The Guns of August

Tuchman begins the book with the funeral of Edward VII because she sees it as the end of an era of tense peace, inevitably leading to disaster. The kings and queens of Europe, and much of the world, are gathered in pomp and circumstance to mourn the passing of Edward. Seventy nations are represented among those gathered, and the interplay between them—the honorary commands they have been given, the intermarriage and familial relationships among the rulers of Europe—shows how closely intertwined they have become. Tuchman metaphorically likens this to the sunset of an era, which means night is about to fall in the shape of the war.

Tuchman describes the animosity between England, France, and Germany to contextualize the coming crisis. Germany’s desire for dominance is clear not only in its belief the other nations of Europe disrespect it but also in von Bernhardi’s book, which argues German superiority. Edward carefully crafted political alliances, and each one seems like an attack to Wilhelm, who fears most of all being encircled by his enemies. (This is also an instance of foreshadowing since that is precisely what will happen when Germany is forced to fight on two fronts.) Tuchman also outlines Germany’s attempts to form an alliance with Russia and Wilhelm’s blunders in the attempts.

The chapter ends back at the funeral and its symbolic resonance. The procession has come to an end, after which Lord Esher, a prominent British politician and friend of the late king, remarked in his diary, “All the old buoys which marked the channel of our lives seem to have been swept away” (14). The lines of acceptable behavior for all the major players on the European stage at the end of the 19th century, so carefully delineated and painstakingly maintained by Edward, were obliterated after his death, leaving the remaining powers victims of their own fear and hubris, the latter of which the book posits as a leading cause of the war.

Chapters 2 and 3 dig deeper into those causes, showing the political maneuvering that goes on before the war. Though Tuchman places most of the blame on Germany (a claim that has drawn criticism), the juxtaposition of France’s and Germany’s motivations for military action against the other nation reveal underlying similarities, including the obstinate nature of each nation’s leaders. This lays the groundwork for Tuchman’s exploration of The Courage of Ordinary Soldiers Versus the Military Machine.

German militarism in the 19th century shapes the country’s militarism in the 20th. German philosophers and strategists lead the German people to believe in their superiority: They are the “Supermen” of Nietzsche, the Hegelian leaders who will see the world to a glorious destiny. Hidden in the rhetoric, however, is the short-sightedness of German leaders. They believe that since their strategy of a swift, decisive victory should work, it will work. However, as Tuchman puts it:

Dead battles, like dead generals, hold the military mind in their dead grip, and Germans, no less than other peoples, prepare for the last war. They staked everything on decisive battle in the image of Hannibal, but even the ghost of Hannibal might have reminded Schlieffen that though Carthage won at Cannae, Rome won the war (22).

Germany fails to write any flexibility into its plan, in part (Tuchman suggests) because its belief in its superiority renders it unable to recognize its own arrogance. Its leadership fails to grasp that the new world, with its complex economic ties, bigger armies and populations, and old alliances, is different from how it was during the last war.

Tuchman portrays France as similarly caught up in its national mythos, further developing the idea that War Is Caused by Hubris, Not Inequity. In the fervor of war and caught up in their own talk of the spirit of France, men such as the Chief of Operations, Colonel Grandmaison “[grasp] only the head and not the feet of Foch’s principles” (33). France goes on the offensive with no protections in place for defense. Much as Germany believes in its superiority simply because it is Germany, France believes it can win the war simply because it is France. Calling upon the spirit of France, France feels it will be victorious, which causes its leaders to ignore the information they receive about how and where Germany will attack: “But the authors of Plan 17 did not want to be convinced. They rejected evidence that argued in favor of their staying on the defensive because their hearts and hopes, as well as their training and strategy, were fixed on the offensive” (43).

Compounding French and German nationalism is bitterness over the last conflict between the two countries. Following the French defeat at Sedan in 1870, Germany humiliated France, annexing Alsace and parts of Lorraine, fining France 5 billion francs—an act meant to keep France in economic hardship for a generation—and occupying parts of the country. France’s reaction, of course, is not only to hate Germany but to prepare itself against the eventuality of something like this happening again. Germany also still hates France since, despite Germany’s victory, France is still respected around the world, taking what Germany sees as its own rightful place in that regard. Tuchman therefore frames both the German and French political elite as too filled with hubris and too focused on the wars of the past to anticipate the great disaster coming in the present.