On War

The defense in war is not an “absolute state of expectancy and warding off” (349). It is not “a completely passive state” but rather a relative one like its offensive counterpart (349). However, the two sides are “incessantly mixed up” with each other because every attack leads to a defense (349). Furthermore, the attack is not a continuous action but rather one with interruptions by periods of rest. Typically, the “attack is the weaker, the defense is the stronger form of war” (350). The circumstances of the defense and attack, the fortifications, and the troops themselves are also factors.

The overarching goal of a war is to overthrow the enemy and to destroy his troops. The means can be both offensive and defensive. For example, by destroying enemy troops, a successful defense transforms into an attack, and the attack may lead to territorial conquest. Territorial conquest is the object of these offensive actions, but they need not capture the entire country. There are “an infinite number of gradations” of a strategic attack (351).

Attacks may feature a decreasing force for many reasons. The latter includes the attack’s objective, such as territorial occupation or guarding the country in its rear and maintaining communication lines. They may also include casualties, distance, blockades, allied secession, and weaker efforts. However, an attack may also be strengthened.

The superiority of force, both psychological and physical, results in a successful attack. Maintaining the superiority of force until victory translates into acquiring the desired objective, such as the possession of the enemy’s territory. At times, the culminating point of an attack comprises a violent reaction. In rare cases, immediate peace is possible. It is up to “the fine tact of judgment” to identify this culminating point (352).

Destroying enemy troops “is a means to an end” (352). There are different opinions on this subject, including only destroying as many as the goal of an attack needs, destroying as many as possible, or favoring the safety of one’s own troops. Only combat allows the destruction of the enemy’s troops, which can be done directly or indirectly. For example, occupying undefended territory may also translate into destroying the enemy’s troops.

In most battles, “the defensive character disappears to a great extent” in contrast to offensive battles that preserve their offensive features (353). Combat undertaken in lines is tactically advantageous, such as enveloping lines used to deny the enemy its defensive positions. Attacking the flank is even more effective. However, most offensive battles are uncertain about the enemy’s positioning.

Typically, large rivers are advantageous for the defense and “very inconvenient for the assailant” (354). However, exceptions exist, such as defenders basing their entire defense on this body of water or a numerically-superior assailant challenging the defense and crosses at a different point at the same time. On its own, “the passage of a river in itself rarely presents great difficulties” (355).

The character of defensive positions “can compel the assailant either to attack them or to give up his advance” (356). Occasionally, assailants can pursue their objective without attacking such positions at all. If he cannot, he may attempt to maneuver the adversary from his position. Clausewitz argues that in most battles, “one party certainly occupies a position, but one which has not been prepared” (356).

Well-designed and well-manned entrenchments are an excellent defense that may be impregnable. Attacking such a camp is the “most difficult undertaking,” although possible with numerical superiority (357). Overall, such attacks are exceptional—for instance, in the case of poorly-made, incomplete entrenchments.

Mountains have significance for offensive actions depending on the circumstances. For example, they may be used for secondary combat separate from the main action. Mountains rarely hold decisive battles throughout military history because generals prefer the plains. Assailants may occupy a mountain as an advantageous point if it has not been occupied by the enemy. An assailant may attack mountain positions, for instance, by attacking a wide defense by using concentrated forces. Some occupied mountainous positions are, however, unassailable, such as Meissen, Germany.

If cordon lines are linked to the “supreme decision” for both sides, then such an attack would benefit the assailant. However, if the assailant is unable to engage in a decisive battle, then he should treat these lines with respect. After all, breaking such a line without proceeding further is not worth the repercussions.

Maneuvers pertain both to the attacking and the defending side. It is “the opposite of executing the offensive by force” (359). The word “maneuver” is typically used to denote enticing the enemy to make mistakes and is akin to the game of chess. Successful maneuvers may include threatening a retreat or attacking individual points with superior forces. A successful maneuver for the assailant may include obtaining territory. A strategic maneuver may comprise two different-looking maneuvers: surrounding the adversary as well as concentrating one’s forces and extending them over many posts.

Terrain features like morasses (“impassable swamps”), inundations (excessive water in the Dutch lowlands), and the woods “present peculiar difficulties to the tactical attack” (359). Typically, it is best to avoid attacking them by passing them. An exception is harsh winters that freeze the water and undermine their defense. Woods are “scarcely passable” and offer defense “powerful assistance” (362). However, some locations like Poland and Russia feature large, thick woods that cannot be passed.

First, the primary goal of an attack is victory. Second, “boldness and self-confidence must animate the assailant” (362). Third, to attain victory, “it is necessary that there should be a battle between the enemy’s principal force and [one’s] own” (363). Fourth, the objectives for an attack “should be more immediately directed” (363). In the absence of an important victory objective, the assailant may target the enemy’s communication lines. Most of the time, offensive action does not require dividing the troops. The assailant must protect his own rear and communications at the same time.

In lieu of the great decision, a strategic attack targeting a lesser objective is still possible. Such objectives may include conquering a strip of territory, capturing an enemy’s magazine or a fortress, or successful combat for a trophy. After all, military fame is often an unseen factor. Combat should occur only if victory is possible and its price is reasonable. There are cases when the assailant has a better grasp of the power and intentions of the defender, which is advantageous for offensive action.

Attacking a fortress in the context of strategy is meant to undermine the defense. At times, capturing a fortress (or a fortification) cannot be avoided. In some cases when the objective is limited, capturing a fortress may even be the end goal, such as using it to negotiate peace, or when the conquest does not require much force. Choosing a fortress depends on such factors as the ability to keep it with ease, that its capture requires small means, and the strength of its design and garrison.

A siege of a fortress may involve circumvallation—an entrenchment encircling the fortress—or lines of observation. Such a siege may be disadvantageous for many reasons, for instance, when positioning all around the fortress is too much of an extent for the forces.

Convoy attacks are in the realm of tactics. Medium-length convoys may comprise up to 400 supply wagons, whereas large convoys may stretch for miles. Typically, convoys are in the rear of the army they supply. However, there may be exceptional situations when an army is linked to the convoys via their flank or the front. Overall, convoy attacks do not have much strategic value.

Launching an attack on an enemy’s army in its cantonments is a unique objective. However, it may have strategic relevance. Such an attack may be a surprise when the army is not ready, which is disadvantageous for the enemy. The enemy’s disorganization may cause it to lose ground. In such a surprise attack, enemy losses may be considerable despite the combat being minor. The author provides several examples, such as Frederick the Great surprising the Duke of Lorraine in the cantonments in 1745 in such a way. In some cases, attacking cantonments has both tactical and strategic relevance. Organizationally, the possible case scenarios include surprise-attacking several cantonments or separate columns vigorously attacking the enemy.

Typically, diversion means “an incursion into the enemy’s country as draws off a portion of his force from the principal point” (364). It is, therefore, a special endeavor. Advantageous circumstances for such an endeavor include having the troop availability, threatening important positions of a defender, or acquiring a rich province for supplies and munitions. However, diversions are not always useful, and—in the case of a country having an organized militia—dangerous. Diversions may include real attacks or be merely demonstrative.

Clausewitz challenges those theorists that use the term “invasion” to describe “every attack which enters deep into the enemy’s country” (366). How far an attacker ventures is, at times, the result of circumstances rather than the system. Victory is attained through “a preponderance of the sum of all the physical and moral powers combined” (367). Advances into enemy territory include the following gains for the assailant: losing men, supply depots, territories, resources, and seceding allies. At the same time, an attacking army may lose strength through sieges, danger, and the longer supply lines, as well as the general nature of the hostile war theater in enemy territory. Enemy losses are initially great but may be restored. Certain enemy provinces may be detached from the rest. At the same time, the increase of sieges and blockades deeper into enemy territory may weaken the advancing army and “soon outweigh all the advantages [it has] gained” (369). The situation may be complicated further by the growing resistance of the enemy and changes in alliances. In turn, defensive superiority involves its use of territory, a prepared theater of war, the support of the country, and waiting. However, defensive campaigns are never purely defensive.