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MenciusMencius
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Book IVChapter Summaries & Analyses
Book IV, Part A Summary
Book IV is distinguished by a strong emphasis on the importance of tradition and reverence for the past. This is seen in the opening lines of Part A. There Mencius says, “Even if you had the keen eyes of Li Lou and the skill Kung-shu Tzu you could not draw squares or circles without a carpenter’s square or a pair of compasses” (76). He is again employing an argument from analogy. Just as one cannot draw a perfect circle without a compass, regardless of one’s natural skill in drawing, there are certain fields in which natural talent and enthusiasm are insufficient for success. Mencius applies this point to the art of governance. Rulers may have good intentions and even innate aptitude, but these will amount to little unless they “take advantage of the way of the Former Kings” (77). This means following the precepts created by the original sages and the practices of former exemplary rulers.
This argument is then used as a broader justification for a certain kind of social conservatism and traditionalism. Mencius stresses in section 1 that there is something superficial and disrespectful about criticizing former kings and ancestors. To do so is to engage in egotistical and idle chatter. Likewise, the way is not found “far away,” in lofty or distant ideals or experiences, nor is it just found in obedience to great traditions and rites of the past. Instead it is uncovered “close by,” specifically in honoring and deferring to one’s parents and elders (section 11). Indeed, says Mencius, doing this, especially in relation to one’s parents, is the most important and basic duty of human beings. Further, one has a duty to one’s parents to have children (section 26).
Finally, Mencius is asked about the conditions under which he would help the Empire if it was in peril (section 17). Ch’un-yu K’un asks whether even though touching one’s sister-in-law’s hand is forbidden by the rites, Mencius would not still stretch out a hand to save her if she was drowning. Mencius accepts that he would but questions the analogy with saving the Empire. He claims he would only save it with the way. This is a metaphor for the question of whether a sage ought to break some of his principles if it is the only means to assist the state.
Book IV, Part B Summary
Part B picks up a theme and question from the end of Part A: What does it mean in practice to obey “the rites,” the socially prescribed rules of the way? Also, what happens, as in the case of saving one’s sister-in-law by touching her hand, when these rites conflict? Mencius says, in a telling aphorism about this, “A great man will not observe a rite that is contrary to the spirit of the rites, nor will he perform a duty that goes against the spirit of dutifulness” (89). In this way, Mencius does not advocate blind obedience of the rites. Rather what matters is that we follow the “spirit” behind them. Thus, with moral action, it is necessary to have an understanding of the rites and the broader role they serve. This is more important than just having knowledge of their detail and allows us to respond sensitively and proportionately to a situation.
An example of this point is given in section 10, where Mencius says that a great man does not necessarily have to keep his word, nor carry a certain action to its conclusion. Mencius does not mean that it is permissible to break a promise just because one feels like it. Instead, he intends, one must understand the spirit behind the law that states that keeping promises is good. There is an implicit sense that when one makes a promise it is about respecting a person by honoring a commitment under reasonable conditions. However, this comes with the unspoken shared awareness that higher commitments can and do sometimes unexpectedly arise. If one suddenly needed to attend to a dying parent, for example, breaking a promise to visit a friend would be reasonable. It would also be within the “spirit” of the rule on promising.
In Part B, more is also said about the figure of Confucius. Continuing the point about the spirit of the rites, he is said to have done everything within “reasonable limits” (90). That is, his wisdom consisted in always acting with the correct sense of proportion and measure fitting to any problem. Mencius also discusses the origins of a text attributed to Confucius. This is the Spring and Autumn Annals, detailing the history of the state of Lu. Mencius says that this was written only after the influence of “the true King” ended and once songs stopped being composed.
Book IV Analysis
Philosophy in the West, since Descartes, has typically defined itself in opposition to tradition and authority. As Kant says in What is Enlightenment?: “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another” (Kant, Immanuel. An Answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?, trans. H.B. Nesbit. Penguin. 2009, p. 1).
In other words, philosophy, synonymous here with “enlightenment,” is about determining for oneself, and in all matters, what is true. This should be done without appeal to any external authority, whether religious or secular. It seems then that nothing could be further from Mencius’s advice in Book IV to “Follow established rules in everything you do” (76). Rather than seeking to undermine the established authority of the past, part of Mencius’s goal is to explain why it is necessary to respect it. Further, he looks to do this not only so that the present might benefit from the wisdom of past ages but so that it can be brought into harmony with it.
Thus “the way” is temporal for Mencius. It expresses a coherence across time, a reconciliation of society and individuals with its traditions and ancestors. This is something that the discord of the present is sorely lacking. Mencius is not suggesting, however, that we respect the immediate or recent past, or the past simply because it is past. On the contrary, he has in mind a specific era. This is the past of the “Former Kings,” a time of purportedly great rulers, sages, and a united, happy Empire. It is by emulating this period, and the laws and practices that allowed it to be successful, that benevolent government, and social harmony, can be restored.
A problem arises when one asks how Mencius knows so much about this past. The exemplary kings alluded to later in the text, Yao and Shun, existed, by Mencius’s own account, over a millennium before his own day (see Page 167). Even if some written and oral histories survived, it is surely stretching credulity to claim that Mencius could have been aware of the details necessary for some of his claims. That is, it’s hard to see how he could be sure of the specific rules, practices, and values of those times. It is even harder to see how he could know that the ideal social order he aspired to “recreate” existed then, or that such practices helped create it.
This point in turn raises the question of whether Mencius’s idea about the “Former Kings” could be equivalent to the “noble lie” that Plato discusses in the Republic (375 BCE). The idealization of past kings, and the harmony of their societies, might have been a myth formulated to suggest that a better social order was possible. It might also have served the function of lending authority to the precepts Mencius thought necessary to creating this order. This idealization could be especially useful in dealing with kings and common people who had minimal interest in philosophy. In this way its function could in part have been rhetorical and practical, allowing Mencius to forward his own philosophical agenda.
A similar question arises regarding the role of Confucius. The attitude of Mencius toward his greatest philosophical influence appears one of reverence, if not outright deification. Confucius is held up throughout Book IV, and earlier as a unique and unsurpassable master whose words are gospel. Mencius seems to view his role not in terms of criticizing or improving on the Confucian system but in correcting later misinterpretations of its essential truth. In this context, the discussion of Mencius’s “noble lie” might qualify this picture. Perhaps Mencius did not agree as uncritically with Confucius as he makes out in the text. Perhaps the figure of Confucius was itself in part myth—a pragmatic rhetorical strategy designed to lend authority and legitimation to Mencius’s own thought by setting himself up as the disciple and heir of an already legendary figure.
