32 pages • 1 hour read
PlatoA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Summary
Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Key Figures
Themes
Index of Terms
Important Quotes
Essay Topics
Tools
At this point, there is a philosophical and dramatic shift in the dialogue. Protagoras takes over the questioning, and Socrates must provide answers. Protagoras believes it is paramount for an educated person to know how to analyze and interpret the verse of the esteemed poets. He asks Socrates whether he finds any contradiction in a couple of famous verses from the esteemed fifth-century BCE poet Simonides. Finding such a contradiction would prove that Simonides is not so wise as most people think. However, Socrates finds Simonides’s verses consistent. Protagoras objects, offers up a speech, and receives applause from the audience.
Because Prodicus hails from the same homeland as Simonides, Socrates calls on him to answer a question about the lines. He asks whether becoming and being are the same thing, and Prodicus responds that they are not. Socrates uses this brief exchange, along with a view from Hesiod, to state that Simonides is not contradicting himself. In one instance, Simonides is discussing the difficulty of becoming good: in the other, he addresses the ease of being good. Socrates further supports his argument in a short discussion with Prodicus about the sense in which Simonides uses his words. He then speaks of the brevity of speech in Spartan society as further evidence of the depth of meaning that can be compressed into a few short lines of verse.
Socrates’s defense of Simonides then turns into a discussion on the difficulty of maintaining goodness in misfortune. Socrates states his famous thesis that the good never willingly do bad things, but badness comes from a state of ignorance. He ends his defense of Simonides’s verse with the conclusion that Simonides is simply saying that all those who do no evil are worthy of his love and praise since, if he were to praise only those who are perfectly good, there would be no one to praise. As Socrates puts it, there is no “wholly blameless human being among all those who partake of the fruit of the wide earth” (76).
At this point, Hippias wants to interject with his own interpretation of the verse, but Alcibiades stops him. Socrates makes a speech against the continued interpretation of verse. Instead, he would like to pursue the line of questioning that was dropped earlier. Protagoras is hesitant to engage, and Socrates sings his praises as an interlocutor. Socrates asks again whether the cardinal virtues are five parts of one and the same thing or whether they are five distinct things with no underlying unity. This time, Protagoras answers by stating that four of the five are united, but courage is different from the rest. Socrates questions Protagoras about the nature of courage and its connection to audacity. Socrates links courage with wisdom, thereby connecting it to the other virtues.
Socrates and Protagoras agree that wisdom and knowledge are the most powerful characteristics for human beings to have (81). Socrates questions him about the nature of pleasure and pain and of goodness and badness. He collapses the distinctions and claims that pleasures are pursued because they are good, insofar as they are purely pleasurable, and pains are avoided for the contrary reason. By collapsing the pairs of names, Socrates wants to expose the view that humans often do not pursue what is truly good because they are overcome by the pleasures of the moment. This would be to say that the good is overcome by the good, but that cannot be. The true issue for Socrates lies in the art of measurement. People are often ignorant as to how good the distant pleasure (or good) is and overestimate the value of the pleasure (or good) that is near at hand. It is not that people avoid the good for the pleasant but that they err in recognizing what the most pleasurable or good thing is. The problem, then, is ignorance in the knowledge of measurement. Protagoras agrees to all of this. Socrates summarizes with the following:
‘Aren’t all actions aimed at this, at living painlessly and pleasantly, beautiful? And isn’t a beautiful deed good and advantageous?’ It seemed so to them in common. ‘Therefore,’ I said, ‘if what’s pleasant is good, no one who knows or believes other things, that are in his power, are better than the things he’s doing, goes on doing them when it’s open to him to do better ones. And this ‘being weaker than oneself’ is nothing other than ignorance, and being stronger than oneself is nothing other than wisdom’ (86).
Socrates uses this discourse to reveal that courageous and cowardly people both pursue the things about which they are passionate. The difference between the courageous person and the cowardly person is that the former has proper knowledge of what is truly frightening and the latter does not. This, again, connects wisdom to courage, indicating that Protagoras is wrong in his thesis that courage is fundamentally disconnected from the other four cardinal virtues.
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates notices a seeming reversal in his and Protagoras’s fundamental views. Socrates proves that every virtue is based on knowledge and may, therefore, open the door to the teachability of virtue. Protagoras, who sought to show that virtue is teachable, now holds the view that virtues, like courage, are something other than knowledge. Socrates believes this leaves them in a “horrendous mess” and wants to continue the discussion in order to clarify things. Protagoras declines, although he claims to admire Socrates. Socrates says that he is overdue to run his errands, and the dialogue ends.
At the outset of this section, the interlocutors have agreed to a more formalized style of conversation. This methodological and dramatic shift prepares their audience for the more rigorous and philosophically detailed material of the latter half of the dialogue.
This begins with a detailed discussion of a few lines of verse. Again, Protagoras’s sophistry is on display: If he can prove that Simonides is not so clever or wise as is commonly believed, then Protagoras will appear even wiser. Socrates, the representative of true philosophy, is unconcerned with appearing superior to Simonides or with making a name for himself in the process. Socrates uses everything at his disposal to show that his interpretation of Simonides’s verse is the correct one. The foray into a metaethical question on the distinction between being good and becoming good may at first seem to be merely a whim. Plato’s literary and philosophical use of this topic, though, recalls the problem of the teachability of virtue. This discussion reinforces the difficulty through which a person becomes good. The distinction between becoming and being also harkens to the background philosophical assumptions between appearance and reality. An ultimate reality would be absolutely good, but this cannot be purely instantiated in the material world. Therefore, praise should go to those who are pursuing this ideal, even though they don’t arrive at it. Protagoras does not notice the fundamental difference between becoming and being, so that he conflates appearances with realities. Socrates keeps them distinct.
Metaethical questions combine a concern with the first principles of reality (as in the study of metaphysics) with the nature of ethics. The metaethicist asks questions regarding such issues as the nature of the good life and whether morality is a real property of the world. The heart of the final section of the book concerns the unity of the virtues, another metaethical question. Socrates is very interested in knowing whether the five cardinal virtues—wisdom, piety, justice, courage, and moderation—are different parts of the same thing—goodness—or whether they are five distinct attributes with no underlying unity. Socrates employs his common approach, now called the Socratic method, to gain agreement from Protagoras that even the most seemingly out-of-sync virtue, courage, is actually connected with wisdom, another cardinal virtue. Protagoras agrees with Socrates but does so unwillingly, presumably because of the shame of being bested in an argument by his interlocutor. Again, he is concerned with how he appears in front of others.
This conversation, which spills over into a tangent on the semantics of goodness and pleasure, settles on the question of the fundamental value of wisdom or knowledge. Protagoras and Socrates do not resolve whether all the virtues are united, but the interlocutors do agree that knowledge is antecedent to the pursuit of any good. Though this is not explicitly stated, the assumption is that wisdom unifies all the other virtues. Essential to this discussion of wisdom is Socrates’s emphasis on the art of measurement. Wisdom resides primarily in skill in this art. Among other things, the art of measurement is skill in correctly determining how to weigh competing goods relative to one another. Humans often go astray because they are unwise: They overvalue goods that are close at hand and undervalue goods that reside in the future.
The Protagoras is a series of interlocking metaethical questions that combine issues of metaphysics with worldly ethical concerns. The problem of sophistry is one such issue. The metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality is background Platonic ideology that informs the assessment of the sophist’s reliance on beautiful presentations. This contrasts with the philosopher’s dedication to the pursuit of truth.
The dialogue’s dramatic conclusion makes this point even more salient. As with many Platonic dialogues, though certainly not all of them, the end of the discussion is anticlimactic. Socrates wants to continue discussing the unity of virtues, but Protagoras is finished and says that it’s time to move on. Interestingly, Socrates is the one who has other obligations to which he must attend, but he is willing to let them wait if he can continue in the pleasure of philosophy. Since Protagoras denies this possibility, Socrates promptly leaves without fanfare. As a result, the dialogue ends in aporia, a state of indeterminacy and confusion in which an individual may feel more doubt than certainty. Many of Plato’s works end in this state. This uncertainty regarding the truth of the matter at hand (e.g., the teachability of virtue) is taken as a philosophically superior state to the delusional belief in falsehoods. Socrates represents the uncertain seeker of truths; Protagoras, the delusional adherent to appearances.
By Plato