The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith examine how revolutionary moments arise and how autocratic leaders prevent and deal with these threats to their political survival. If regimes excel at convincing everyday people that their lives will be worse off if they rebel, then the everyday people are unlikely to do so. Revolutions happen when there is a tipping point, or a crucial moment when the everyday people believe that life under the existing government is sufficiently terrible that they are willing to risk the substantial costs of rebellion. Moreover, the everyday people “must believe that some few who have come forward first in rebellion have a decent chance of success and a decent chance of making the lives of ordinary people better” (196). For this reason, the authors suggest that “middle-of-the-road dictators” (198), rather than the most brutal dictators, are more likely to experience a mass uprising. Unfortunately, rebellions sometimes replace one autocratic leader for another, even when the rebellion leaders promise to make the country democratic.

The authors note that “shocks that trigger protests come in many forms” (202). Contagion is one example. Contagion is when people in a state see the regime in a surrounding state fall. This type of shock makes people realize that their own government might also be vulnerable. Rigged elections are another example. Dictators hold elections to dispel domestic unrest, satisfy foreign aid conditions, or gain a misleading sense of legitimacy. The outcomes of these elections are often pre-determined, meaning the dictator will win. People sometimes seize the moment and vote overwhelmingly for another leader. If the dictator tries to stay in power after the election, this sometimes prompts an uprising. Natural disasters might also serve as a spark for rebellions. This is especially the case when everyday people must gather in refugee camps. Refugee camps present people, who already have little to lose, with the opportunity to organize a rebellion.

There are several factors that shape how leaders respond to rebellions. The first is whether the leader has the military’s loyalty. Leaders are easily able to suppress rebellions if they have the military’s support. However, if those in the military no longer believe that the leader can reward them, they are less likely to do the dirty work (i.e., suppress the uprising) to keep the current regime in power. Without this support during these tipping point moments, the leader has a much higher chance of losing power.

Another factor is whether the current leader has sufficient financial resources, especially natural resource wealth, to sustain them through rebellions. Economic troubles spell political troubles for autocratic leaders. Without financial resources, leaders are unable to pay their supporters, which could lead their supporters to join the rebellion.

There are two ways a leader can respond to a rebellion. The first is to increase autocratic principles. This response is only possible if the current leader has the financial wealth to continue paying their supporters. The supporters will be the ones who brutally suppress the rebellion. They will only do so if they continue receiving rewards. The second response is for the leader to increase democratic principles. In rare situations, incumbents might expand freedoms. They hope that doing so will increase the quality of life for the everyday people, thus decreasing rebellious inclinations and keeping the incumbent in power.

The authors focus on how war is another pathology of politics in Chapter 9. War is often thought to “transcend everyday politics” and be about national interests and power balances (225). However, war is political. Autocratic and democratic leaders fight over the exact same thing: staying in power. However, their perspectives on going and staying in war differ substantially.

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith believe the democratic leaders are better at fighting wars than their autocratic counterparts due to which great political and military thinkers’ recommendations they depend on. Sun Tzu, a Chinese writer, philosopher, military thinker, and general who lived 2,500 years ago still exerts influence on leaders of small-coalition systems. He is most famous for writing The Art of War, which is a book on how to wage war. There are three main points made in the book. First, quick action in war is more important than having an advantage in skill. Second, the supplies mobilized to fight should be enough for a short campaign. If a general needs to resupply their army, then they lack skill to win the battle. Sun Tzu advises generals in this position to give up the fight rather than waste the state’s treasury. Finally, leaders must use private rewards to motivate soldiers.

Leaders in democratic countries, especially the United States, also follow recommendations made by military and political thinkers, such as Caspar Weinberger (1916-2006), Colin Powell (1937-2021), and Madeleine Albright (1937-2022). In contrast to Sun Tzu, these thinkers believed that leaders need to be cautious about going into war and should first try and exert all diplomatic options for peace. Once this decision has been made, however, leaders need to spend as much money and involve as many troops as necessary to win the war. Democratic leaders should only fight wars they can win and that have the support of their citizens. Weinberger, Powell, and Albright all emphasize the “public good of protecting national interests” (228).

As the differences in thinking between Sun Tzu and Weinberger, Powell, and Albright illustrate, there is a great divide between small- and large-coalition systems in terms of the military and war. In small-coalition systems, the military serves to keep the leader safe from domestic rivals and tries to protect the leader from foreign rivals. Autocrats do not squander resources in battle since those resources need to go towards keeping their coalitions loyal. They also place less value on a soldier’s life. Autocrats also fight for treasure, slaves, and land, items they can use as rewards for supporters. They are also less sensitive to defeat than their democratic counterparts. Autocrats can survive in office after military defeat so long as they still have the resources to pay their coalitions.

The military primarily worries about protecting the system of government, and not the leader, in large-coalition systems. Since war is costly for democratic leaders, they need to be confident about winning. For this reason, democratic countries typically only fight smaller adversaries, including smaller democratic countries. They prefer to use diplomacy for stronger states. The willingness of democratic countries to try harder at winning also explains why weaker democracies are sometimes able to defeat strong autocracies. Democratic leaders also place great value on the lives of soldiers and will spend resources trying to protect them. Democratic leaders also fight over policy issues. As a result, they are more sensitive to war outcomes than autocrats. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith demonstrate throughout this book how policy failures are political death sentences for democratic leaders. Citizens view war losses as policy failures and will vote for other candidates when this happens. 

In the final chapter, the authors focus on how we might fix the rules to rule by. They first caution readers to be suspicious of people’s motives. As they demonstrate throughout the book, everyone has an interest in change, but leaders, supporters, influentials, and interchangeables rarely agree on the change. Change means that someone loses out. For example, as the coalition size initially expands, the supporter’s wealth declines. The addition of more supporters dilutes the share of private rewards. The extent of this dilution eventually declines as the coalition continues to get larger. Private rewards no longer make the leader’s supporters much better off than the majority of people. This change helps stabilize the democracy because leaders no longer have leverage to induce coalition members to purge the people or other supporters.

The authors believe that supporters in small-coalition systems represent the most important group when trying to institute change for the everyday people. There are only three instances when this group might be receptive to such change: when a leader has just come to power, when a leader is old or terminally sick, or when the leader is facing a financial crisis. The potential for purges is highest at these three points. Since the coalition members do not know if they will be retained, they are more receptive to reform. The everyday people are likely to comply since it will mean more public goods for them as the coalition expands. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith encourage foreign governments to take cues from these same lessons and only intervene to facilitate democratic change when the time is right.

Improvements to democracies can make this form of government even better. For example, the authors suggest that the United States should consider removing the electoral college from the US Constitution. The electoral college negates the idea of “one-person, one-vote” since small states are overrepresented in terms of electoral college votes (268). In a two-candidate system, one candidate could win the popular vote, but the other candidate could win the presidency, something the United States has seen in recent years. Because of the electoral college, US political leaders need to win the right combination of states, rather than the majority of votes, to be president.

Improvements in developing countries are more difficult than in developed countries, but not impossible. To determine which developing countries are ready for change, the authors suggest looking at those who rely on tourism for their economy. Changes to tourism from rebellions might encourage autocratic leaders to increase freedoms in the country because these changes disrupt the flow of money. Financial crises are political crises. If the autocratic leader wants to stay in power, then they need to be willing to make some changes. Failure to do so will likely result in loss of power.

Cell phone technology and access to the Internet can also help induce change. These technologies allow citizens to coordinate better even with an oppressive regime. They also increase access to markets, which helps everyday people make more money. Leaders might also be happy with these technologies since they improve commerce in the country, thus generating more revenue for the leader’s discretionary use. Smart leaders will accept the technology since they benefit from it. Over time, this acceptance might lead them to also liberalize so they stay in power.

In the end, leaders decide their country’s relative share of freedom by following the rules to rule by. People cannot alter these rules, but we can hopefully find paths that improve the human condition within the laws of politics. Despite their cynicism throughout much of the book, the authors are hopeful. Small-coalition regimes always face the risk of collapse due to their own corruption and inefficiency. When those crucial moments happen, the authors emphasize that just a few small changes can improve lives of everyday people living in those countries.