The Federalist Papers

Returning to the objection that two years is too long an interval between elections of representatives, Madison quotes critics who say “that where annual elections end, tyranny begins” (272). However, Madison writes that there is no evidence to show that Connecticut, which elects legislators every six months, is better governed than South Carolina, which elects legislators every two years. More to the point, Madison believes that one year is not enough time to acquire the necessary experience to perform one’s duties at an optimal level. This is particularly true for US representatives, who must understand the laws of their own state, the federal government’s laws, and, to some degree, the laws of other states and foreign nations.

Madison writes that members of the House of Representatives will be apportioned among the states according to population size. However, a particularly contentious issue involves whether enslaved people should be counted toward a state’s population, or whether they should be treated the way the law treats them—as property, not people. Many Northerners believe that, as property, enslaved people should count toward the amount of tax each state must pay but not its population, which would entitle them to more political representation and increase the power of slave-holding states. Southern convention members predictably disagreed, arguing that enslaved people are neither solely persons nor solely property; rather, “they partake of both these qualities” (277).

Ultimately, the Northern and Southern convention members reached a compromise: For the purpose of apportioning House members, enslaved people will be counted as three-fifths of a human being. While Madison calls this reasoning “a little strained,” he also says it “fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have established” (281).

Of the issue concerning how many representatives will be in the House, Madison writes, “Scarce any article, indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed” (282). Critics believe that the current number of 65 is too low to accurately represent the will of constituents. Moreover, they argue that this small group will only represent an elite socioeconomic slice of each district.

However, Madison believes that a precise balance must be struck so that there are enough representatives to ensure a free exchange of diverse opinions, but not so many that the legislative body devolves into “the confusion and intemperance of a multitude” (283). In addition, the number of representatives will increase after the next census in three years, commensurate to the increase to the US population.

For Madison, the crux of the issue, however, is whether such a low number poses an immediate risk to the safety and good governance of the United States. He forcefully rejects this argument. His opinion of the American people is too high for him to believe that they would elect 65 people “who would either desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them” (285).

Another objection leveled at the House of Representatives is that it is “too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents” (287). Madison sets out to define what knowledge is required to exercise federal legislative authority. In terms of local knowledge, he says the representative must be well-versed in the state’s taxation, commerce, and militia. Much of the knowledge pertaining to taxation, Madison writes, may be acquired by anyone in private, simply by reading local tax codes. Commerce, he admits, may vary depending on the location within the state, posing some challenges. The militia, however, will be regulated the same across the state, and therefore a representative is likely to have already ascertained this information simply by living there.

Madison addresses the criticism that the House of Representatives will be made up of “that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few” (291). He finds this ludicrous, given that the principles and practices of republican government are all designed to prevent the emergence of such an oligarchy. The voters are rich and poor, learned and ignorant, and, crucially, the same individuals who elect state legislators without causing oligarchies to emerge at the state level. The only difference, Madison notes, between how representatives will be elected and how state legislators are elected is that in the latter case thousands will vote, and in the former case only hundreds do. According to Madison, that makes the representative more likely to be virtuous, not less, because they will have attracted the admiration of so many more people.

The objection that the size of the House of Representatives will not increase as the population increases is an easy one for Madison to counter: It is not true. The current number of 65 is only set to last for three years until the 1790 census, at which point that number will increase. It will continue to increase with each ten-year census going forward. Madison also addresses critics who believe that a supermajority should be required to pass legislation, rather than a simple majority. The author rejects this notion on the grounds that it would reverse “the fundamental principle of free government” (300) by giving a minority the power to block any and all new legislation.

Hamilton returns to discuss a controversial clause in the Constitution stipulating that while state legislatures are generally in charge of holding and regulating elections of representatives, Congress may step in at any time to change those regulations. He argues that it would be potentially disastrous to place the administration of national elections solely under the purview of state governments, leaving “the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy” (300). In short, removing this clause would violate a principle fundamental to Hamilton’s view of government: “EVERY GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION” (300).

Hamilton considers the question of whether there might be negative consequences stemming from empowering the federal government to regulate its own elections by default. “[I]t is alleged,” Hamilton writes, “that [the federal government] might [...] promote the election of some favorite class of men [...] by confining the places of election to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice” (309). Such a possibility, however, would be immediately met with a revolt by the people, according to Hamilton. Moreover, he argues that such a scheme, presumably designed to elevate “the wealthy and well-born” (309), would fail because such individuals are scattered all over the state in various concentrations.

In a final essay on this matter, Hamilton explores the question of whether elections must be held in the counties where the voters live, a stipulation which is absent from the Constitution. In response, he cites numerous state constitutions—including New York’s—that do not include this provision.

Madison begins with a discussion of the qualifications required of senators. Unlike representatives, senators must be at least 30 years old with at least nine years of citizenship behind them. This, he writes, is because senators require “greater extent of information and stability of character” (315). Also unlike representatives, senators are appointed by state legislatures, in what Madison calls a popular provision that hands states a significant role in forming the composition of the federal government. Another crucial difference is that Senate representation is equal rather than proportional among the states, with each state appointing two senators regardless of its population. Madison admits this decision was made not according to any political theory but rather in “a spirit of amity” (315) with the states.

Madison believes that the Senate will be useful in conveying America’s “national character” to foreign countries, thereby increasing the respect it commands on the international stage. Given that its members will not be directly elected by the people, the Senate will serve as a safeguard against self-inflicted damage caused by the passions of the people. Looking to history, Madison points out that there is “no long-lived republic which had not a senate” (322).

Jay expounds upon the section of the Constitution granting the President the power to make treaties “with the advice and consent of the Senate, [...] provided two thirds of the senators present concur” (327). He greatly approves of empowering the President and the Senate to make treaties as opposed to the House of Representatives. This is because House members are subject to replacement every two years, and treaties require greater stability so other countries will trust entering into them with the United States.

Hamilton discusses two other powers granted to the Senate. The first is the power to cooperate with the executive to appoint officers to that branch, and the second is the power to serve as a court for impeachment trials. Although the Senate will act in a judiciary capacity in impeachment trials, the crimes at the center of these trials will be those committed against the public trust, and are therefore considered to be inherently “POLITICAL” offenses, not criminal defenses. For that reason, representatives of the people should be responsible for impeachment, rather than the Supreme Court or any other more traditional judiciary body. Taking a page from Great Britain, where the House of Lords and the House of Commons cooperate on impeachment, the Constitution empowers the House of Representatives to originate impeachment proceedings and the Senate to rule on them. Referring to the Senate, where members are only up for reelection every six years, Hamilton asks, “What other body would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, HIS ACCUSERS?” (334).

Hamilton discusses other objections to the Senate’s role in ruling in impeachment proceedings. Some critics worry that imbuing a legislative body with a judicial responsibility violates the maxim concerning the separation of powers. Yet the authors already discussed at length the benefits of a “partial intermixture” of powers between the three branches as part of a system of checks and balances. Others worry that the Senate, given its role in making appointments, will be loath to hold those same appointees accountable. Hamilton, however, argues that the Senate merely approves nominees, while it is the President who chooses them. Thus, he does not believe favoritism will play an undue role in impeachment hearings.