do they grasp war’s reality.

“Pressed by the Russians to declare themselves, and by Joffre to mobilize, yet held to a standstill by the need to prove to England that France would act only in self-defense, the French government found calm not easy.”

Tuchman is outlining the political maneuvering and the uncertainty of the hours leading up the war. France has an agreement with Russia to attack Germany if Germany attacks Russia, but France cannot attack Germany unless Germany invades France or enters neutral Belgium because England won’t come to its aid except in those circumstances. Further, General Joffre, the highest military commander, fears France will be defeated if he does not begin full mobilization now. The Russian ambassadors, as well as the French premier and president, are nervous, and they also fear the threat of war could cause civil strife.

“‘A long, tragic silence of several minutes’ followed the reading, Bassompierre recalled, as each man in the room thought of the choice that faced his country.”

The Belgian government receives a note from Germany claiming that France is planning to invade Belgium on its way to Germany. The note further says that Germany is invading Belgium only to stop France and that Germany wishes Belgium to remain neutral. The part about France invading is false, and Belgium knows it, but the long silence with which Belgium responds is telling. In the days leading up to the war, there have been many such silences while each country contemplates not only its next move but also the momentous war that is looming. Belgium is aware that any German invasion means the end of life as it knows it. Belgium also knows the war has begun. In the long, tragic silence, the men in the room are, in a way, saying goodbye to peace. All over Europe, the other countries are doing the same.

“No more distressing moment can ever face a British government than that which requires it to come to a hard and fast and specific decision.”

Tuchman’s remark applies to all the governments Tuchman has described so far. England especially has tried to keep from declaring its intentions, but so have the other countries: France is poised on the German border but can’t make a move unless Germany does so first, and its government can’t decide whether to mobilize the rest of its reserves or not. Germany is facing a two-front war, and its government wants to forget about France to take on Russia, all while trying to coerce Belgium into staying neutral. Russia’s government cannot make a quick decision due to corruption. Bureaucratic breakdowns occur at the very hour when decisions need to be made, plans need to be put forward, and armies need to move into battle.

“If Grey had sent his ultimatum to Germany the night before, immediately following his speech to Parliament, Britain and Germany would then have been at war and the cruisers’ guns would have spoken.”

Here Tuchman points out the opportunities missed by the British and other Allied forces, developing the theme of The Ripple Effects of Individual Actions. Admiral de Lapeyrère never thinks the Goebens will perform a diplomatic mission. Tuchman points out that had Grey sent his ultimatum without the usual British hesitation, Allied forces might have stopped Souchon’s mission aboard the Goeben, which was to seal the alliance between Germany and Turkey. This would cut off Russia’s allies from supplying it, which will extend the war far beyond the six months both sides believe it will last.

“Coming at a steady purposeful trot, they carried twelve-foot steel-headed lances and were otherwise hung about with an arsenal of sabers, pistols and rifles.”

World War I sees the first real military use of many weapons: machine guns, tanks, and airplanes. It is also a war that spans two time periods, the old and the new, exemplified in this description of German soldiers riding into Belgium carrying lances like medieval knights. They also carry sabers on horseback, while behind them infantry troops are transported by cars and guns of a size never seen before. This represents a clear clash of two very different types of war—one with the supposed honor and heraldry of a bygone era, the other mechanized, modern, and capable of producing unheard of death and destruction.

“Standing at a distance he was able to view the war as a whole, in terms of the relations of the powers, and to realize the immense effort of national military expansion that would be required for the long contest about to begin.”

Lord Kitchener’s view of war, expressed here, not only shows the enormity of the war effort that England needs to undertake but also implies the struggle between the army and the civilian leadership. Kitchener, somewhere in between the two as a military man sitting in a civilian cabinet position, tends to overlook both sides’ concerns. He sees beyond the immediate problem of whether to support France, which is the army’s concern, and the length and breadth of the war, which is the concern of the civilian leaders. These opposite positions, and Kitchener’s straddling of them, delay English entry into the war.

“A rag doll lying on the road with its head squashed flat by the wheel of a gun carriage seemed to one American correspondent a symbol of Belgium’s fate in the war.”

The doll symbolizes a crushed Belgium, all its small comforts left behind as it flees before the German advance. Notably, this symbolism is not Tuchman’s but that of war correspondents at the time. This shows how a narrative of the war develops in real-time, as well as how German atrocities reverberate around the world. Earlier, Tuchman mentions that German assassinations and village burnings are not done in reprisal, as some of the German commanders state. Their purpose is to cow the Belgian populace so that the German army does not have to worry about them at its rear. This foreshadows two historical developments: The Germans will commit similar acts in World War II, and the Belgians will continue to harass them, not at all cowed.

“Although the French did not yet know it, the slaughter at Morhange snuffed out the bright flame of the doctrine of the offensive.”

The French have just been forced to fall back from entrenched German troops whose machine guns and artillery have cut them to shreds. This begins the war of attrition and trenches. For days the French have been throwing themselves against heavily fortified German positions. Their training has been all wrong, and their thought process has been all wrong. They’ve been caught up, as the Germans have, in securing a decisive victory, but this defeat will change the course of the war. There will be no more massive sweeps of men and machinery but rather ground gained by feet or yards, at heavy cost.

“There was an aura about 1914 that caused those who sensed it to shiver for mankind. Tears came even to the most bold and resolute. Messimy opened a Cabinet meeting on August 5 with a speech full of valor and confidence, broke off midway, buried his head in his hands, and sobbed, unable to continue. Winston Churchill wishing godspeed and victory to the BEF, when taking leave of Henry Wilson, ‘broke down and cried so that he could not finish the sentence.’ Something of the same emotion could be felt in St. Petersburg.”

After all the flag waving, the military maneuvers, the preparations and declarations, the speeches and salutes, the reality and finality of the war set in and overwhelm those involved. Despite the patriotism, the nationalism, the claims to quick victories, the élan and cran, countries are finally faced with the enormous reality of the war. They know more men will die than they’ve ever imagined. They know the world has changed forever and cannot be changed back. The Europe they knew will never exist again, and their tears bid it farewell as the war gets underway.

“Danilov was disquieted by Rennenkampf’s obvious loss of contact with the enemy and by failing communications as a result of which Jilinsky appeared not to know where the armies were nor the armies each other.”

Communications affect not only the fighting but the planning of the fighting. Russia is not just short of food and rifles; it also lacks telegraph and telephone lines, which means its communications are severely lacking. Oftentimes, Russian messages are sent “wireless,” or without a direct line, which means they must be sent “open.” Because of this, the Germans often intercept them. After a Russian message detailing its army’s exact movement is intercepted by the Germans, the Russian armies not only don’t know where the Germans are as they head into a major battle, but each army doesn’t know where its allies are.

“When the Battle of the Frontiers ended, the war had been in progress for twenty days and during that time had created passions, attitudes, ideas, and issues, both among belligerents and watching neutrals, which determined its future course and the course of history since. The world that used to be and the ideas that shaped it disappeared to […]”

Tuchman has just written about a Belgian poet who prefaced his 1915 book about the German invasion of Belgium by saying that he was formerly a pacifist but became disillusioned after the invasion. The same will hold true for many countries. The war shaped the course of history, but it also shaped hatred between countries and peoples, putting up new physical and symbolic borders. Out of the ashes of this war will grow an even bigger war, in much the same way the War of 1870, and the hatred the French and Germans held for each other, contributes to this one.

“Eventually, the United States became the larder, arsenal, and bank of the Allies and acquired a direct interest in Allied victory […] “

This quote sums up the United States’ eventual involvement in the war, which becomes one of economic necessity. Simply put, the United States must protect its economic interests and must ensure that England and the Allies win the war, else its own economic ruin might come about.

“That afternoon for the first time a Taube bombed Paris. Besides three bombs on the Quai de Valmy which killed two persons and injured others, it dropped leaflets telling Parisians that the Germans were at their gates, as in 1870, and ‘There is nothing you can do but surrender.’”

For the most part, airplanes have been used for reconnaissance so far in the war. Now, they are used not only for aerial bombing but also for the psychological warfare of dropping leaflets to get the French to give up hope and surrender. It is a foreshadowing of wars to come: Aerial bombings, leaflets, and terror tactics all begin, or are improved, in this war.

“Despite his concern Moltke did not go forward to investigate for himself but remained fretting at headquarters, depending on delegates for reports.”

The French are falling back, and the German reports coming in say that they are “routed” and “decisively beaten.” The fact is that the French are falling back, but they are neither routed nor beaten. Instead they are regrouping to stop the German advance, but General Moltke, German chief of the general staff, does not know this because he does not bother to investigate. Because of the belief in German superiority, the Germans do not follow through on numerous occasions, relying instead on uncertain communications from the front. Tuchman points out these instances to show how the Germans might have won the war had their communications been better, had their sense of superiority not deceived them, and had their leaders investigated the front instead of staying at headquarters. All war is blunder, Tuchman seems to be saying, and any small alteration could have changed history.

“‘We can do no more,’ wrote an officer of the Xth Reserve Corps. ‘The men fall in the ditches and lie there just to breathe […] The order comes to mount. I ride bent over with my head resting on the horse’s mane. We are thirsty and hungry. Indifference comes over us. Such a life isn’t worth much. To lose it is to lose little.’”

This quote exemplifies two important points. The first is how deathly tired all the soldiers on both sides are. They have been fighting for days. They have been marching for days. They have eaten little and drank less, and all are at the point of utter exhaustion. The second point is that Von Kluck makes a serious mistake in not resting his men. He becomes so obsessed with catching the retreating French and ending the war that he turns his flank toward Paris and marches his men almost to death. When the battle comes, his men are not prepared for it, and the Germans are forced to retreat, stalling their great advance and their chance for a decisive victory. This extends the war another four years but also gives the Allies the ultimate victory.

“The basic reason for German failure at the Marne, ‘the reason that transcends all others,’ said Von Kluck afterward, was ‘the extraordinary and peculiar aptitude of the French soldier to recover quickly.’”

In the last battle before the war becomes a war of attrition and each side takes to the trenches, the French find their élan. During “the Miracle of the Marne,” the French army, hounded and harassed, faces the Germans and forces them to retreat. Though the British come too slowly and the Germans retreat too quickly for an ultimate French victory, turning back the Germans at this point is the same as turning the tide of the war. True victory will take four years, and the loss of thousands of dollars and a generation of men and women, but at the Marne, the fighting spirit the French count upon finally appears.