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47 pages 1 hour read

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith

The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2011

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Chapters 2-3Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 2 Summary: “Coming to Power”

There are three things that a challenger must do to come to power in autocracies. The first is to remove the current leader. There are three ways to remove the current leader. The first and easiest is that the leader dies. The second is that the challenger can convince the current leader’s essentials to defect. Finally, outside forces, such as a revolution or military defeat by a foreign power, can overwhelm the current political system.

Once the old leader is gone, the challenger needs to seize the treasury and other instruments of power as quickly as possible. There are often multiple challengers vying for power, especially in small-coalition systems. Challengers need to show the individuals backing their power grab that they can buy their loyalty. The only way for challengers to do this is to immediately seize control of the state’s cash flow. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith note that “waiting is risky business. There is no prize for coming in second” (24).

Finally, the challenger needs to form a coalition of supporters that will sustain him as the new leader. Simply put, the challenger needs to ensure they have enough money to buy the supporters’ loyalty. This makes it more difficult for someone to overthrow them.

There are several circumstances that open the door to a new leader in autocracies (or political systems with few essentials). The first is mortality. Dead leaders are not able to deliver rewards to their supporters. Dying leaders also make it easier for challengers. Once essential backers know their leader is dying, they will start looking for a new leader to ensure that the flow of rewards continues into their pockets. For this reason, many leaders, especially those in autocracies, keep terminal illnesses a secret.

One way a dying leader might be able to stave off challenges is to designate an heir (also known as inheritance). Since the essence of good government is buying loyalty, heirs are still able to reward supporters. The heirs already know where the money is and whom they need to continue paying off. Thus, supporters are already in place with inheritance. For sick leaders, designating a new heir can help them maintain power until they die. Other opportunities that pave the way for new leaders include current leaders who fail to do the right thing, especially in the eyes of their supporters; financial crises; supporters of the current leader finding out that they are going to be replaced; and coalition expansions.

Leader transitions in democracies follow the same mechanisms as those in autocracies, although they are less violent. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith state, “Just as in an autocracy, a democratic challenger needs to ensure the deposition of the incumbent [current political leader], seize command of the instruments of the state, and sufficiently reward a coalition of supporters so that they back her as the new democratic incumbent” (41).

In a democracy, challengers are more easily able to detach supporters from the current coalition because of the reliance on public goods in this political system. Since public goods benefit everyone, those in the coalition are not much different than those outside the coalition. Loyalty is easy to dilute in this case. Challengers who come up with more popular public policies than the current government will also win over more supporters. There is also a lack of urgency in democratic transitions. The reason is that there is often time between election result announcements and candidates coming to power. This time window allows incoming presidents, at least in the United States, to prepare, nominate their cabinet, and appoint people into government positions.

One of the main differences between coming to power in a democracy and in a dictatorship is the role of good or popular policy ideas. Democrats use policy ideas to buy loyalty. Unfortunately, policy ideas do not buy the same kind of loyalty as private rewards do. The reason is that everyone partakes in the policy benefit whether they support the current democratic leader or not. Past deeds do not buy loyalty. If a challenger comes along and has a more appealing policy idea, people are easily able to switch their support to the challenger. Winston Churchill’s election loss at the end of World War II provides a particularly infamous example. Churchill is one of Britain’s greatest politicians. His rhetoric and policy ideas helped defeat Hitler’s Nazi Germany during World War II. Britons admired and praised Churchill at the end of the war. Yet, they still selected another candidate over Churchill. In the end, they preferred the challenger’s policies to Churchill’s policies.

While public policies help leaders build and maintain supporters, there are still private rewards in democratic politics. For example, dynastic rule is still common. The authors note that one-quarter of American presidents were close relatives. 

Chapter 3 Summary: “Staying in Power”

Once an individual comes to power, they immediately face a new challenge: staying in power. One of the first things new leaders must do is “shore up the coalition of supporters” (49). A prudent leader will quickly remove some of their original backers and replace them with others who will be more loyal. Loyalty to the leader is the most important characteristic of a coalition.

No matter how well a leader surrounds themselves with loyal supporters, they must always keep the coalition itself off-balance. The best way to do this is to keep a small number of essentials and make sure they understand they are easily replaceable. Rigged elections are a powerful tool for warning supporters that they are expendable. This is why autocracies often have elections.

Leaders in democratic systems also cheat with elections. Leaders can restrict who is eligible to vote. They can also use intimidation and violence to restrict access to voting places. Leaders can also miscount and destroy ballots. Leaders also encourage additional competitors. Having numerous small parties divides the opposition vote, keeping the dominant party in power. Leaders can also reduce the number of people they have to rely on by designating seats for underrepresented minorities. By focusing on winning districts in which the minority group is prevalent, the leader can win an election with just a small subset of the population. This tactic reduces the number of essentials needed for leaders to stay in power. Candidates will lose power if they are unwilling to cheat.

To stay in power, leaders must build small coalitions. Autocrats find it harder to survive the first few months of claiming power than democrats. Once an autocrat makes it past the first six months, they are more likely to survive being in power longer than democrats. The reason is that democrats typically have larger coalitions than autocrats.

Chapters 2-3 Analysis

In these two chapters, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith establish how leaders come to power and how they stay in power. An analysis of Liberia’s Sergeant Doe, who led the country from 1980 to 1990, shows how these are two very different political elements. To come to power, Sergeant Doe followed all the rules. He removed the political leader by killing him. He then formed a new coalition of supporters. He replaced nearly everyone in the government or army with members from his own tribe. He also significantly increased the pay of army officials using revenue from a foreign company, which bought their loyalty. The people of Liberia hated Sergeant Doe due to his corruption and inability to rule the country. Yet, he remained in power for years because he knew where the money was and whom he needed to pay off. Sergeant Doe’s situation changed, however, when the source of revenue dried up. This led to challengers, one of whom eventually captured and killed Sergeant Doe. Politics does not end once an individual becomes a leader.

There are different ways that leaders can be ousted from power. One of the most dangerous ones is a financial crisis. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith underscore throughout The Dictator’s Handbook that a financial crisis is a political crisis. As one example, Czar Nicholas II, who was the last Russian emperor ruling the country from 1894 to 1917, “had the silly idea that a sober army would prove more effective than army that was falling-over drunk” (37). Nicholas thought that banning vodka would improve the performance of Russian troops during World War I. He did not consider the impact this ban would have on his revenue source. Vodka sales made up about one-third of the government’s revenue. The ban drastically reduced his revenue. This ban coupled with the rising costs of war resulted in Nicholas being unable to pay his soldiers. As a result, the army refused to stop protestors, leading to Nicholas’s removal from power. Policy matters so long as leaders can pay off their cronies. Once leaders are no longer able to do this, supporters will look for someone who can. This is the reason why financial crises are political crises.

While Bueno de Mesquita and Smith focus primarily on politics in this book, they also provide examples from other settings to show how leaders all follow the same rules to try and stay in power. The rise and fall of Carly Fiorina, the CEO at Hewlett-Packard from 1999 to 2005, demonstrate the need for leaders to reshuffle their coalition to ensure only the most loyal supporters remain in a business setting. While Fiorina was able to reshuffle the original board, she still faced significant opposition from the inner circle of essentials and influentials. During her entire tenure, she was unable to secure the board’s loyalty. She tried to purge several board members midway through her tenure and better compensate those who remained. These tactics failed to get the right loyalists in place to help her survive. After the company’s share values continued to decline and Fiorina was unable to build a board loyal to her, she stepped down. This example illustrates how a leader’s inability to build a coalition loyal to them will hinder their political survival.

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