The German Ideology

“Production is thus at the same time consumption, and consumption is at the same time production. Each is directly its own counterpart.”

The “Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy” begins with an analysis of production and consumption. By opening the book with a rigorous analysis of the connection between production, distribution, and consumption, Marx establishes “all material production by individuals” (1) as the critical hinge that his argument rests on. Production is an important area of study in political economy.

“But this very condition of being assigned to wage-labor is the result of the existence of capital and landed property as independent agents of production.” 

Earlier, Marx argues that capital is not an eternal, universal category. He also argues that wage-labor is not a natural category. Instead, wage-labor developed through historical change. For wage-labor to be possible, private property and capital must exist. If wage-labor isn’t a natural state of affairs, then it can be abolished, meaning the classless society that Marx advocates for is possible.

“Population is an abstraction, if we leave out, e.g., the classes of which it consists. These classes, again, are but an empty word, unless we know what are the elements on which they are based, such as wage-labor, capital, etc. These imply, in their turn, exchange, division of labor, prices, etc. Capital, e.g., does not mean anything without wage-labor, value, money, price

One of Marx and Engels’s core arguments is that concepts must be grounded in real life. To speak of concepts like population, production, or nature without framing these concepts in a historically situated context makes them meaningless. Throughout the text they highlight how philosophers and economists turn physical, material things that impact people’s lives into abstractions. Once these concepts are turned into abstractions, they can be used to prove the philosopher or economist’s argument. This quote also reveals the interconnectedness at the heart of the dialectic as a method. Marx and Engels argue that population cannot be considered separately from other concepts like class and capital because everything is connected.

“All the German philosophical critics assert that the real world of men has hitherto been dominated and determined by ideas, images, concepts, and that the real world is a product of the world of ideas. This has been the case up to now, but it ought to be changed.” 

Idealism was the dominant philosophy in mid-19th-century Germany. Idealism is described here as understanding the world as corresponding to ideas, images, and concepts. The conflict between materialism and idealism dates back to ancient philosophy, but Marx and Engels reframe materialism’s emphasis on the natural, physical world of the senses as historical materialism. This shift considers how humans change and transform their environments, and how these environments in turn shape humans. In the concluding line they explicitly state that idealism is inadequate to address the philosophical and political challenges of the 19th century.

“The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly ‘world-shattering’ phrases, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against ‘phrases;’. They forget, however, that they themselves are opposing nothing but phrases to these phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are combating solely the phrases of this world.” 

Marx and Engels are concerned with the idealist philosophy of the Young Hegelians, who were very popular in Germany in this period. However, despite their claims to innovative thought, the Young Hegelians are dismissed as being conservative. Marx argues that none of them bothered to study the connection between their philosophical ideas and the contemporary German reality or “the connection of their criticism with their own material surroundings” (36). No political, economic, or social change is possible without moving beyond the realm of ideas and phrases. Only materialism, which directly addresses the contemporary reality in Germany, can affect change.

“Nor shall we explain to them that it is possible to achieve real liberation only in the real world and by real means, that slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine and the mule jenny, serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture, and that, in general, people cannot be liberated as long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, housing and clothing in adequate quality and quantity. Liberation is a historical and not a mental act.” 

This quote describes the theory of historical stages. This analysis builds from Hegel’s teleological view of history. However, Marx and Engels alter Hegel’s analysis to suggest that material conditions are the key factor in historical change. In this quote Marx and Engels respond to philosophers who argue that ideas and concepts are enough to change the world. In contrast, they argue that change develops in specific historical periods as a result of the material conditions of the period. They argue that changing material conditions facilitate social change. People cannot be revolutionary without having their basic needs met. Liberation is rooted in the real circumstances of people’s lives.

“History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which uses the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity.” 

History is in a constant state of change. These changes do not come out of thin air. Rather, they build from the previous generation. Changing material circumstances produce new needs, new desires, and new conflicts. These new conflicts and contradictions cause historical change. The progression of history is not linear; rather, some parts of the past remain while others are replaced.

“Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; the revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew.”

The previous quote outlines Marx and Engels’s argument that change is driven by material circumstances, and ideas and concepts emerge from these concrete shifts. In this quote we see why this is relevant to their theory of social change and, in particular, communism. The conceptual and idealistic aspects of communism must surface from changing social conditions. The emergence of a consciousness that can envision and enact a classless society must come from a revolutionary state where workers decide to transform society. They argue that it is impossible to know what communism would look like because society has not yet reached the state where it is possible to imagine this new society. Once again, they critique idealist philosophy, which would suggest that the idea of the communist state is the critical factor in producing a revolution. In contrast, Marx and Engels suggest that revolution will come from the workers’ realization that the exploitation of their labor by the ruling class and the poverty that the proletariat live in is morally wrong.

“With this the relation of man to nature is excluded from history and hence the antithesis of nature and history is created.” 

Marx and Engels emphasize the material world. Nature is an important category of analysis, but they argue that the separation of nature from history is conceptual, not material. Philosophers who idealize nature as timeless and eternal ignore the constant transformations that nature undergoes. Like human society, the natural world changes over time. History is not merely great men, major events, and religious or political struggles. It is also the changes in ecosystems.

“These pompous and arrogant hucksters of ideas, who imagine themselves infinitely exalted above all national prejudices, are thus in practice far more national than the beer-swilling Philistines who dream of a united Germany. They do not recognise the deeds of other nations as historical.”

One of Marx and Engels’s major criticisms of German idealists and socialists is their nationalism. The intellectual culture in Germany emphasized philosophy over history, sociology, or politics. Because of this, German scholars argued that German intellectual culture was more advanced than that of other nations. Marx and Engels cite several examples of German thinkers who dismiss French and English radicalism and intellectual culture because it is based in politics or history. This tendency is attacked by the authors as arrogant nationalism.

“Feuerbach, therefore, never speaks of the world of man in such cases, but always takes refuge in external nature, and moreover in nature which has not yet been subdued by men. But every new invention, every advance made by industry, detaches another piece from this domain, so that the ground which produces examples illustrating such Feuerbachian propositions is steadily shrinking. The ‘essence’ of the fish is its ‘being’, water—to go no further than this one proposition. But the latter ceases to be the ‘essence’ of the fish and is no longer a suitable medium of existence as soon as the river is made to serve industry, as soon as it is polluted by dyes and other waste products and navigated by steamboats, or as soon as its water is diverted into canals where simple drainage can deprive the fish of its medium of existence.” 

To demonstrate that all things are historically produced, Marx and Engels contest the use of “nature” as a stand in for something eternal. Philosophers often use examples in nature to justify their arguments that there is a pure essence or a natural state. For instance, British philosopher Thomas Hobbes used nature as an example to justify his argument that life was difficult, competitive, and nasty. The authors dismiss the idea that nature exists outside of human history. They point to the reality that natural things like water and fish are changed by human development. In another example they argue that a cherry tree that Feuerbach would take as timeless and outside of history was not native to Germany. Instead, the tree was transplanted from a different ecosystem in a different country. The tree’s existence in Germany is therefore not “natural” but the result of human choices, in this case, commerce.

“During the time the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc., were dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc.” 

In the previous quote Marx and Engels dismiss the idea that nature proves that some things are timeless and outside of history. Here, they connect this argument to their theory of social change. They argue that the ruling class of different periods establishes the dominant concepts of that period. These concepts are then proclaimed as universal ideals. In doing so, they “present them as the only rational, universally valid ones” (68). By using the aristocracy and the bourgeoise as historical examples, Marx and Engels show that so-called universal ideals change in different historical periods.

“Poor Bruno was quite forgotten, as was best proved by the polemic between Feuerbach and Stirner, in which no notice at all was taken of him. For just this reason he seized on this polemic in order to be able to proclaim himself, as the antithesis of the antagonists, their higher unity, the Holy Spirit.”

A significant proportion of The German Ideology responds directly to popular philosophers of the period, with the authors often adopting a mocking tone. In this example they describe Bruno Bauer as “Poor Bruno” and dismiss his ideas as derivative. Throughout the text Marx and Engels use language like this to tear apart their intellectual enemies. For instance, a page later they write, “Saint Bruno still continues to prance about on his old-Hegelian war horse” (107). By making fun of other philosophers, the authors imply that their theories are ridiculous and deserve scorn.

“The illusions which some ‘youths’, ‘men’, etc., have or claim to have about themselves, are without any examination accepted by Stirner himself and confused with the ‘life’, with the reality, of these highly ambiguous youths and men.” 

Idealist philosophy argues that concepts and ideas are enough to change history. In their critique of contemporary idealist philosophy, Marx and Engels suggest that philosophers overemphasize how the individual understands themselves. The authors highlight the “illusions” some people have about themselves, suggesting that changing one’s perception is not enough to change reality.

“Thus, history becomes a mere history of illusory ideas, a history of spirits and ghosts, while the real, empirical history that forms the basis of this ghostly history is only utilised to provide bodies for these ghosts; from it are borrowed the names required to clothe these ghosts with the appearance of reality. In making this experiment our saint frequently forgets his role and writes an undisguised ghost-story.” 

In 19th-century Germany the history of ideas was very popular. Marx and Engels are positioning their research against the dominant emphasis on philosophy in this period. They argue that idealist philosophy is “a history of spirit and ghosts” that ignores the real, physical world. For instance, in critiquing Stirner’s reading of ancient history, they observe that he only studies the writings of philosophers to develop his analysis. In doing so, he neglects to consider what life was like for ancient people and how these philosophies might connect to day-to-day life. Marx and Engels assert the primacy of lived experience over “ghost stories.”

“Freedom of labour is free competition of the workers among themselves.” 

One of the main theories of bourgeoise society was that the freedom of labor increased personal freedom. This is one of the core tenants of capitalist society: By choosing a vocation, the worker can shape their own destiny. The authors dismiss this as a fantasy. They argue that the freedom of labor forces workers to compete against each other for gain. This breaks down collective bonds and reduces the power of workers.

“‘Henceforth’—‘no longer’—‘on the other hand’—‘now’—‘as previously’—‘now’—‘or’—‘not’—such is the content of this proposition.” 

Throughout the text Marx and Engels cite the writings of their intellectual enemies, often using quotes to make their ideas look silly. The original quote by Stirner referenced above is “‘However, henceforth your having [Dein Haben] and what you have [Deine Habe] no longer suffices, and is no longer recognised; on the other hand, your working and your work increases in value. We now respect your mastery of things as previously’ (?) ‘we respected your possession of them. Your labour is your wealth. You are now the master or possessor of what you have obtained by work and not by inheritance’” (241). In the excerpt Marx and Engels pull all the prepositions out of the sentence. In doing so, they imply that there is no actual content in the original sentence. Another way they dismiss Stirner’s ideas is by inserting (?) in his quote, suggesting to the reader that it doesn’t make sense. They argue that the only content in the sentence is the words they pulled out. This reflects the derisive tone the authors take in their text.

“When the narrow-minded bourgeois says to the communists: by abolishing property, i.e., my existence as a capitalist, as a landed proprietor, as a factory-owner, and your existence as workers, you abolish my individuality and your own; by making it impossible for me to exploit you, the workers, to rake in my profit, interest or rent, you make it impossible for me to exist as an individual.—When, therefore, the bourgeois fells the communists: by abolishing my existence as a bourgeois, you abolish my existence as an individual; when thus he identifies himself as a bourgeois with himself as an individual, one must, at least, recognise his frankness and shamelessness. For the bourgeois it is actually the case, he believes himself to be an individual only insofar as he is a bourgeois.” 

One of the liberals’ main criticisms of communism was that it doesn’t account for human individuality. In response, Marx and Engels suggest that individuality transcends one’s labor. If the bourgeois cannot locate a sense of self that is distinct from being a bourgeois, this is a problem of the bourgeois individual. Marx and Engels conclude that what bourgeoise are really saying is that they want to continue to exploit the working class. Their objection to communism on the grounds of individuality is disingenuous. They are really objecting to the abolition of private property.

“The struggle over ‘man’ is the fulfilment of the word, as written in the twenty-first chapter of Cervantes, which deals with ‘the high adventure and rich prize of Mambrino’s helmet’. Our Sancho, who in everything imitates his former lord and present servant, ‘has sworn to win Mambrino’s helmet’—man—for himself. After having during his various ‘campaigns’ sought in vain to find the longed-for helmet among the ancients and moderns, liberals and communists, ‘he caught sight of a man on a horse carrying something on his head which shone like gold’. And he said to Don Quixote-Szeliga: ‘If I am not mistaken, there is someone approaching us bearing on his head that helmet of Mambrino, about which I swore the oath you know of.’ ‘Take good care of what you say, your worship, and even greater care of what you do,’ replied Don Quixote, who by now has become wiser. ‘Tell me, can you not see that knight coming towards us on a dapple-grey steed with a gold helmet on his head?’—‘What I see and perceive,’ replies Don Quixote, ‘is nothing but a man on a grey ass like yours with something glittering on his head.’—‘Why, that is Mambrino’s helmet,’ says Sancho.” 

Marx and Engels spend the majority of the text attacking Stirner. They use particularly pointed nicknames to imply he is ridiculous. One of the most common nicknames they use is Sancho, a reference to Sancho Panza, a character in the Miguel de Cervantes novel Don Quixote. Sancho Panza is a peasant laborer who accompanies hero Don Quixote on his quest. In this quote they use Don Quixote to respond to Stirner’s argument about “man.” They reframe Don Quixote and Sancho Panza’s quest for Mambrino’s helmet to be about Stirner’s philosophical quest for man. In his text Stirner creates an alter-ego called Szeliga. Marx and Engels explain, “Szeliga is Stirner as a creation, Stirner is Szeliga as creator. Stirner is the ‘I’, Szeliga the ‘you’” (286). In calling Stirner Sancho Panza, Marx suggests that he is the egoist, identified with common sense and earthy wisdom. The quote refers to “Don Quixote-Szeliga,” suggesting that Szeliga is the mad, errant knight Don Quixote. In essence, Marx argues that Stirner is simply arguing with himself. Throughout the text the authors rename Stirner repeatedly. This is in reference to the fact that his birth name was Johann Kaspar Schmidt. Other nicknames include the Berlin school-master, Saint Max, Saint Sancho, and Jacques le bonhomme.

“The inactive petty bourgeois, for whom railways dropped from the sky and who for that very reason imagines that he invented them himself, begins to indulge in fantasies about aerial flight after having once travelled by railway. Actually, the balloon came first and then the railways. Saint Sancho had to reverse this, for otherwise everyone would have seen that when the balloon was invented the demand for railways was still a long way off, whereas the opposite is easy to imagine.”

The idealist argues that railways are created because the individual wants the freedom afforded by the railway. Stirner writes that the speed of rail travel gave birth to the desire for flight. History, however, shows that balloons were invented before railways. Further, Marx and Engels argue that railways did not simply appear; rather, they were built to fulfill changing material needs—in this case, the need to transport goods to market.

“We will only give a few examples of the objections raised to communism in his essay: Page 168: ‘Communism does not combine the atoms into an organic whole.’ The demand that the ‘atoms’ should be combined into an ‘organic whole’ is no more realistic than the demand for the squaring of the circle.” 

The specificity of language is another theme in the critiques advanced by Marx and Engels. In this quote they attack Stirner for using a nonsensical analogy to attack communism. Marx and Engels are interested in biology and the natural world. Atoms are the basic unit of matter. They correctly note that it is incorrect to suggest that atoms should form an organic whole. The materialist philosophy advanced by Marx and Engels suggests that change is constant and that the desire for an organic whole is misguided. By highlighting a quote that is illogical, they suggest that Stirner’s larger critique should be dismissed.

“Of course, we realise that the communist movement cannot be impaired by a few German phrase-mongers. But in a country like Germany—where philosophic phrases have for centuries exerted a certain power, and where, moreover, communist consciousness is anyhow less keen and determined because class contradictions do not exist in as acute a form as in other nations—it is, nevertheless, necessary to resist all phrases which obscure and dilute still further the realisation that communism is totally opposed to the existing world order.”

In this quote the authors articulate the stakes of their argument. Communism is a political movement, but philosophers analyze it in abstract terms. Marx and Engels argue that concepts cannot stop the rapidly developing movement. However, refuting these incorrect assessments matters because they dilute the real message and meaning of communism.

“‘Man’ could also observe a great many other things in nature, e.g., the bitterest competition among plants and animals; he could see, for example, in the plant world, in his ‘forest of tall and stately oaks’, how these tall and stately capitalists consume the nutriment of the tiny shrubs, which might well complain: terra, aqua, aere et igni interdicti sumus; he could observe the parasitic plants, the ideologists of the vegetable world, he could further observe that there is open warfare between the ‘forest birds’ and the ‘infinite multitude of tiny creatures’, between the grass of his ‘meadows’ and the ‘mettlesome troop of young horses’. He could see in his ‘countless host of worlds’ a whole heavenly feudal monarchy complete with tenants and satellites, a few of which, e.g., the moon, lead a very poor life aere et aqua interdicti; a feudal system in which even the homeless vagabonds, the comets, have been apportioned their station in life and in which, for example, the shattered asteroids bear witness to occasional unpleasant scenes, while the meteors, those fallen angels, creep shamefaced through the ‘infinite space’ distance, he would come upon the reactionary fixed stars.” 

Throughout the text Marx and Engels highlight how philosophers use nature to justify their ideas. In this passage they systematically reveal how one can find a justification for any belief system in nature. The desire to find unity or the eternal in nature is misguided. By not assessing nature on its own terms, philosophers abstract the material world into meaningless symbolism.