Justice and The Politics of Difference

Young considers the ideal of impartiality to be fictitious and inappropriate for any moral context. In seeking to reduce difference into unity, the ideal creates “dichotomies between universal and particular, public and private, reason and passion” (97). In so doing, it turns difference into something negative, achieving unity at the cost of expulsion. Impartiality presumes that there is one universal perspective dictated by reason and applicable to all moral situations irrespective of their context. Young explains that this assumption represses difference because it denies the particularity of situations, eliminates heterogeneity in the form of feeling, and reduces the “plurality of moral subjects to one subjectivity” (100). All perspectives are allegedly contained in one universal position, which Young argues is impossible. No one, she maintains, “can adopt a point of view that is completely impersonal and dispassionate, separated from any particular context and commitments” (103). A moral point of view, in contrast, develops from interaction with others. Reflection is of course necessary, but all need not adopt the same point of view. They must recognize the validity of the claims of others.

Modern, or liberal, political theorists tend to cast the public realm of the state as impartial (107). Feelings are relegated to the private sphere, keeping the public one universalist and therefore homogeneous. In practice, this has historically meant that the public conversation has excluded women and people of color: Since the public sphere demands homogeneity, all groups who threaten to bring difference are expelled. White men are associated with reason, while women are associated with desire. In the past, groups such as American Indians and African Americans were also characterized as passionate. The traits of reason and desire are attributed to kinds of persons (109), and the dichotomy makes the public sphere the purview of only the privileged.

Young thus exposes the ideological function of the ideal of impartiality (beliefs are ideological, in Young’s sense, when they serve to reproduce and justify domination and oppression). The ideal of impartiality serves three ideological functions. First, it supports the idea of a neutral state, which in turn justifies a distributive theory of justice. There is no such thing as a neutral state, per Young. State decisions typically serve powerful interests, and no human decision-maker can shed their biases and apply “transcendental reason” to all decisions (114). Second, the ideal legitimates bureaucratic and hierarchical decision-making; if universal reason dictates one correct answer, there is no need for democratic decision-making. The ideal incorrectly presumes such perspectives are embedded in the bureaucracy. Third, the ideal of impartiality reinforces oppression via its claim that the perspective of privileged groups is universal (112). It systematically hides the experiences and values of some social groups and makes it difficult to expose the biases of the universal standpoint.

Young calls for the abandonment of the ideal of impartiality. Once this ideal is abandoned, there is no justification for undemocratic processes: The only way to incorporate all perspectives is to bring all people into the decision-making process. The public thus becomes an open and accessible area where all persons can express their points of view. No one is excluded from the public sphere or forced into privacy. All social institutions and practices are subject to public debate. The private realm becomes not that which “should be” hidden from public view, but what a person has a right to exclude others from. Young’s critique of the opposition between public and private, universality and particularity, and reason and affectivity challenges the distributive theory of justice as well (121). Justice as a virtue must name “the institutional conditions that enable people to meet their needs and express their desires” (121).

Oppression in the forms of cultural imperialism and violence persist for social groups such as African Americans and women. This stems in part from the social construction of ugly bodies, which are feared and avoided unconsciously. The claim that reason is neutral and universal leads to the creation of an abstract subject or knower, who views the world from outside as an observer or gazer. This subject observes others for accordance with normality via five operations: “comparison, differentiation, hierarchization, homogenization, and exclusion” (126). The attributes of this knowing subject closely align with masculinity, whiteness, and a privileged class. Other groups, defined as different, become objectified, while the privileged groups “lose their particularity” (127).

In the 19th century, scientists applied this method of observation to bodies, measuring and comparing them for physical health, moral soundness, and mental balance. In so doing, modern science “generated theories of human physical, moral, and aesthetic superiority, which presumed the young white bourgeois man as the norm” (130). Other groups came up short. While the outright racism and sexism of the 19th century have lost legitimacy with belief in legal equality widespread, they persist in practical consciousness, or “those aspects of action and situation which involve often reflexive monitoring of the subject’s body to those of other subjects” (131), and in people’s basic security systems, or sense of identity security and autonomy. As a result, whites behave nervously around African Americans or avoid being in their presence. The oppressed group typically experiences the differential treatment in silence. If one complains about such treatment, that individual is said to be overreacting since there was no intentional discrimination. Such unconscious bias is found in judgments about people, policies, and media imagery, as well as in social interactions. For example, assertive women are judged negatively while assertive men are not.

These judgments also concern notions of respectability. In the 19th century, this concept implied “conforming to norms that repress sexuality, bodily functions, and emotional expression” in public (136). The ability to do so indicated manliness or self-mastery and extended to the control of one’s wife, who was denied subjectivity. In contemporary society, where sex is glorified, respectability is associated with the professional, who represses the “body’s physicality and expressiveness” in the business setting via select behaviors and forms of dress (139). While all groups can theoretically become professional, the standards are not neutral but the product of the culture of white, Anglo, heterosexual, middle-class men. Even when members of oppressed groups exhibit the norms of respectability, their bodies identify them as different and they must prove themselves constantly.

Citing Joel Kovel’s work, Young identifies three forms of racism: dominative, aversive, and meta. Dominative is outright domination and not the prevalent form of racism in the US. Aversive racism is one of avoidance and separation, while metaracism describes how a white-dominated economy and technology do not serve minorities (141). These latter two forms of racism correspond to practical consciousness and basic security systems. All oppressed groups have despised and feared bodies, though each group also has its unique history and experiences.

Young describes abjection as the “feeling of loathing and disgust the subject has in encountering certain matter, images, and fantasies – the horrible, to which it can only respond with aversion, with nausea and distraction” (143). Yet the subject is also drawn to the abject with fascination. Drawing upon psychological theory, Young traces this to the formation of self when an infant leaves the womb. To defend oneself, one must turn from others to retain integrity. The abject is thus other, but only just on the border of otherness, and it provokes fear for that reason: The subject fears for their identity. For example, a heterosexual male seeks distinction from gay men and therefore considers them abject, or a young person fears an elderly one and avoids that person. Young explains that even members of an oppressed group exhibit fear and aversion towards members of their group at times. In so doing, they exhibit double consciousness, simultaneously holding the perspective of the dominant group (which fears them) and their own (which knows members of their group to be ordinary).

Political theory does not concern itself with feelings and bodily reactions. Yet in not doing so, it fails to address injustice and contributes to silencing the oppressed (149). Because unconscious acts contribute to oppression in the forms of cultural imperialism and violence, a theory of justice must address them. Theorists previously subjected only intentional acts to moral and political judgment, but Young argues that unconscious acts must be judged for change to come. This need not entail blaming or punishing individuals; instead they should be held responsible and thereby driven to change future behavior. Young therefore seeks to politicize these unconscious behaviors and foster public discussion to make the dominant group aware of how their behaviors contribute to oppression. Additionally, Young recommends publicizing the positive definitions oppressed groups have given themselves and encourages people to reflect upon otherness within to prevent abjection.