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Amartya SenA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
When Sen began his career, intellectual orthodoxy concentrated on the flaws of market mechanics to the point of advocating any alternative. However, at the time if his writing this book, the situation is reversed, and orthodoxy scoffs at any limitations on the free market. He says that neither extreme is healthy. Free markets are, however, generally good, both as a matter of principle and considering their practical results. The freedom to engage in transactions is so common in Western countries that people often don’t see it as a freedom, but it is an important freedom. Enslavement and other bonded labor still exist (albeit illegally), and people suffer from that unfreedom. Communism, while often increasing lifespans, similarly deprives people of that freedom to control their economic lives. Child labor and restrictions on women working outside the home pose similar issues of unfreedom. A capabilities-approach must advocate for people’s substantive freedom to control how they sell their work or the fruits of their labor.
Beyond the issue of freedom, economists correctly state that a perfectly functioning free market ought to give the best economic results. The Arrow-Debreu theorem shows that this hypothetical market should achieve the “Pareto optimality,” in which no one’s utility can rise without harming another person’s utility. Sen has argued elsewhere that the mathematics of Arrow-Debreu hold up even when freedom replaces utility as the end goal. However, this Pareto optimality can include problematic inequality, especially since unequal capabilities (such as disability) are coupled with unequal incomes. Efficiency and equity therefore need to be analyzed simultaneously, and free markets do not always meet these double criteria.
One major problem with actual markets is that special interest groups, such as wealthy industrialists, may use their political influence to create monopolies or otherwise rig markets to artificially limit competition to protect their wealth. Adam Smith’s classic defense of markets was aimed precisely at this recurring issue. Transparency and free public discourse serve as the best defense against such selfish market restrictions. Here, once again, different freedoms—economic and political—show their close connection. Since markets sometimes need rational restrictions, and since noneconomic concerns may rationally take precedence, this should be a true dialogue shaped by critical reason and concern for the good of all citizens. Indeed, public goods—like an environment free of malaria—cannot be directly purchased in the market, so a nonmarket mechanism may be the best way to obtain it, even if that means imposing government restrictions. Public policy, especially in developing countries, needs to create social opportunities when markets fail to do so.
Government interventions may distort the incentives in the marketplace or increase the strain on the public budget. Focusing on the deprivation of capabilities makes analyzing the tradeoffs easier. Few people opt to die young, suffer malnourishment, or remain illiterate, if they have the freedom to choose otherwise. Therefore, those enduring these deprivations must lack a realistic market option for healthcare or basic education. That means that free public provision of such services for them would not compete with the market. Many governments have adopted means-testing criteria to limit their expenditure on such goods to only those unable to afford them. However, public bureaucracy often struggles to determine eligibility accurately and efficiently. Associating aid with poverty also creates a social stigma. Means-testing may reduce the recipients to targets, rather than acknowledging them as agents. In addition, people’s fear of losing public aid can distort the economic incentive to improve their situation.
Another factor to consider in structuring public aid, whether targeted or available to all, is deficits. These are a normal part of government operations. Even analysis from conservative economists demonstrates that moderate deficits and low inflation do not harm growth, as long as the state avoids moderate to high inflation (over 15-20% annually). A genuinely financially conservative approach that limits deficits is wise, but it should not be confused with anti-deficit radicalism that rejects any deficit spending. The need to balance all these concerns is one reason why careful public discussion of alternatives is so important.
Sen says that Bengal tigers roam the protected forests of the Sundarbans in India. In an average year, they kill 50 of the poor gatherers who go into the forest to harvest luxury honey that will earn them around a dollar. Most development economists would argue that the dire poverty driving them into danger means that the sole sensible focus must be raising their income; issues like democracy and civil rights have no importance in comparison and should be left aside for now. Even at a major conference on human rights in Vienna in 1993, delegations posing that line of thought met little direct opposition. They argue that rights like habeas corpus (that is, having to justify keeping someone in prison) is of no use to someone who is starving. However, Sen disagrees. He says that since economic and political freedoms are both valuable and are interconnected, then urgent economic needs also require urgent improvements in political capacities.
The argument for prioritizing economic freedom over political freedom rests on the assumption that the two kinds of freedoms are in conflict (this is the Lee thesis). In fact, while some authoritarian countries have succeeded in substantially raising per capita income, there is no statistical evidence that shows they more frequently enjoy success than democracies. The commonly identified causes for economic growth (such as strong education, land reform, and use of international markets) in authoritarian East Asian countries like China or Singapore could all occur in democracies. Even if economic and political reform were in tension, it is not clear what choice the poor would make. The only way to know their will would, by definition, be a democratic process such as a referendum rather than simply trusting what a dictator says. When Indira Gandhi put her authoritarian emergency decree to a vote in 1970s India, the electorate (including the very poor) dramatically rejected that curtailing of political freedoms.
Beyond the intrinsic importance of political freedom to quality of life, embracing such freedoms has an instrumental role in improving economic freedom. Democratic reform can help fight poverty. Democracies with a free press have, for example, been uniquely successful in preventing famines. Free speech allows citizens to bring economic issues to public attention, including criticism of the authorities if their polices helped cause the problems. Voting power forces officials to respond. Democracy does not automatically solve these problems—especially if they are too complex for easy political soundbites or center on minorities with few active voters—but it does at least create opportunities to do so. Healthy multiparty democracies with vibrant opposition parties are more likely to amplify the voices of the underserved. India’s stability, despite its tremendous diversity, and its eradication of famines after independence testifies to the strength of democracy.
In this section, Sen highlights the idea of Freedom as the Means and End of Development. He insists that reductive economic measurements fail to capture human wellbeing and that development efforts must focus on the true goal of freedom in a broad sense, ranging from freedom from hunger to freedom to voice political opinions without repression. Sen begins both chapters with a full-throated defense of freedom as a good in itself. Then, he argues that development strategies that restrict freedom (like authoritarian central planning) must be rejected even if they result in increased economic growth.
Sen goes on to claim that promoting freedom across the board actually helps economic growth through empowering people and making the powerful accountable. This also lays the foundation for his theme of The Importance of Empowering Marginalized People. Sen, however, dislikes absolute principles that claim to offer a magic formula that always works. Sen expects reality to be messy and involve pragmatic compromise, so he qualifies his argument. He insists blind adherence to free markets can trample other freedoms. In analyzing democracies, he warns against “overselling their effectiveness” (154); democracy “has to be seen as creating a set of opportunities” (155). Sen has faith in the power of rational public discussion (as he will expand on in Chapter 12), but he knows that the messy reality of democratic politics often excludes the voices of minorities, and he acknowledges that the power of opposition parties to hold the authorities accountable varies considerably between countries. Sen sees democracy as creating institutions that allow the kind of public discussion that will promote all freedom (including economic), but, contrary to theorists like John Rawls, he sees those institutions as being reliant on the political culture and people’s practices.
Sen primarily argues against two prominent groups in development economics: Neoclassical economists and neoliberals who believe in absolute free markets, and supporters of the Lee thesis. Neoclassical economics is a revision of Adam Smith’s free market theories that prioritize analysis of supply and demand, incorporating measurements of utility. This theory argues that markets function best when free and that government intervention usually proves counterproductive (with some possible exceptions such as monopolies that undermine the market’s freedom). Neoliberal political theorists wish to reduce the role of government and often embrace this neoclassical model for the state’s economic policies. They are not only suspicious of government intervention on a practical level but also oppose government power in principle, seeing it as a threat to liberty. These theoretical considerations have practical consequences.
Sen has a great deal of sympathy for the freedoms these neoclassical and neoliberal thinkers want to defend. He also strongly believes that free market policies usually are advisable but warns against making that an absolute principle. He demands that “we have to evaluate the actual possibilities critically” (126). He emphasizes a pragmatic look at consequences that evaluates a broad range of information about freedom and equality. If the market in practice serves to deny freedom to the poor or fosters excessive inequality that could be reasonably reduced, then the government may need to intervene in the market. Similarly, if the market fails to provide educational or healthcare opportunities, it is perfectly reasonable for the government to step in to fill that gap. Finally, some public goods—such as an unpolluted environment—cannot be easily turned into commodities to be managed using market mechanisms. Therefore, public policy offers the best way to ensure access to these goods.
Sen more directly addresses the thesis championed by Singapore’s leader Lee Kuan Yew that authoritarian regimes can impose policies that grow the economy more effectively than democratic ones; Lee also sees civil liberties as a luxury that developing nations may not be able to afford. This is an argument made by various leaders from China to Chile and supported by a number of Western economists, as well. Sen argues that this view fails to appreciate the value of freedom as a goal in itself. He further argues that the successes enjoyed by more authoritarian regimes do not exceed those of countries that value civil liberties.