54 pages • 1 hour read
Henry KissingerA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
The successful statesman cannot simply be a chess player, viewing the world purely in terms of the costs and benefits to the next move. They must have a profound sense of right and wrong and the steely resolve to see it through. Henry Kissinger was the leading American chronicler of the intricacies of diplomacy, having taken part in so many complex, pivotal negotiations himself. The text thus reflects significantly on episodes that exemplify the real skill to diplomacy, such as Nixon facilitating an opening to China, which prompted the Soviet Union to pursue détente with the United States to avert too close a partnership between their two principal rivals.
In Kissinger’s account, however, life is not a game with a predetermined means of success. All leadership “must be transformational, especially in moments of crisis” (xxv), and only a moral vision can inform a sense of the world as it might be. Thus Nixon imagined a shift from the grim bipolar rivalry of the Cold War to an equilibrium among multiple powers, “each balancing the other, not one playing against the other, an even balance” (139). Most would not consider Richard Nixon a moral person, and even Kissinger admits to some of his personal failings, but Kissinger nonetheless saw Nixon’s elaborate diplomatic maneuverings as a way to not just bring about a better world but to change the way his people thought about that world.
Nearly every other example in the book finds this same pairing of qualities. In the case of Margaret Thatcher, her tactics ultimately succeed or fail based on her absolute resolve, whether staring down striking coal miners or the Argentinian junta that attacked the Falkland Islands. In a contrasting example, Konrad Adenauer secured West Germany’s entry into the Atlantic Alliance with humility bordering on prostration, convincing his wary allies that a revival of German power would not revive the ghosts of the Nazi era. Lee Kuan Yew’s tactics were focused on the moral character of his people, crafting “a feeling of national unity and social equality across ethnic divides” that unleashed the productive capabilities of the Singaporean people (295).
Morality without strategy is empty idealism, but strategy without morality is a similarly hollow technocracy, and for Kissinger, politics is ultimately a creative act with the purpose of improving the human condition. Kissinger suggests that the disorienting pace of modern life is constantly invalidating the tactics that once worked, even recently, and therefore moral vision is the rare source of stability on which a people can anchor themselves.
In the Introduction, Kissinger introduces two archetypes of leadership: the statesman, who “assesses possible courses of action on the basis of their utility rather than their truth” and the prophet, who “regards this approach as a sacrilege, a triumph of expediency over universal principle” (xxv). There is a similarity here to The Importance of Strategic Skill and Moral Character for Leadership in terms of a distinction between pragmatism and vision, but the differences are acute. Strategy and morality are modes of getting things done with different audiences, while the statesman and the prophet are archetypes reflecting a particular sense of how politics works and ought to operate. Nixon was a skilled tactician with a moral vision, but was not prophetic, as the prophet rejects the switch between pragmatism and idealism as a compromise of their ideal. De Gaulle was a true prophet, articulating a vision of “grandeur” that actively disregarded material restraints in order to drive straight to the collective psychology of the French people (69). The tactics necessarily shifted—anyone who pursues a prophetic vision in a simplistic way is bound to fail—but whether Algeria remained within the empire or achieved its independence, the result had to be a reaffirmation of France’s “ability to conduct its own independent foreign policy and to fulfill de Gaulle’s vision of its role in the emerging world order” (104).
Normally, the statesman and the prophet are dueling archetypes. De Gaulle’s soaring declarations of French glory draw a sharp contrast with Adenauer’s painstaking efforts to secure Germany within the moral but decidedly unprophetic goal of membership within the Atlantic alliance. Sadat began his career as the consummate statesman, managing the administrative details of the Egyptian Republic while Nasser championed the prophetic cause of Arab nationalism. Yet Sadat ultimately made the transition, as his peace with Israel may have begun as a practical recognition that further war with Israel was futile, but blossomed into an idea of peace as “a rewriting of history. Peace is a giant struggle against all and every ambition and whim” (262). His assassination cut his prophetic vision short, and it retains a mostly institutional rather than visionary character, but it is hard to imagine it having progressed so far without a prophetic vision lurking in the distant horizon. Whereas morality is a perennial need, prophecy is born of a particular time and place, rarely welcome in that time, ultimately achieving its vindication when political structures come to reflect ideas that in previous generations would have seemed utterly impossible.
All states are principally motivated to secure their own interests in a competitive international arena where there is no overarching authority to mediate their disputes. Conflicts of interest are inevitable, and will from time to time lead to violence. As the text suggests, however, the nation that simply prioritizes its own interests to the exclusion of all others is bound to fail, because ultimately states form a society of (at least theoretically) permanent members who are going to have to take one another’s interests into account. It therefore becomes necessary for states to develop standards of legitimacy that can then regulate their conduct, even their competition, so as to prevent conflict from ruining them all. This theme thus describes a pairing of the practical and the normative, and so where strategy and morality operate on the level of tactics, and the statesman and prophet are the archetypical leadership styles, interest and legitimacy are the means of imprinting tactics and leadership styles onto the international arena.
For example, Margaret Thatcher was more concerned with how Britain fit within the world order than with manifesting any particular archetype of leadership. She was of course known for her steely resolve, but this personality trait helped her in her goal of symbolizing a Britain that “has rekindled that spirit which has fired her for generations past and which today has begun to burn as brightly as before” (351). In addition to reviving a sense of national pride and a fierce defense of national interests, a newly confident Britain was also a more productive and valued partner in the Atlantic alliance.
Lee Kuan Yew’s principal task, by contrast, was to define a nation where none had been before, and he was unapologetic in asserting the interests of that nation apart from its Malaysian neighbor, China, and the United States. At the same time, the mix of cultural influences that informed a Singaporean identity came to represent a world “of living political entities, each replete with individual histories and culture, and each obliged to make a judgment of its opportunities” (301). A state consisting of many parts proved the possibility of an international system capable of accommodating different forms of government and visions of the good, even if true unity would be much more difficult on the international plane. Since all forms of legitimacy are subject to decay, Kissinger suggests, the ultimate task of the statesman is to balance the preservation of old modes with the achievement of new ones.
By Henry Kissinger
Books About Leadership
View Collection
Business & Economics
View Collection
Inspiring Biographies
View Collection
Jewish American Literature
View Collection
Nation & Nationalism
View Collection
New York Times Best Sellers
View Collection
Philosophy, Logic, & Ethics
View Collection
Politics & Government
View Collection
War
View Collection