45 pages • 1 hour read
Émile DurkheimThe Division of Labor in Society
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1893A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Book I, Introduction-Chapter 3Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Book I: “The Function of the Division of Labor”
Introduction Summary & Analysis: “The Problem”
Durkheim argues that the division of labor is a sign of progress. Adam Smith and English philosopher John Stuart Mill first defined it as a specialization in economic production, and it is characterized by certain socio-economic developments. Tasks are becoming more specific and less wholistic, and big industries are replacing small-scale businesses, to the point where even the domain of agriculture is becoming increasingly mechanized. However, Durkheim notes that the division of labor also touches upon other areas of society beyond the economic, such as the political and scientific spheres; experts are encouraged to specialize, and can no longer dabble in multiple disciplines or even encompass the whole of their own field.
The division of labor is not simply a social institution created by men, Durkheim argues, but a biological phenomenon that directs the future of human progress. The main question Durkheim seeks to answer is whether people should resist or embrace this change from a moral standpoint. Philosophers and economists of his time were increasingly concerned with how the division of labor has encouraged low-skill work over more rounded and artistic work from artisans for the sake of productivity. Durkheim himself wishes to know how the division of labor might affect human behavior and their moral aspirations: Will people be content with only ever producing part of a whole, or should people seek to become more rounded and self-sufficient as in the past?
Durkheim illustrates his approach to moral inquiry as different from moralists, who formulate an ideal theory before observing the facts and then attempt to categorize facts into their framework. Durkheim instead declares that to fully assess the moral implications of the division of labor, he must first understand the phenomenon itself without substituting his own views for the moral consciousness of the society as a whole. This approach is one that he finds to be more scientific, because it is not based on a priori assumptions, or theories believed to be true without proof, but on a posteriori observation, or knowledge attained from experience.
The Division of Labor is separated into three books. The first book analyzes the causes and consequences that the division of labor has on society. The second book investigates the conditions that have created the division of labor in the first place. The final book observes instances where the division of labor takes an unusual (abnormal) form. Durkheim argues that there are exceptions to every rule, and that deviations can help reinforce people’s understanding of the rule.
Book I, Chapter 1 Summary & Analysis: “The Method of Determining This Function”
Durkheim begins by defending his choice in terminology. He first defines function as the use and the relationship between an item being observed and its environment. He prefers to refer to the “function” of the division of labor rather than the “purpose” or “aim.” This is to not presuppose that there is an ultimate moral meaning to the division of labor, especially since at first glance the phenomenon seems to be purely economic, divorced from questions of morality. If it is purely an economic question, then there is no right or wrong in choosing to stubbornly remain a small-scale artisan against the trend of the division of labor, or to follow the trend and become a great manufacturer on the national scale.
Durkheim proposes to evaluate the moral weight of the division of labor by first measuring the standard of morality in any given society (civilization). As there is no measuring tool for assessing how much good moral behavior is being made, he offers instead to look at the rate of “immoral” behavior, such as crime and suicide rates, which is much easier to delineate, both qualitatively and quantitatively. However, Durkheim warns that there is rarely any moral significance to human progress, unlike what most moralists claim. Civilizational progress is not inherently moral or immoral, and if the division of labor enables progress, it also is neither ethically good nor bad.
The only exception is the discipline of science: People increasingly believe it is their duty to develop their intelligence through the pursuit of scientific truth. However, true science, defined as the rigorous pursuit of truth rather than generalized scientific facts, is only reserved for the expert and inaccessible to the public. Thus, society can survive without science, and much like the arts or the economy, there is not necessarily a moral obligation to pursue it.
Durkheim tentatively concludes that the division of labor cannot only exist to meet certain human needs. This is because these human needs often result from the consequences of the division of labor. For example, an increase in fatigue from the workload imposed by the division of labor will push people to increasingly seek modes of curing that fatigue. These products are therefore both created and mitigated by the division of labor. It must fulfill another function.
In the second half of the chapter, Durkheim proposes that division of labor is a source of solidarity: It brings together diverse elements by highlighting how they complement one another. For example, the division of labor between the sexes in modern societies allows for certain domestic tasks; before, the division of labor between the sexes was limited to a difference in biology, such as in reproductive organs. Durkheim uses data from social Darwinism to argue that marriage was not yet a strong and fixed institution in “primitive” societies, and that women were as strong as men based on the size of their bones and brain. In modern societies, however, marriage ties men and women together because they are different but complementary; they work more efficiently when there is a starker distinction in the type of labor each is expected to perform.
By expanding this same logic to other aspects of society, Durkheim concludes it is possible to consider the division of labor as a source of social solidarity. If this is the case, and if harmony and order are about ethics, then the division of labor must possess moral character.
To what extent does the division of labor contribute to social cohesion? Durkheim seeks to answer this question with a posteriori observations by using law as a measuring tool. Where men gather and form complex relationships with each other, they need ways to stay organized, and the law fulfills this role. Durkheim divides the legal system into two main categories: penal and restitutive law. Penal law covers all repressive sanctions, where somebody who transgresses a rule is punished by decreasing their possessions, life, or liberty. Restitutive law, meanwhile, does not seek to cause harm to the perpetrator necessarily; its goal is to restore things to the previous state, prior to the infringement. A more detailed exploration can be found in the following chapter.
Book I, Chapter 2 Summary & Analysis: “Mechanical Solidarity, or Solidarity by Similarities”
Chapter 2 defines penal law as that which deals with crime, an act which must be repressed through the administration of punishment. While there are many different types of committable crime, there tends to be a uniformity to punishment across societies. Durkheim underscores that crime is not to be defined as acts harmful to society, because some acts clearly harmful to society are not punished accordingly. For example, there are penal laws to punish the homicide of one individual, but no proportional law to punish manmade stock market crashes or economic crises.
There is one observable common denominator for all criminal law: The law presumes that the majority of society, if not everyone, understands implicitly the authority of certain societal rules. For example, criminal laws do not state that every human life is valuable; it rather skips to the punishment, presuming that people already understand the inherent worth of living. In contrast, civil law prescribes an obligation and defines a sanction if that obligation is not observed, weighed in relation to the severity of the transgression. These obligations are often based on what is deemed morally correct in that particular society or at that particular time. Since moral norms change, so do civil laws. In contrast, criminal law is relatively static, especially in “primitive” societies, which rely on them.
Durkheim concludes that certain beliefs and sentiments are relatively constant, and known and accepted by the average members of a society. He terms the aggregate of these beliefs the “collective” or “common consciousness.” The collective consciousness is a psychological society: It exists only within the minds of individuals that make up a society, but it also reflects their reality. Crime is defined as a transgression of one or more beliefs in the common consciousness.
Durkheim believes the government was first established to ensure that the beliefs and traditions of the collective consciousness are respected. Durkheim defines the collective consciousness as the embodiment of the collectivity. Thus, it has the authority to regulate what constitutes a crime and the severity of the punishment attached to it.
Durkheim argues in this passage that punishment consists of a passionate reaction to injury. In the past, “primitive” societies punished as a means to channel their “passionate feeling” rather than to seek any compensation for the injured party. Durkheim points out that punishment rarely matches the severity of the crime committed: It is much like vengeance, which is the result of an emotional reaction rather than dispassionate reasoning. Hence, punishment often struck beyond the guilty party, injuring the innocent people surrounding them, such as family and neighbors.
In contrast, “modern” societies have evolved not to use punishment purely as a way to diffuse anger, but to protect themselves by deterring people from committing crimes detrimental to their proper functioning. Although punishment itself is still the result of “passionate reaction,” it is controlled in its intensity. Durkheim describes this shift as moving away from avenging and into premeditated foresight. Thus, there is greater care in modern societies to deliver punishment proportional to the crime committed.
Contrary to popular belief, punishment largely springs from religion, a social phenomenon, rather than individuals seeking retribution. Examples from India, Judaea, Egypt, and even Greece reveal that punishment was carried out in the name of their respective gods to punish acts injurious to the public interest. Thus, both “primitive” and “modern” societies regulate their penal law using an organized body, such as the government, and carry out retribution in the name of public interest. Durkheim concludes that even when crimes are injurious only to a few members of a population, the society acts as substitute for the individual: Penal law is exerted by the governing body on behalf of the members it protects.
Next, Durkheim uses historical observation to further prove the social character of punitive law. He begins by illustrating how crimes are considered acts that violate strong and well-defined aspects of the common consciousness. Violent retaliation is an emotional reaction, a means to protect the sacred state of the common consciousness that has been violated. A moderate reaction would be insufficient because it would undermine both the passion of the defender and the transcendent (divine) nature of the object.
There is a religiosity to the act of punishing, and this is socially-entrenched to the extent that religion is a communal endeavor. This is why, historically, people have gathered to perform the functions of a modern court of law. They decide spontaneously and unanimously the punishment to be carried out, guided by a common consciousness, a mutual belief in the inherently valuable nature of the object violated, and a collective aversion to the evil nature of the crime. Durkheim concludes that punitive law serves to sustain the common consciousness by reinforcing certain objects as transcendent.
Durkheim explores a key theme, Combining Biology and Sociology: The Community as an Organism. Common consciousness acts as a glue for society to remain coherent and harmonious. It underlines the similarities in each individual of a society over their differences. Every individual possesses two consciousness: One is individual, characteristic only to the person themselves, and one is common, a characteristic shared by the society.
Crimes either offend the common consciousness directly, or they reflect an individual type too dissimilar to the body collective to be accepted. This explains why certain acts not practically injurious to the collective may remain criminal due to them violating long-established symbolic elements of the collective. Durkheim concludes this chapter by assessing that punishment, however emotional and reactionary it may be, serves the practical function of maintaining social cohesion.
Book I, Chapter 3 Summary & Analysis: “Solidarity Arising from the Division of Labor, or Organic Solidarity”
In Chapter 3, Durkheim moves from punitive law to restitutive law. He observes that the latter distinguishes itself from the former by concerning itself with restoring the status quo rather than delivering punishment. This more moderate reaction to certain types of crime means the rules they violate are not as sacrosanct in the collective consciousness compared to those protected by punitive law. Durkheim believes that, for the majority of cases, restitutive law does not reflect the concerns of the collective consciousness. Whereas the regulation of repressive law is diffused throughout society, civil law is regulated by specialized bodies—such as consular courts and industrial and administrative tribunals—and defended by trained officials—such as magistrates and lawyers.
Nevertheless, restitutive law is not entirely a private endeavor. For example, although marriage is essentially a pact between two individuals, which can be negotiated or broken by either party, society exerts a certain amount pressure to ensure the upholding of that bond, so that individuals may still become concerned about the repercussions of breaking the law.
Durkheim borrows from jurisconsults to separate “real” rights and “personal” rights. “Real” rights defend people’s rights in relation to objects, whereas “personal” rights determine people’s rights in relation to one another. Section II of Chapter 3 focuses on “real” rights, exemplified by property rights: They regulate through various means how “real” objects belong to certain individuals, earning them the right to control these objects and barring others from enjoying the same.
However, given that objects have no will of their own, “real” rights mediate and limit people’s access to certain objects, and do not contribute to moving individual wills to collective ends. “Real” rights are therefore described as “negative,” as they do not contribute to the unity of the body social but rather detach individuals and put boundaries between them. The premise upon which this argument relies is the idea of finite resources: Every object owned by one individual cannot be owned by others due to a limit in accessibility or quantity. Durkheim concludes that the possession of objects ultimately encourages setting social boundaries rather than fostering unity.
Durkheim observes “personal” rights, which are regulated by domestic law, contractual law, commercial law, procedural law, and administrative and constitutional law. These rights exert a positive contribution on society because they regulate the relationship between individuals by fostering the division of labor. For example, domestic law seeks to delineate, on one hand, how family functions are allocated in the domestic sphere, and, on the other, how these tasks relate to one another. Commercial law does the same for contracts between agent and principle, carrier and consignor, lender and borrower, etc. Durkheim considers restitutive law, with the exception of property law, as the “supreme legal expression of cooperation” because its purpose is to ensure social productivity by effectively allocating tasks between different members of the society (79). He likens restitutive law to the nervous system of an organism: It ensures the harmonious functioning of the whole by regulating individual functions of the particular.
Durkheim distinguishes two types of positive solidarity: The first is the collective type, which directly links individuals to society without an intermediary. It exemplifies a less organized collective glued together through common beliefs and sentiments. The second is a more complex society made whole by uniting separate individuals through the division of tasks that ensure the harmonious functioning of the whole.
Although both types of solidarity can foster cohesive societies, the former glues people together by ensuring they think similarly, whereas the latter does so by underlining their differences. Durkheim argues, in tandem with popular theories of social Darwinism of the time, that the latter is more advanced than the former because it mirrors biological evolution: Complex organisms develop organs that perform increasingly differentiated tasks but work together to ensure the survival of the individual.
