Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations

While states can defend themselves from imminent threats via preemptive strikes, it is necessary to “get the terms of the judgment right” (75). There is a wide spectrum of anticipation of an imminent threat to a distant or hypothetical danger. The latter would be a preventative war or one of choice, not necessity. Walzer cites and criticizes balance-of-power justifications as in this category: War is fought to ensure that no state gets enough power to dominate. The theory presumes that the balance of power preserves liberty and fighting early, before the balance tips too much, reduces the cost of defense (77). A state’s desire to augment its power, Walzer argues, does not justify war. There needs to be a more objective threat.

Walzer claims that the “line between legitimate and illegitimate first strikes is not going to be drawn at the point of imminent attack but at the point of sufficient threat” (81). This standard has some leeway, but it requires three factors: “a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, […] greatly magnifies the risk” (81). He cites Israel’s preemptive strike in the Six Day War with Egypt on June 5, 1967 as an example of a legitimate action. The previous month, the Egyptian government had put its troops on high alert and proceeded to place troops in a threatening position. The Egyptian president claimed that Israel had “no rightful existence” (82), and the Straights of Tiran were closed to Israeli shipping despite the world’s recognition of those straights as an international waterway. An economic blockade from the closure of the Straight would strain the Israeli defense system. Given this context and the imminent threat posed by Egypt, Israel was justified in striking first: The war had been started by the actions of the Egyptians. Walzer admits this formula is not foolproof, but it provides criteria that ensure moral judgment and restrictions on pre-emptive strikes.

Even if a state does not have free institutions, it possesses the right of self-determination. Military intervention in the domestic affairs of a state is only allowed in three types of cases: large-scale military struggles for secession or national liberation, a war in which another foreign power has already intervened, and cases of extreme violations of human rights, such as massacres and enslavement (90). These exceptions allow for just wars that are not fought in self-defense. However, there is a heavy burden on the intervening state in these cases to prove intervention was necessary: The situations must be “radically different from what we take to be the general run of cases” (91).

Walzer cites the example of the Hungarian Revolution in 1849 against the Hapsburg Empire as one of national liberation. The British chose not to intervene on the side of the Hungarians, but John Stuart Mill, a noted political philosopher, argued for intervention. The Hapsburgs enlisted help from the Russians to put the revolution down. Walzer highlights the complexity of the choice with this case, noting that it is not easy to discern the correct ratio between virtue and prudence; a war between Britain and Russia had high risks. States must consider the dangers of intervention to themselves, the people their actions are supposed to benefit, and any others involved (95).

In a civil war, there are typically many factions. A state should, if it chooses, assist the established government until insurgents gain control over a substantial portion of the population and territory. At that point, foreign powers should remain neutral, as intervention cannot serve the cause of self-determination. Walzer points to American involvement in Vietnam as unjust for this reason. The South Vietnamese government, which the United States was supporting, had lost popular support and was illegitimate. In contrast, the Korean War was an example of counter-intervention. In such wars, the goal is not absolute victory but restoration of boundaries, and the outcome in civil wars should reflect the local alignment of forces.

There are often mixed motivations when states intervene on humanitarian grounds. Walzer cites American intervention in Cuba in response to Spain’s policy of forced resettlement during which thousands of Cubans died as motivated mainly by economic and strategic factors. The US did not grant the requests of the Cuban insurgents for recognition and simply replaced the Spanish forces. In contrast, the Indian invasion of Bangladesh in 1971 had a truly humanitarian motivation. Reacting to a massacre by the Pakistani government, Indian forces invaded, left the country quickly, and did not impose political control. Walzer stipulates that humanitarian intervention demands that the intervening state, “to some degree” (104), fight for the interests of the victims. Walzer concludes that the legalist paradigm must be revised to allow states to assist secessionist movements if they are representative of the people, balance the prior intervention of other powers, and rescue people whose human rights are threatened.

A just cause implies a moral urgency to win, but Walzer notes this is difficult to define. Just wars have limits, and once those limits are reached, the fighting should cease. Even in the case of the unconditional surrender of Germany in World War II, there were limits: The Allies refused to negotiate with the Nazis and would not recognize Germany until victory was secured and a new regime was in place. However, the continued existence of a German nation was assumed, and the punishment of Germany was limited and temporary. Even so, Walzer argues that this case constitutes the outer limits of a just war and was justified only because the very nature of the Nazi regime threatened values of political independence and territorial integrity (114). Just wars cannot be crusades, aiming to create “new political orders” and “mass conversions” (114). The Nazis were at war with nations and the existence of peoples, and that alone allowed for the right of political reconstruction.

In most cases, unconditional surrender is not appropriate. Walzer cites the example of the Korean War. The United States entered that war in response to the invasion of South Korea. The stated goal was to drive the North Koreans from South Korea and restore the boundaries. Therefore, when the United States crossed that boundary and prolonged the war, it was a case of military hubris. The destruction of the North Korean regime was not justified as it did not present “a standing affront to the conscience” (119). Walzer argues that the legalist paradigm must be revised because the cost of continued fighting must be weighed against the value of punishing aggressors. The punishment of aggressor states, which is part of the legalist approach, is not a significant deterrent. It also extends the number of people exposed to coercion and risk and requires acts of conquest aimed at entire political communities (121). Just wars cannot eliminate illegal violence but can establish a better peace, making people less vulnerable. Walzer concludes that the ends of a war are shaped by the same rights that justify fighting, especially the right of nations to continued existence and territorial integrity.