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44 pages 1 hour read

John Lewis, Andrew Aydin

March: Books 2 & 3

Nonfiction | Graphic Memoir | YA | Published in 2016

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March: Book Three, Pages 1-125Chapter Summaries & Analyses

March: Book Three, Pages 1-125 Summary

Book Three begins with the events immediately prior to the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church, which ended Book Two. During the church’s annual “Youth Day,” a bomb exploded, killing four young girls and injuring 21 others. The immediate aftermath saw more violence in Birmingham, including a young Black boy shot in the back by a police officer who never faced charges. At the funeral for the bombing victims, Martin Luther King Jr. gave a stirring eulogy calling out the system that produces such terrible violence. Diane Nash wanted a mass effort to paralyze the city government in Montgomery until Governor George Wallace stepped down and all Alabamians received the right to vote. Dr. King instead called for a rededicated effort to register voters in Alabama’s “Black Belt,” especially in the city of Selma. The county sheriff in Selma cracked down on protesters with the help of a posse armed with guns and cattle prods. The city had all kinds of mechanisms for preventing Black people from registering to vote, so the SNCC planned a series of demonstrations in front of the Selma courthouse. The police broke up all such demonstrations as “unlawful assemblies,” and on the few days that people could gather legally to vote, they were left to languish outside the courthouse for hours with no food, water, or bathroom access. Those who brought provisions, or even took photos, suffered vicious beatings.

After his release from Selma jail, Lewis traveled to raise money for the SNCC, while Bob Moses organized a “mock election” in Mississippi to coincide with the real election and used the results to show how much Black voters were excluded from the political process. With the help of the indomitable Fannie Lou Hamer, Lewis and the SNCC encouraged over 90,000 people to vote in their mock election, but the book shows how their satisfaction was cut short when they learned of President Kennedy’s assassination weeks later. The SNCC doubted newly elected President Johnson’s commitment to civil rights, and the assassination of a president was a visceral reminder of the dangers facing activists.

At the same time, the SNCC members were divided over whether to rely on white volunteers, who were more likely to win press coverage, or elevate a Black leadership. In Mississippi, the SNCC decided to do both by calling for thousands of volunteers, Black and white, to engage in direct action, while also running training programs for Black youth seeking a role in the movement. With the presidential election of 1964 looming, the SNCC adopted a motion to prioritize winning the right to vote for all Mississippians. Since it was a federal crime to interfere with someone trying to vote, the SNCC actions would expose how the federal government failed to enforce its own laws.

As Mississippi prepared for an incoming wave of protests, Lewis was part of efforts to form the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), which would attempt to challenge the segregated Democratic party for its seats at the national convention. Just as the SNCC began its campaign to register Mississippi’s Black voters, three civil rights workers—James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner—disappeared after having been arrested. Local police told the SNCC that the workers had been released and were likely faking being missing to attract attention. The case of the missing workers did in fact draw enormous national attention—Lewis notes that two of the disappeared were white, and in the course of searching for those three, other missing civil rights workers were also found dead. While the search was underway, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act, banning segregation in all public facilities and businesses with over 100 employees, but failing to address voting rights.

In early August, the bodies of the three missing civil rights workers were discovered, and two days afterward, the MFDP met in Jackson to commence its efforts to send delegates to the Democratic convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Their chances seemed promising when many pro-segregation Democrats broke with Johnson over the Civil Rights Act and called for backing the Republican candidate. That Republican turned out to be Barry Goldwater, an Arizona senator who had voted against the Civil Rights Act and whose convention speech implied that those claiming to seek equality were in fact aspiring to tyranny and that “extremism” might be justified in resisting them. President Johnson, reluctant to antagonize either the Southern Democratic party or Black voters, wanted a compromise with the MFDP prior to the convention, while the delegates prepared testimony for the party’s Credentials Committee. When Hamer gave a stirring televised testimony to the committee regarding the harassment and abuse she suffered for trying to vote, Johnson preempted her with an impromptu press conference on military operations in Vietnam. More speakers followed, including King, while Johnson authorized illegal wiretaps in the delegates’ hotel rooms.

Eventually, Johnson offered two voting seats for the MFDP alongside the Mississippi Democrats, with the promise that the Democratic Party would ban segregated delegations in all future conventions. The MFDP unanimously rejected this offer, instead staging a sit-in that the police quickly dispersed. It was a defeat for both sides—the MFDP failed to gain a foothold in the party apparatus, and for all of Johnson’s efforts to appease segregationists, he still lost the South to Goldwater.

March: Book Three, Pages 1-125 Analysis

For those who were not present for the events themselves, or who only witnessed them from afar, the civil rights movement may appear to be a straightforward story of virtue triumphant, wherein everyone endured hardship with resolve in expectation of ultimate vindication. However, notwithstanding its commitment to nonviolence, the civil rights movement was complex and in many respects similar to a successful military campaign. This is apparent in these pages, which interweave the book’s arguments about Nonviolence as a Way of Life and The Civil Rights Movement as a Revolution. As Lewis says with respect to the signing of the Civil Rights Act, “we were in the middle of a war.” In the wake of a victory, the outcome often appears to have been inevitable, but the March series makes clear that the skill of the movement’s leaders, the bravery of its rank and file, and the vulnerabilities of the adversary were all key factors.

The first half of Book Three shows how, even as the movement approached one of its greatest successes with the ratification of the Civil Rights Act in July 1964, its members faced tremendous difficulties and profound doubts. The terrorist bombing of the 16th Baptist Street Church in Birmingham proved that there was no limit to what the forces of segregation would do to maintain power. While the FBI was able to identify likely suspects, they could not secure enough local cooperation to mount a case, so there were no prosecutions until the late 1970s. Such a heinous act might have swayed popular opinion nationwide, but it only hardened attitudes in the Jim Crow South, with random murders and police actions seeking to suppress any public reaction to the bombing. The movement would have to make a decisive response of some kind, but it lacked the resources to carry out Diane Nash’s plan to paralyze the city with protests. Registering voters in Alabama was useful but would not assuage the grief and rage its members were feeling.

Selma was the logical choice for a campaign, deep in the “Black Belt” with a huge reservoir of potential voters and volunteers, but the obstacles to victory were extraordinary. The letter of the law made it nearly impossible to register to vote, and those few who did risked the wrath of the Klan. Segregationist judges criminalized any public demonstrations, and even aid or comfort to those waiting in line to register was absurdly deemed “interference.” Following each arrest, Lewis usually did not stay long in jail and could come back to protest, but then he would simply be arrested again, making no progress.

If there was little progress in Alabama, then the campaign in Mississippi was a failure. Bob Moses’s idea for a mock election was innovative and succeeded in what it was trying to achieve, but no number of symbolic votes would translate into actual ones. The attempt to challenge the Democratic Party in Mississippi threatened the movement’s relationship with the Johnson administration, but the movement leaders had recognized that they could not simply depend on the administration’s goodwill to secure voting rights. Rather, the movement would need a power base all their own. Johnson again proved his skills as a political dogfighter, although for all his tactical prowess, it was too late to prevent the mass exodus of segregationists from the Democratic party. The failure of the MFDP appeared to place the movement at a dead end, divided and demoralized without a clear way forward.

Even the greatest accomplishment the movement had achieved to date, the passage of the Civil Rights Act, was a partial and costly victory. It ended public segregation and set meaningful limits on workplace discrimination but conspicuously lacked voting provisions, and as long as Black Americans lacked power at the ballot box, they could not reliably expect that the government would be any better at enforcing its own laws than it had been in the past. Making matters worse, the law was signed during the search for Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner. Their disappearances made it clear how closely intertwined the police and local authorities were with the Ku Klux Klan. Bob Moses and others had to wrestle with the fact that they were potentially sending volunteers to a grisly death, knowing that their skin color would offer them no protection.

Even as the murders galvanized public opinion, especially following the discovery of the corpses, the Johnson administration failed to draw a meaningful connection between the murder of three people who were trying to register Black voters and the efforts of Black activists seeking the right to vote. This event vindicated Lewis’s position that pressure, not sympathy, was the only way to advance their goals, but in the summer of 1964, there appeared to be no clear path forward in terms of applying meaningful pressure. Without the right to vote, Black activists could only go so far, yet they lacked the power to secure the right to vote. With the benefit of hindsight, readers know that the movement ultimately succeeded. The Voting Rights Act was signed in 1965. However, Lewis’s narrative shows how that outcome was hardly preordained—at the time, it did not even seem likely.

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