87 pages • 2 hours read
Carl von ClausewitzOn War
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1832A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Themes
The Role of Human Psychology in Warfare
Psychology is one of the key factors in warfare for Clausewitz. He refers to psychology as “moral quantities,” or the human mind (49). The intricacies of human behavior are also one of the subjective factors in war. They complicate the theory of war since they cannot be reduced to a mathematical equation, which leads Clausewitz to admit “[t]he difficulty of Theory as soon as moral quantities come into consideration” (49). However, he insists that “the moral cannot be omitted” (41) because psychological factors are “the spirits which permeate the whole element of war” (86). Of all the psychological characteristics, it is military virtue that is “one of the most important moral powers in war” (90).
There are certain objective factors that may contribute to (but do not guarantee) victory in battle and in the overall war. These factors include advanced technology and numeric superiority. However, Clausewitz argues, the inequality between the physical forces and capabilities of the two opponents “could be balanced by moral forces” (14). For example, individual courage may play a decisive role in battle and surpass the objective factors. In his view, war is not limited to physical combat, but is also “a trial of strength of the moral and physical forces” (41). Alternatively, in the case of a loss, “the moral forces also are shaken, broken, and go to ruin” (119-20).
Clausewitz discusses danger, courage, the element of surprise, and hatred (“hostile feeling”) as different aspects linked to psychology in war (50). Danger often has a physical aspect, such as getting wounded, but also features psychological aspects because “the peculiar characteristics of mind is the chief actor” (51). Furthermore, “Envy, generosity, pride and humility, fierceness and tenderness, all may appear as active powers in this great drama” (51).
In writing of how “[e]veryone knows the moral effect of a surprise, of an attack in flank or rear,” Clausewitz underscores the element of surprise in combat (49). This concept is linked to the use of “shock and awe” tactics in order to overwhelm the opponent with a display of force and undermine his will to fight by shaping the perception of the battle. Shock and awe tactics were used in different wars, including the Nazi-German Blitzkrieg and the 2003 American invasion of Iraq.
Overall, Clausewitz foresaw the growing emphasis on psychology in the military. Some of this direction addressed the psychological damage of combat. For example, a British specialist, Charles Samuel Myers, came up with the term “shell shock” in the medical journal Lancet in 1915 to describe what happened to soldiers during the First World War. The traumatic symptoms of veterans ranged from anxiety and fight-or-flight responses to the loss of vision and hearing.
At this time, psychologists suggested that war had a profoundly negative effect on the nervous system. During World War II, terms such as “battle fatigue” arose, and the term “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder” arose in the 1980s. Clausewitz was therefore ahead of his time in understanding that human psychology both influences the outcomes of war and is, in turn, shaped by wartime experiences.
The Dialectics of War: From Combat Violence to Politics
Clausewitz had extensive experience with warfare both as a participant, a teacher and director of war studies at the Prussian War College, and as a military theorist. He also studied philosophy. Perhaps it is for these reasons that he uses distinct concepts of war throughout On War based on the dialectical method. This method produces a thesis and a reaction—an antithesis—that merge together into a synthesis. For Clausewitz, examining these dialectical features and their relationships is essential in developing a greater understanding of the features of war.
The book opens with the following definition: “War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale” (1). Clausewitz proceeds to argue that war is “an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (1). Here, the author underscores the material aspects of war and focuses on combat. Psychological factors such as courage and hatred are also relevant in this context. Clausewitz therefore asserts that war studies cannot be reduced to mathematical components, because they are also linked to uncertainties, probabilities, and psychological factors that are more subjective and unpredictable. He also approaches the pairings of strategy and tactics, and defense and the attack, in a similar dialectical manner. The latter, for example, are “incessantly mixed up” (349), as successful defensive action necessarily leads to an attack.
At the same time, however, Clausewitz defines war as “a mere continuation of policy by other means” (11, emphasis added). He suggests that “war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means” (11, emphasis added). In other words, there is a direct relationship between war and foreign policy, especially in the context of wars between nation-states. When other means of arriving at a desired goal, such as one’s security concerns, are exhausted, a ruler may use war instrumentally. This is why, Clausewitz argues, war is always “a political act” (11) and is exercised to achieve wider political objectives. There are therefore two main elements that merge to create the synthesis that is warfare: the violence of domination, which is fueled and shaped by psychological factors, and the wider political objectives as determined by the state’s needs and ambitions.
The Role of Military Genius in War
Clausewitz uses many examples of specific battles throughout On War. Their purpose is to illustrate the rules and exceptions of war theory, and even to suggest alternative solutions to improve battlefield success or to mitigate failure. The two most frequently-cited historic figures are France’s Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte and Prussia’s King Frederick the Great (See: Key Figures). Clausewitz believes that both men serve as examples of the role of military genius in warfare.
Napoleon is a useful exemplar because his initial military successes allowed him to conquer or dominate much of Europe in the early 19th century. Clausewitz was a participant in some of the given battles, such as Jena (1806) and Borodino (1812), as well as later political events. Clausewitz’s descriptions of Napoleon acknowledge his impressive skills as a commander. It seems, at times, that Clausewitz writes of him with admiration, even though he himself fought against him.
Similarly, Clausewitz writes of Frederick the Great as an exemplar because he also enjoyed impressive military feats that Clausewitz believes are indicative of a special talent for warfare. Frederick the Great was responsible for making Prussia a strong state, including his reform of the army and his successful battles in Silesia. For Clausewitz, military commanders like Napoleon and Frederick the Great must display military genius that pertains to both tactics and strategy. However, this genius introduces an element of individuality that cannot be easily replicated: “However preeminently a great Commander does things, there is always something subjective in the way he does them” (63, emphasis added), Clausewitz writes, suggesting that military genius is difficult to fully explain through theory alone.
In general terms, subjective psychological factors also play a key role in the makeup of a brilliant commander. One such trait is “stability of character” (94) in the face of intense emotions on the battlefield. Intense emotions such as courage or hatred are important to soldiers participating in combat, in Clausewitz’s view. However, he favors commanders with greater self-control and emphasizes the intellect: “The higher we rise in a position of command, the more do the mind, understanding, and penetration predominate in activity” while “boldness, which is a property of the feelings, [must be] kept in subjection” (92-93).
The military genius must also be discerning and trust his instincts, because he is often “in a constant whirlpool of false and true information” (93) that may affect the course of a single combat or the whole war. The balance of emotions and intellect in a commander must therefore comprise a “harmonious association of powers” (21), in which the “heart and head co-operate” (31). Important to both tactics and strategy is also heightened spatial awareness and visualization of topography, known as Ortsinn. Finally, because a military commander is responsible for strategy, he must also be keenly focused on the political aims of war. In Clausewitz’s words, “[t]he general becomes a statesman, but he must not cease to be the general” (34).
