The German Ideology

Stirner’s philosophy reflects the German philosophical conception of history. The driving force of history becomes the idea, the speculation, the abstract concept. History itself becomes so abstracted it ceases to have meaning, becoming what the authors describe as a “ghost story” (142). Stirner pushes this idealist version of history further than his contemporaries to its “most naïve” outcome (142). Stirner writes, “Concepts should play the decisive role everywhere, concepts should regulate life, concepts should rule. That is the religious world to which Hegel gave systematic expression” (204).

For Stirner, development occurs through self-realization. Gradual discoveries in the individual’s life contribute to the emergence of the ego and a higher consciousness. Social, political, economic, and historical conditions do not factor into Stirner’s analysis. This is critiqued by Marx and Engels, who suggest that one’s material circumstances cannot be easily transcended by discovering the ego. They write that “the true spirit of his book” is his “enormous gullibility” (140) because he accepts the illusions people have of themselves as being reality.

Stirner writes, “I take the world as it is for me, as my world, as my property” (138), a process enacted through thought. The authors write that Stirner cannot actually appropriate the world as his property; rather, they argue that he has a “delirious fantasy” of taking the world as his property (138). Once again, they suggest that the world of ideas is not sufficient to intervene into the material world, writing this “mode of acquisition which, indeed, is not mentioned by any of the economists” (137). This is an important argument in Marx and Engels’s philosophy. No level of consciousness, incisive criticism, or brilliant thought can change material conditions without being grounded in reality. Ideas cannot make a person the master of the world around them. They further dismiss Stirner for simply adopting Hegel’s theory of the stages of life.

Marx and Engels criticize Stirner’s philosophy as it applies to historical analysis. He uses “world-embracing names” to “clarify” (176) the different stages he lays out (child, youth, man). This theory separates “the ‘uneducated’ (evil ones, bourgeois, egoists in the ordinary sense) = Negros, children, Catholics, realists, etc.” from “the ‘educated’ (good ones, citoyens, devotees, priests, etc.) = Mongols, youths, Protestants, idealists” (144). Marx and Engels highlight the implications of this theory, noting that it constructs a hierarchy that naturalizes the domination of some classes over others. Thus, this view of history as ideas becomes a way of justifying domination in reality. They conclude that Stirner argues that the educated—who dominate the uneducated—are Hegelians.

They further criticize Stirner for ignoring historical specificity. Stirner reads history through the lens of idealist philosophy and as being completely disconnected from material realities. He flattens out historical contradictions and ignores things that complicate his theory. Instead, he conforms history and philosophy to fit his theory. Marx and Engels criticize his vagueness and lack of evidence. For example, they quote Stirner saying:

‘The Middle Ages’ were a ‘lengthy period, in which people were content with the illusion of having the truth’ (they did not desire or do anything else), ‘without seriously thinking about whether one must be true oneself in order to possess the truth’ (184).

They highlight the lack of specificity, for instance, describing an epoch as a “lengthy period” without providing dates, explaining parameters, or including any specifics. They also editorialize, injecting their own comments between Stirner’s quote—“they did not desire or do anything else” (184)—highlighting the absurdity of such a blanket statement about an entire era. They accuse Stirner of cherry-picking random examples.

A key argument against communism that is advanced in popular thought is the belief that communism abolishes individuality. Stirner defends property by arguing that property does not simply describe money and goods but also extends to opinions. To abolish property, then, requires abolishing every opinion or making opinion universal. Marx and Engels argue that abolishing the right to exploit workers does not abolish the self as an individual, unless your only identity is your identification with the bourgeoise as a class. The private property is a social relation, “they are ‘individual’ only so long as they have not become fetters on the existing productive forces” (248). Marx and Engels thus draw a distinction between social relations and the individual.

Stirner elects to call communism “social liberalism” (220). Liberalism as a concept is not popular among radical thinkers, and Stirner uses this misnaming to refute communism. Stirner analyzes the ideas of communist-leaning liberals rather than communists themselves. Marx and Engels critique Stirner for historically baseless claims, sloppy uses of concepts, and an oversimplification of political economy. For example, Stirner reduces communism to the goal of equal wages. In another instance they describe Stirner’s “new theory of exploitation” in which “the workers in a factory exploit one another, since they ‘play into the hands’ of one another; whereas the factory-owner, whose hands do not work at all, cannot, therefore, exploit the workers” (242). They further refute Stirner’s stance that many communists are not revolutionary, arguing that communism is about the abolition of the state.