On War

The art and science of war once described the “totality of those branches of knowledge and those appliances of skill occupied with material things” (46). These included building fortifications as well as army organization and its movement. Historically, “the art of sieges,” such as using entrenchments, was the first area to display “a certain degree of guidance of the combat” (47). After this, it was tactics that “attempted to give to the mechanism of its joints the character of a general disposition” (47). Eventually, the critical examination of previous wars led to the establishment of theory, including “maxims, rules, and even systems for the conduct of war” (47).

War theory changed over time. In the past, superiority in numbers was considered the one key component needed to secure victory because material concerns dominated. Clausewitz challenges this assertion as a “restriction overruled by the force of realities” (48). Overall, Clausewitz argues that reducing victory in war to material conditions is limiting because it excludes military genius, “which raises itself above rules” (48).

“Moral qualities” (49) such as the element of surprise, “hostile feeling” (50), danger, and courage, complicate war theory. For example, danger is both physical but also has psychological aspects. In this realm, “the peculiar characteristics of mind is the chief actor” (51). Uncertainties of war are also relevant. For these reasons, “it is easier to make a theory for tactics than for strategy” (52). Overall, “[t]heory must be of the nature of observation, not of doctrine” (52). Such theory may, for example, show the “probable effects” of military actions and separate war into intelligible parts which is sufficient (53). For Clausewitz, “[t]heory, therefore, considers the nature of ends and means” (54).

When discussing the means, the geographic area, the time of day, and the weather play a role. In addition, both the means and the end are relevant in strategy as far as achieving the ultimate object and establishing peace are concerned. Theory must always be practical, and its knowledge simplified. However, despite the reduction to simplicity, this knowledge features some difficulties. More significant difficulties are part of strategy rather than tactics. In general, the “[s]cience [of war] must become art” (57).

In military theory, the use of “art” or “science” of war is “still unsettled” (58). In the author’s view, science pertains to the knowledge of an object, whereas art describes the doing. However, “art and science can never be completely separated from each other” (59). Clausewitz chooses to classify war as belonging to “the province of social life” as a “conflict of great interests that is settled by bloodshed” (59). War is also the direct result of state policy. However, war is not “an activity of the will, which exerts itself upon inanimate matter like the mechanical arts” because it is “part of the intercourse of the human race” (59).

War, in its key features, consists of “separate great decisive events which must be dealt with separately” (62). Methods of action are an important part of war in which a “mode of acting [...] is an always recurring proceeding selected out of several possible ones” (60). Related terms are “directions and instructions” which are “determinations of action which have an influence upon a number of minor circumstances” (60). Rules are usually linked to principles or laws. Overall, “principles, rules, prescriptions, and methods are conceptions indispensable to a theory of the conduct of war” (61). The method of war is “more generally used” (62). However, it cannot be “ready made as if from a machine” (63). Experience is important because “there is always something subjective in the way” that great commanders operate (63).

Theoretical principles exert a greater impact on real life through criticism. Criticism, therefore, is useful in three key ways. First, it helps historical research, such as identifying proof and examples and is unrelated to theory. Second, critical inquiry identifies the causes and effects. Third, the critical approach allows for “the testing of the means employed” (64). Criticism and historical research “go hand in hand” (64). Critical inquiry also reveals that “the progress of events in war seldom proceeds from one simple cause” (65). Criticism must also be supported by “the results of the analytical investigation of theory” (66). Since wars are not made “with an abstraction but with a reality,” it is important to note the psychological factors involved, such as the “terror” that Napoleon inspired which helped him to get to Moscow in 1812, where he failed (68). Clausewitz demonstrates how different uncertainties and probabilities affected this campaign. Overall, “[m]ilitary history, with all its events, is a source of instruction for criticism itself” (72). Action in war is also “directed on probable, not on certain results” (74).

Historical examples of war “furnish the best description of proof in the empirical sciences” (77). For example, the use and impact of gunpowder were “only learnt by experience” (77). The usage of historical examples is linked to four key aspects. First, they simply explain ideas. Second, they “serve as an application of an idea” (78). Third, historical facts strengthen one’s arguments. Finally, historical precedents help one “deduce some theory,” in which the fact acts as proof (78). Overall, teaching “the art of war entirely by historical examples” would be “an immense service” (80).