Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938

The final three chapters in Rise to Globalism discuss President Bill Clinton’s second term in office and the first term of President George W. Bush. The two leaders displayed different foreign policy styles but tackled related issues. Bill Clinton sought NATO enlargement, pursued the peace process in the Middle East, and involved the United States in another conflict in the Balkans. Osama bin Laden, the leader of the al Qaeda terrorists, carried out attacks abroad in the late 1990s on Bill Clinton’s watch. The authors suggest that the danger that bin Laden represented did not receive sufficient attention from the Clinton administration, in part, resulting, in unprecedented terrorist attacks on American soil on September 11, 2011. It was these attacks that President Bush used to justify the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s. With his global war on terror hunting down non-state terrorist actors underway, it seemed that the United States found its new role in the post-Cold War world order after all.

The authors discuss how the US both cooperated and challenged post-Soviet Russia. For example, Clinton promoted Russian entry into the G8 and the World Trade Organization. On the other hand, the US sought to expand toward Russia’s borders by accepting new members. The authors argue that this expansion generated an “understandably pessimistic reaction” (437) in a country that had been invaded by Napoleon and Hitler.

NATO found itself reinvigorated in other ways. As the crisis continued in the Balkans, the military alliance carried out a 78-day bombing campaign of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with a large civilian death toll, including the Chinese Embassy staff in Belgrade, and significant damage to non-military targets. Secretary of State Madeline Albright “pushed the hardest for military bombings” (453).

Unlike his previous term, Clinton was more engaged in foreign policy questions in the late 1990s. He unsuccessfully sought peace in the Middle East and visited South Africa to meet Nelson Mandela. American foreign policy remained the same in Latin America. For example, Clinton continued to enforce strict sanctions against Cuba even after the Soviet dissolution.

In 1998, Osama bin Laden made statements targeting Americans and other Western nations like Israel. He accused the US of “occupying the most holy lands of Islam” (440). US intelligence discovered that the terrorist planned to strike New York and Washington, DC. Yet despite these reports, the terrorists were able to carry out the attacks within the United States on September 11, 2001. The authors discuss the public mood, which transformed from terror, confusion, and sadness to patriotism: “Within hours, Walmarts and mom-and-pop stores sold out of flags” (462). The most important question, however, was the reason why the Bush administration failed to do more to prevent the attacks. According to historian Lawrence Wright: “From 1993 to 2000, the world witnessed the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the rise of al Qaeda, and the breakdown of CIA intelligence” (464).

On the one hand, Bush had been given briefings in August 2001 claiming the imminent nature of domestic attacks. On the other hand, he had been president for less than a year, Rise to Globalism argues. Therefore, it is difficult to place the blame solely on him. The Clinton administration did not sufficiently address the attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. Al Qaeda’s terrorism changed Bush’s foreign policy, “moving steadily in the direction of isolationism” (470) toward neoconservative hawkishness.

As a result, Bush chose to invade Afghanistan, harboring al Qaeda, in 2001. Whereas several leaders of that terrorist organization were killed, it was not until the Obama presidency a decade later that bin Laden himself was assassinated. This war in Afghanistan gradually transformed into other objectives, such as nation-building, and dragged on.

The Iraq War also arose out of the Clinton era. In the late 1990s, Saddam Hussein did not abide by the agreements made after the Gulf War. The US enforced a no-fly zone over Iraq. In 1999, Clinton sought military training for Hussein’s opponents. The authors argue that it was these events that escalated during the Bush administration.

Bush used the 9/11 attacks to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The invasion occurred under the false premise of the weapons of mass destruction thought to be in possession of Saddam Hussein contrary to UN reports. There were debates within the administration: Vice President Dick Cheney supported the invasion, whereas Secretary of State Colin Powell initially opposed it. Bush framed his international goals broadly as a war on terror: “Now American foreign policy was based on ‘military strength and moral clarity’ rather than collective security” (479). The moralizing aspects of this broad policy included calling Iraq part of “the axis of evil” (484) mimicking the language of the Second World War.

The 2002 National Security Strategy best expressed the vagueness of Bush’s foreign policy by mentioning the threat to “capitalism as a whole” or “the entire Western way of life” (488). Ultimately, toppling Saddam Hussein led to having Iraq “immediately thrown into bloody turmoil as factions representing different religious sects, like Sunnis and Shiites, and, to some extent, different regions extent, to wage a violent guerrilla war” (494). This war lasted for years.

Rise to Globalism concludes by arguing that as President Obama’s term began, “a huge global battle is being waged between the forces of light and darkness” (512) in reference to non-state terrorist actors. The world was no safer than it was during the Cold War.