87 pages • 2 hours read
Carl von ClausewitzOn War
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1832A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Book 1, Chapters 1-8Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Book 1: “On the Nature of War”
Chapter 1 Summary: “What is War?”
In the first chapter of Book I, the author defines war as a “duel on an extensive scale” (1). War comprises multiple duels in a single war event between two enemy sides that use “an act of violence” for the purpose of compelling “the other to submit to his will” (1). This violence “knows no bounds” (2). In this context, the violence is the means, whereas the enemy’s submission is the objective. To “disarm the enemy” is the goal achieved by placing “him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand” (2). Alternatively, the enemy can be overthrown. To defeat the enemy, we must “proportion our efforts to his power of resistance” (2) comprised of “the sum of available means and the strength of the will” (3). However, even after the enemy’s defeat, “the result in war is never absolute” (5).
Wars require the armed forces, the support of the country, and allies. Sometimes they can be “a completely isolated act” with no previous history (3). Overall, “the original motive for war” is the “political object” that defines military action (5). Military action must continue toward a climax unless there is cause to suspend it. This cause is the “expectation of a more favourable moment” for action (7). However, the enemy “may not give the conquered party the desired time” (7). War actions feature both defense and attack, with the former often being advantageous.
Other aspects of war are the “imperfect knowledge of circumstances” (9). Wars also have objective and subjective qualities, such as moral qualities like courage. Good fortune is also a factor. Overall, the nature of war is diverse. War is a “true chameleon” because of its subjective elements and the role of chance (12).
Chapter 2 Summary: “End and Means in War”
The overarching purpose of war is its political objective. Three features, “military power, the country, and the will of the enemy,” pertain to all other aspects of war (13). The immediate purpose of war, however, is to destroy the military power of the enemy, to conquer a country to ensure that no new military arises, and to subdue the enemy’s will to fight, for instance, by signing peace. “The enemy’s outlay in strength lies in the wear and tear of his forces,” which includes their destruction and loss of territory (16). Occasionally, wars end before the enemy is overthrown. It is the political object that “determines the measure of the sacrifice by which it is to be purchased” (15). However, the probabilities of war must be considered.
There are different means of conducting warfare, such as an invasion with the goal of occupation and devastation without the long-term goal of keeping the territory. Causing one’s enemy harm is very important, such as through the “gradual exhaustion of the physical powers and of the will produced through the long continuance of exertion” (16). Other key factors include the numerical superiority, or their balance, and the duration of the conflict.
The armed forces may have many subordinate parts and a vast organization designed to work together as a whole. Every aspect of war is linked to combat, including supplies, weapons, and exercise. The goal of combat is not always to destroy the enemy’s force if the political objective can be attained in some other way that may be less costly. It is also important to consider the preservation of one’s own army.
Chapter 3 Summary: “The Genius of War”
Every field of expertise has its own genius, including the “genius for war” (23). Even “civilized people” are not immune to having “a warlike tendency” (23). War comprises suffering, danger, uncertainty, chance, and physical exertion. Military genius thus requires “a certain strength of body and mind” (24) and the “harmonious association of powers” (23). To combat these circumstances of war, other military theorists emphasized “energy, firmness, staunchness, strength of mind and character” (26).
Two qualities are indispensable here: coup d'œil and resolution. The first allows one to identify the advantages quickly, such as the optimal point of attack. Resolution refers to “an act of courage in single instances” (25). Used repeatedly, it becomes “a habit of the mind” (25). The “presence of mind” allows one to act “in a region of the unexpected like war” (26). “Self-command” is another important factor in emotionally-charged situations. In a great military commander, the “heart and head co-operate” (31). Commanders must possess additional qualities too— for instance, Ortsinn, which is a sense of place and strong spatial awareness by using one’s imagination. Military genius is also well-versed in politics: “[T]he general becomes a statesman, but he must not cease to be the general” (34).
Chapter 4 Summary: “Of Danger in War”
Here, Clausewitz is primarily addressing young, inexperienced soldiers about the dangers of war. The first concern is the “intoxication of enthusiasm” while not paying sufficient attention to “bullets and men falling” (35). Another concern is the distraction of empathy, as “compassion strikes the beating heart with pity,” Clausewitz warns, when describing the wounded and dead (35). Only experience “soon blunts such impressions” (36).
Chapter 5 Summary: “Of Bodily Exertion in War”
Physical exertion is another integral aspect of war. It involves not only direct participation in combat but also the ability to withstand hardships, such as being “benumbed by frost, sinking from heat and thirst” (36). As the commander requires such exertion from his soldiers, so do the soldiers require the “personal physical exertion of generals and of the chief commander” (36). The latter cannot be overlooked.
Chapter 6 Summary: “Information in War”
Information functions as the “foundation of all our ideas and actions” (37). However, war also offers uncertain or false information. Clausewitz argues that an officer must use “the law of probabilities” to ascertain the way to act upon such information. He suggests that, typically, “everyone is more inclined to lend credence to the bad than the good” (37), which affects one’s assessment. At times, “[t]he impression of the senses is stronger than the force of the ideas” (37). It is, therefore, important to exercise a firm “reliance on [one’s] own better convictions” to overcome “the seeming pressure of the moment” (37).
Chapter 7 Summary: “Friction in War”
First-hand experience in war is significant, for “if we have seen war, all becomes intelligible” (38). One paradox of war is that “[e]verything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult” (38). The accumulation of these difficulties produces “friction” (38). Friction “distinguishes real war from war on paper” (38). It is friction that “makes that which appears easy in war difficult in reality” (39). Actions in war are “movement in a resistant medium” like walking in water (39). For this reason, theorists must have war experience and be able to generalize. Those who do not are “unpractical and even absurd” (39).
Chapter 8 Summary: “Concluding Remarks, Book I”
Clausewitz concludes Book I by reviewing friction, danger, physical exertion, and information in war. Developing experience is an important aspect here; “[i]t is the habituation of an army to war” both for the body and the mind (39). Inexperienced soldiers should experience war in peacetime through appropriate training. Such preparedness also ensures that the soldier does not experience distress from embarrassing moments and mistakes. Another important area of development is “to invite into the service officers of foreign armies, who have had experience in war” (40).
Book 1, Chapters 1-8 Analysis
The purpose of Book I is to set the overall parameters for the scope and scale of On War. In this section, the author briefly reviews some of the key elements from the rest of the book, such as human psychology, the political aims of armed conflicts, and the limits of military theory, among others. Clausewitz defines war as a violent duel between two sides on a mass scale in which each side seeks to dominate the other. However, this domination is the means rather than the end because the overall aim of war is political: “The war of a community—of whole nations and particularly of civilized nations—always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It is therefore a political act” (11). In other words, Clausewitz uses the dialectical method to assess war, which is explored in The Dialectics of War theme (See: Themes).
Clausewitz uses language typical in the 19th century, such as the distinction between “civilized” countries and “savages” (1). It appears implicit that, in his view, Europeans are “civilized” people and that non-Europeans are inferior, as when the author writes, “[T]he Russians at that time [were] hardly to be regarded as Europeans” (95, emphasis added) in the context of the Great Northern War between Russia and Sweden. He also calls Poles “Tatars” (228). Nonetheless, Clausewitz argues that cultural differences have no impact on the underlying character of war in which violence is intrinsic. When the “civilized” avoid war, it is because they found a different solution to the same problem.
Furthermore, Clausewitz views war as a natural state of society, arguing, “Peace seldom reigns over all Europe, and never in all quarters of the world” (40). Therefore, mental and physical preparedness and a theoretical understanding of war are key to facing it. The author also appears to anticipate the arrival of “total war” involving civilian society and infrastructure, not just the armed forces, when he suggests that war requires “the armies actually on foot, the country, with its superficial extent and its population, and the allies” (4). In the 19th century, war became “an affair of the whole nation” (387). The 20th century saw this type of warfare on an even larger scale with the two world wars that engulfed entire countries and increasingly involved civilians. Clausewitz also foresaw the growing importance of technology in the context of warfare.
Clausewitz’s analysis is generally limited to conflicts between nation-states or empires, as they are linked to foreign policy. His was the time of empires such as Britain, France, and Russia, and emergent, culturally-homogenous nation-states, such as Germany and Italy. It was the Prussian leader Otto von Bismarck that established the modern German state four decades after Clausewitz’s death. Civil wars, revolutions, and insurgencies generally remain beyond the scope of Clausewitz’s investigation, with only brief exceptions. His examples are generally limited to the mid-18th and early 19th centuries. However, one of the reasons for this choice is the availability (or lack of his access) to detailed historical records. He writes, for example, about the Battle of Narva, that “the principle circumstances of even the battle, are too little known” (95) to be of much use.
In this section, Clausewitz also highlights another important element of his study: the limitation of theory, because war also features exceptions, case-specific scenarios, probabilities, and uncertainties. To arrive at theoretic generalization, one requires real combat experience. In Clausewitz’s view, military training is important but still insufficient for truly understanding war. Clausewitz likely draws from his own experience when describing certain aspects of war. After all, he joined the Prussian Army at the age of 12 as a lance corporal and saw his first combat soon after.
