How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them

The title of the chapter, “The Rise of Factions,” reveals its primary aim: to show how extremists can use nationalism to mobilize ordinary citizens into believing civil wars are the only way to protect themselves and their culture. According to Walter, factionalism represents the second variable that best predicts civil wars (anocracy is the first, which Walter discusses in Chapter 1). Researchers analyzed nearly 500 civil wars from the last two centuries. The likelihood of civil wars doubles with the occurrence of these types of political parties. If a country is in the anocracy zone, the likelihood is even greater.

In this chapter, Walter continues to build on her theme that there are patterns and risk factors that predict where and when civils wars might break out. She emphasizes how factionalism emerges in predictable ways. First, ethnic entrepreneurs and their supporters—many of whom are initially elites—of a particular identity sense that they can exploit the political instability in their country. Often this instability derives from the government becoming weak or a demographic change. The change makes the group feel more vulnerable or reaffirms their grievances.

Second, the ethnic entrepreneur and their supporters start to encourage loyalty from other members of their group. This is done by rallying people around words and symbols related to their identity rather than policy issues. In doing so, ethnic entrepreneurs create personality cults. Ordinary citizens gradually start to feel that they are separate from individuals who are not part of their group.

Third, if the ethnic entrepreneur is already in a political office, they will use their political power to suppress other identities. This strategy increases tension and fear between different rival groups. These groups are now at a point where they start considering force to resolve issues within the country. If the ethnic entrepreneur is not in political power, they use fearmongering to create political parties that coalesce around an identity rather than policy issues.

Factionalism shifts ordinary citizens from caring about “the good of the country as a whole, to one in which they care only about members of their group” (38, emphasis added). To Walter, this shift is what makes factionalism so dangerous, particularly in situations where one group comprises between 40% and 60% of the population. In this situation, civil wars are especially likely, as was the case with Yugoslavia where Serbs represented nearly 40% of the country.

By presenting the patterns and risk factors that predict civil wars, Walter gestures toward several factors that can apply to the modern US. One factor is how superfactions exacerbate the urban-rural divide. Citizens who live in urban areas tend to be younger, more liberal, less religious, and more educated. As a result, they often embrace multiculturalism more readily than their rural counterparts, who often value tradition. The 2020 election is a good example of this divide. Rural and small-town voters overwhelmingly supported Republican candidates, whereas urban voters primarily supported Democratic candidates. Both Democrats and Republicans continue to worsen this divide by focusing on identity politics rather than actual policies.

Another example is the importance of a mouthpiece or ethnic entrepreneur in helping factions gain traction. In later chapters, Walter asserts that Trump is likely the greatest symbol of an ethnic entrepreneur in the US and that his methods are not unique. Like other ethnic entrepreneurs, including Modi and Bolsonaro, he created a personality cult, used anti-democratic methods to consolidate his power (e.g., attacking the media and free elections), spread populist lies, and ruthlessly attacked his opponents and critics. In doing all of this, he helped further the divide in the US between those in his group and those outside his group. People in his group felt increasingly vulnerable and suspicious of outsiders, which culminated in the attack on the US Capitol.

Walter also claims that “average citizens are often clear-eyed about ethnic entrepreneurs. They know these individuals have their own agenda and are not telling the whole truth” (46). Walter notes how many Serbs initially disliked Milošević, believing that he was simply power-hungry. Their opinions of him slowly changed as he continued to spread messages of fear. People started believing these messages, which made them more willing to embrace a leader who promised to protect them. Walter thus shows how fearmongering is a powerful tool in an ethnic entrepreneur’s toolbox.

While Walter focuses primarily on the civil war in Yugoslavia in this chapter, she also uses examples from around the world, including from Sri Lanka, Syria, India, and Brazil. The civil wars in each of these countries are unique to its specific situation. For example, fighting broke out between Hindus and Buddhists in Sri Lanka, whereas tension occurred between Hindus and Muslims in India. However, the overarching risk factors and patterns that predict civil war are found in each country. The diversity of examples underscores Walter’s primary assertion that we can anticipate the start of a civil war.

Walter also continues to punctuate her narrative with recollections of ordinary people who lived through civil wars. In Chapter 2, she focuses on Berina Kovac and her husband Daris. Both lived in Sarajevo, Bosnia’s capital. They were highly educated and Muslim. Berina and Daris both emphasized how before Milošević’s rise to power, mixed marriages were common in Bosnia. As Milošević ramped up his rhetoric that Serbs needed to live together in a united Yugoslavia, Bosnians split into three ethnonationalist parties: Muslim, Croat, and Serb. Soon, people in Serbia stopped identifying themselves as Yugoslavs and instead by their religious or ethnic identity.

Both Daris and Berina recount specific examples of when things started to change for them. Daris recalls how political leaders from all three parties told lies and spread misinformation to scare their supporters and deepen division. Berina remembers how a Serbian friend at a wedding told her and other partygoers to stop singing a “Turk song” (49). This love song, which dated back to the Ottoman period, was traditionally sung at weddings in Serbia. Berina emphasized, “[W]hen somebody really wants to insult us deeply, they tell us we are Turkish. It eliminates our Bosnian identity and our roots” (50). Anti-Muslim rhetoric continued to worsen until Bosnia descended into civil war. Berina remembers how a co-worker, who was a Serb and someone she once considered a friend, was killed fighting Muslims.

Walter uses Daris and Berina’s recollections to demonstrate how average citizens often do not foresee civil wars. While Daris and Berina now recognize when political and ethnic tension began to worsen in Bosnia, at the time, they were oblivious to these risk factors. Berina only realized that war broke out when she heard machine guns. While Daris and Berina did not recognize the danger signs, the CIA did. The CIA predicted a year and a half before civil war broke out that Milošević and his extremist supporters would start violence and use nationalism to encourage other Serbs to fight. Walter underscores that “experts who study civil war know where to look” (57).