A World In Disarray

“But in its time, in its day, in the first half of the seventeenth century, this was an enormous breakthrough. Until then, there was little order in the world other than that imposed by the strongest entity. War was a frequent occurrence between and among this or that principality or state or empire. The idea of trying to bring about a world in which there was not, to use modern parlance, nonstop intervention in the internal affairs of others was a major advance. And it helped set the stage for a considerable period of relative stability in Europe.” 

Here Haass refers to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the starting point of his overview of the history of international relations. It was revolutionary in that it established the concept of sovereignty being sacrosanct—no matter the size or power of the nation—ending the long period when might made right. Sovereignty continues to be the cornerstone of relations between states today.

“The result was something of a departure from the Westphalian notion of order, because rather than merely making sure that neither defeated country would be allowed to possess the military means to harm others, what was agreed to was an approach to order that recognized that what goes on within a country’s borders matters not just to its own citizens but to others. And what the victorious Allies thought they needed to do to ensure that there would not be a World War III, as World War II had followed World War I, was to remake their former adversaries, Germany and Japan. 

It wasn’t until after World War II that the essential aspect of Westphalian sovereignty in foreign relations changed to include a state’s internal affairs. It had become clear from the behavior of the Axis Powers that other nations could no longer ignore egregious domestic behavior that would inevitably influence external behavior. The peace after World War I had failed, resulting in another world war, so this time the United States and its allies virtually remade the societies of Germany and Japan, starting with an overhaul of their political systems. Haass notes, however, that the move was more than idealistic, as the United States wanted to keep communism out of both countries.

“In reviewing the sweep of the four decades of the Cold War, it is hard not to conclude that it did in fact comprise a significant degree of order. There was a balance of power (and, as noted, one including nuclear weapons), a shared if limited notion of what constituted legitimacy, and a diplomatic process to maintain the balance of power and to deal with situations that challenged competing notions of what was desirable and acceptable. The result was that the third great-power struggle of the twentieth century proved to be fundamentally different from the first two.” 

Haass writes that there is irony in some of what he presents. Looking back from the vantage point of 2017, it’s clear that despite the dangers of the Cold War, it also provided a measure of stability. As he notes, the existence of only two great powers meant that the foreign relations of each were focused on the other, not diffuse as is the case today. The powers tended to balance each other out, a phenomenon made stronger by the doctrine of mutually assured destruction that nuclear weapons afforded. Despite this great rivalry, clear lines of diplomacy were maintained as well. In fact, it all added up to a fairly well maintained world order.

“It thus comes as little surprise that the post-World War II order—effectively World Order 1.0—provided only a degree of structure for the international system once the overlay and discipline of the Cold War order disappeared. Just as important, the world was not well positioned to deal with the diffusion of power that was to come, with the emergence of nonstate actors, or with the many challenges of globalization. There was little in the way of thinking about, much less agreement on, what would constitute a legitimate order and the global architecture and machinery that would be needed to create and sustain it. This would call for a new and different approach, World Order 2.0. Thus when the Cold War ended it was as if the tide had gone out, leaving a world that had been expecting something of a respite from history mostly exposed and unprepared for what was to follow.” 

This passage continues the idea of the previous quotation. When the Soviet Union fell, most people thought that the demise of the Cold War dangers would result in a safer, more ordered world. Haass is saying that, in hindsight, the system and structures that had been set up to deal with the Cold War dynamics were inadequate for the world that emerged when the Cold War ended. This only became apparent over time, as the old system failed to meet the new challenges the world faced, actually resulting in more disorder.

“I say all this because by the measure of major-power politics, the quarter century that is the post-Cold War world appears to have gone quite well. Relations among the major powers of this era—the United States, China, Russia, Japan, Europe, and India—while far from harmonious, have been by historical standards pretty good. Direct conflict between one or more major powers has been absent from international relations over the past twenty-five years. Indeed, it is hard to point to a case where major conflict (as opposed to an armed incident) was even a serious possibility. This as much as anything else distinguishes these few decades from most others in the modern (post-1648) era. Yet, as the title of this book makes clear, ours is a world in disarray. All of which raises the fundamental question: How is it that the world is not doing better, if what has been the principal source of history’s problems is by most measures relatively absent?”

Here Haass reminds the reader that despite his argument of a declining order since the end of the Cold War, it has not been all bad. Underlying this is the fact that great-power relations have been fairly uneventful compared to the centuries that came before. There’s no denying this is a positive state of affairs. However, as Haass notes, the fact that the world order is not even better than it is presents a conundrum. The bulk of this book consists of his explaining why, based on factors other than great-power relationships.

“More significant, though, was the decision to enlarge NATO, which started in the late 1990s under the Clinton administration and was continued by its successors. This policy has proved to be one of the most consequential and controversial of the post-Cold War era. That NATO would continue, much less enlarge, was hardly a foregone conclusion. It is rare in history for an alliance born in one strategic context (in NATO’s case, the Cold War, to deter and if need be defend against a Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Europe) to remain in place once the context has changed and the mission has become obsolete. The question was whether NATO could and should endure—or whether its success would prove to be its undoing.

The author gives one reason for the state of the world’s not being better than it is today. He believes that enlarging NATO to include former nations in the Soviet orbit was a mistake, as it only made Russia feel threatened. He notes here that NATO perhaps could even have been disbanded since its reason for existing had disappeared. As he emphasizes a number of times elsewhere in the book, very little in history is inevitable or fated to happen; decisions made by political leaders and diplomats matter, and continuing NATO was one such decision that could have gone differently.

“There is a fundamental difference between the absence of major-power conflict and the presence of major-power cooperation. Or to return to the themes that have informed this book, there were bulwarks that worked against direct conflict, including a balance of power (reinforced by nuclear and nonnuclear deterrence) and economic interdependence. But missing was anything approximating a shared definition of legitimacy as applied to determining how best to deal with either global or regional challenges. What all this means, though, is that the causes of the world’s increased disarray lie elsewhere, beyond the dynamics of direct major-power competition.” 

Part of the answer to the question posed in Important Quote 6 lies in the first sentence of this quotation: A lack of conflict does not equal cooperation. Here the author highlights one of his main themes: the lack of consensus on what constitutes legitimacy in international organizations. This has contributed to disarray in the state of the world order in spite of the absence of a great-power rivalry. Another factor, as the end of the quotation indicates, is that great-power relations alone no longer constitute the state of world order.

“A theme that ran through the early part of this book was that of order and its centrality to understanding international relations. Three criteria are central to the degree or quality of order: the extent to which there is a widely shared definition of the rules and principles by which the world is to operate; the existence of a broadly accepted process for setting, adjusting, and applying these rules and principles; and a balance of power. There was as well the judgment that international order at the end of the Cold War in 1989 was both incomplete and fragile, with the loss of the constraints, discipline, and structure of a world dominated by two nuclear-armed superpowers and the relative weakness of the remaining post-World War II arrangements.” 

This passage sums up the requirements for order in the world and highlights some of the reasons Haass believes the world today is in disarray. Particularly important has been the lack of legitimacy in world organizations, which stems from nations’ not agreeing on either the principles for dealing with challenges or the process through which to implement and secure them. It turns out, too, that having a strongly balanced power in the Cold War—as oppositional and antagonistic as it was—helped to maintain order.

“But less clear and certainly less broadly embraced was the notion of a right of self-determination for peoples living within established nation-states. Unlike those seeking to get out from under colonial rule, self-determination broadly applied would not be a one-time affair. To the contrary, it could be potentially unlimited in its application. What is more, if it applied to groups living within countries, it threatened the idea and the ideal of state sovereignty, in that sovereignty could be attacked and undermined not just from the outside but from within. It was thus a potential threat to the integrity of many countries as well as to the basis of international order.” 

This explains the difference between what happened in the post-World War II period, when former colonies sought their independence, and what happened in the post-Cold War period, when a number of peoples sought to break away from established states. The legitimacy of the latter was less clear and confused the issue of sovereignty, long a pillar of international relations. The way the world dealt with this process in areas like the Balkans led to differences in opinion about the principle involved, helping to undermine its legitimacy.

“What these crises had in common was that they involved governments that either attacked elements of their own population or failed to protect their own people from attacks. The crises tended to have stakes and consequences more humanitarian than strategic, although in some cases the population flows that resulted posed problems for the stability of neighboring states. But the issue contained within it a major challenge to governments everywhere, in that it raised the question of what if anything was to be done if local governments were unable or unwilling to provide basic security to their own citizens.” 

This quotation refers to the notion of “responsibility to protect” (R2P), which developed during the 1990s. It was another thing that changed the idea of sovereignty established at Westphalia. In cases such as Rwanda, governments attacked (or failed to protect) their own people, leading to international intervention on humanitarian grounds. Where domestic affairs were once off limits, they now became part of the calculus for other countries when deciding to intervene. As played out over the following two decades, lack of agreement as to its legitimacy was another factor in the world becoming less orderly.

“In cyberspace, by contrast, there are now billions of actors, as it takes no more than access to a cell phone or tablet or computer connected to the Internet. Much of what is needed can be purchased easily. The Internet plays an incomparably larger global role in the civilian or commercial economy than does nuclear energy, a reality that make restricting the spread of technologies all but impossible. States do not dominate; to the contrary, groups of a few talented individuals can have real impact. Attacks can often be carried out in a manner that disguises those responsible, which makes retaliation and hence deterrence far more difficult.” 

This is an example of the author’s assertion that the number of players on the world stage has increased and the power centers have become more diffuse. No longer are states the only powerful actors influencing what happens. The nature of cyberspace exacerbates this problem since the Internet is so ubiquitous, reaching around the globe, and allows for anonymity. Cyberattacks can cause serious damage, but the technology is freely available to everyone. Haass argues that nonstate actors should be consulted when challenges in the world are addressed. For instance, tech companies should be part of discussions involving cyberspace.

“In many domains of international life there is a pattern of agreement in principle that translates into little agreement in practice. In still other domains there is not even much in the way of agreement in principle. Such differences cannot for the most part be resolved through negotiation; process cannot overcome policy given the large number of governments in the world and the reality that nongovernmental entities that often matter a great deal never get invited into the room.

The result is that the phrase ‘international community’ is far more aspirational than actual. Much less international community exists than anyone could be forgiven for thinking given how often the phrase is invoked. In principle, a community (or ‘society’ in Hedley Bull’s lexicon) would agree on both the means and the ends of international relations, on what was to be done and how that was to be determined. But the cold reality is that no such broad and deep consensus exists as to what is to be done, who is to do it, and how to decide. There is a substantial gap between what is desirable when it comes to meeting the challenges of globalization and what has proven possible. This gap is one of the principal reasons for the disarray that exists in the world.” 

Coming at the end of the long Chapter 5, this passage sums up the author’s argument that forms the basis of the chapter title: “A Global Gap.” Nations have different levels of consensus about how to address various issues, but in large part, little agreement exists on either principles or processes for upholding them. Over the 25 years covered since the end of the Cold War, this gap between what should be addressed and what has actually been done (or not done, as the case may be) is the major cause of declining order in the world.

“The war and its aftermath had numerous consequences beyond Iraq’s borders. Contrary to what was hoped for, democracy was dealt a major setback throughout the region as the ideal of democracy had come to be associated in the eyes of many in the Arab world with chaos. National identity in Iraq had been superseded by subnational identities tied to sect, tribe, and ethnicity; people saw themselves far more as a Sunni or Shia or Kurd than as an Iraqi. Sunni anger and humiliation stoked recruiting for both al-Qaeda and subsequently ISIS.” 

Throughout the text, Haass makes the case for realism in foreign relations because he believes its counterpart, Wilsonian idealism, can lead to overreach as it places an emphasis on shaping other nations from within. This is what happened in Iraq in the early 2000s, as the United States government thought it had a chance to introduce democracy to the Middle East through regime change. What actually happened left the Arab states wary of democracy and Iraq vulnerable to bad actors like ISIS.

“The Syrian case is if anything even more consequential. Indeed, it is as strong an argument as exists that when it comes to foreign policy, what you choose not to do can be every bit as consequential as what you do. Syria in the years since 2011 is the bookend to the 2003 decision to go to war with Iraq. One was an act of commission, the other largely one of omission, and each in its own way proved costly beyond imagination.” (

Most of the book discusses taking action of some kind—what has happened in the past or what should be done in the future. Here the author notes that inaction can also play a major role in world affairs. The Iraq War in 2003 had negative consequences (described in the previous quotation), but so did a decision not to act in Syria a decade later. President Obama had declared that the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government would be a “red line” that it should not cross, but when this actually took place, Obama held off on responding militarily. Haass considers this a mistake that led to a decrease in credibility for the United States.

“Closely related to this trend is an associated reality, namely, that the major powers have had to contend with a growing number of state and nonstate entities that could also exert significant power. The word I use to capture this reality of widely distributed power and capacity is ‘nonpolarity.’ It is qualitatively and fundamentally different from the nature of the world in the past. The greater distribution of power that characterizes this era makes it more difficult to assemble all the relevant actors in one place and keep such a gathering workable.” 

The trend Haass refers to in the first sentence of this quotation is that of great powers losing power relative to other, rising powers. In addition, an increasing number of nonstate entities can exert power in the world. Haass uses the word “nonpolarity” to describe the state of the world today. Some think it’s “multipolar,” but that term is limited only to a group of states and excludes the other centers of power that exist.

“Today’s foreign policy must begin with a concerted effort to discourage major-power rivalry, competition, and above all conflict from again becoming the dominant feature of the international system. The reasons are twofold. First, any such deterioration in major-power relations would be extremely costly even if it did not lead to direct conflict and incomparably more costly if it did. Second, adversarial relationships between and among the major powers would prove to be a major distraction that would make it far more difficult for them to work together to deal with the many global and regional challenges that confront them.”

Despite the idea expressed in the previous quotation, major powers still matter, and the relations between them are very important. Haass explains that poor relations, like the rivalry and competition found in earlier eras, would not only have a negative effect on the powers involved; a secondary effect would be just as harmful as it would interfere with the concerted effort needed to solve the serious issues facing the world as a whole, such as climate change. Thus the United States must enter into foreign relations with the resolve to prevent this from happening.

“This reinforces the case for adopting a policy toward them that is best described as ‘integration.’ It seeks to involve them in regional and global orders both by giving them a role in defining what constitutes legitimacy and by ‘hedging,’ by making clear that they will not benefit from but rather will pay a steep price for pursuing a policy that the United States and its allies view as illegitimate. Another way to say this is that military preparations and signs of strength, while necessary, are not sufficient. The United States does not want to communicate the impression that confrontation and conflict are inevitable. It is thus important to offer and where possible bolster what might be described as diplomatic and economic interdependence.” 

Haass returns here to the theme of legitimacy and how to restore it in international relations. The quotation refers to how the United States should deal with China and Russia. He believes the actions of both can be influenced and that neither country is looking to dominate the world. As such, the United States should seek to involve them in as many areas as possible. By integrating them into decision making and world systems, The United States will give them an incentive to act positively. The author also notes that all three countries need to agree on the definition of legitimate principles and processes so they and other world powers can once again face the challenges of the world together.

“Again, the objective is to maintain or even strengthen what is best about the sovereign order, including broad acceptance of a meaningful zone of autonomy for governments as well as a robust respect for borders and for the principle that they are not to be modified through the use of military force or other forms of coercion. This definition of legitimacy, this approach to international relations, can be summed up as World Order 1.0.

The argument being advanced here is that the requirements for order must be expanded and adapted to the realities of our interconnected world. The goal should be to build consensus around a larger approach to sovereignty, one that includes obligations beyond borders. Call it World Order 2.0.” 

Haass presents his recommendation for how to update the world order for today’s situation. The idea of sovereignty—which began in Westphalia as involving nations’ external relations only and then touched on internal affairs with the “responsibility to protect” doctrine in the 20th century—should become one of “sovereign obligation.” By this he means that states have a responsibility not only to their own people but also to other states in the world community. He calls it a kind of realism for a globalized world.

“Consistent with all this, and to return to a theme that has appeared throughout this book, legitimacy requires a commitment to process as well as policy. A big part of the process of building legitimacy for sovereign obligations will be consultations. In some areas, such as health, the conversation is already far advanced. What mostly remains is building national capacity. In other realms, such as cyber, the world is far from agreement as to what is desirable. In still other areas, such as proliferation, the norms are agreed on, but unresolved is what is permissible or desirable in practice when the norms are ignored.” 

This quotation refers to the theme of legitimacy again, emphasizing that it consists of two parts. Much of the book highlights that legitimacy comes from agreeing on the definitions of principles and norms. However, equally important is agreeing on the process involved in adhering to norms. That is, when one country fails to meet those norms, there needs to be consensus on how other nations can respond. If states don’t agree on this, they tend to go their own way, and the world falls further into disarray.

“We have already noted the reality that in many ways it makes more sense to speak of world orders than of world order. This is true in the functional domains just discussed, as the degree of consensus in, for example, trade cannot be expected to be mirrored in others such as climate or cyberspace. This same separateness is reflected in the geographic sense as well. There are a number of distinct regions in today’s world, including North America, the Asia-Pacific, South Asia, the Middle East, South or Latin America, Africa, and Europe. Indeed, it is another one of those seeming contradictions that at one and the same time the world is experiencing increased globalization and increased regionalization.” 

One of the ironies of the world in 2017 is that while globalization is racing along, so, too, is regionalization. This trend is related to the fact that great powers no longer dominate like they once did. Because there are multiple actors (many of which are not states) with influence in the world, the issues facing different regions are varied. This situation calls for different approaches to finding appropriate solutions.

“Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the trajectory of this part of the world will be central to that of the world writ large. The Asia-Pacific is where several of the major powers of this era are located. It will account for the lion’s share of the world’s population, wealth, and military might. The ability of countries in or bordering on this part of the world to agree or at least limit their disagreement will go a long way toward determining whether global issues such as climate change and cyberspace can be successfully managed. What happens there will also largely shape the character of relations among the major powers of this era.” 

This passage highlights the importance of the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century. Haass considers it the bellwether for how relations between states will play out worldwide. Most of the major issues facing the world rely on this area for their resolution because of the concentration of economic and military power, along with the huge aggregate population.

“The Middle East constitutes the greatest challenge to policymakers of any region in the world. It is the region experiencing the greatest level of violence. The previous section (Part II) explained both where it is and how it got there. To argue for an ambitious set of objectives amid such circumstances, though, is to embrace fantasy over reality. There are times in statecraft when to set modest goals is to squander opportunity; this is not one of those times. To the contrary, even the most modest goals promise to be ambitious.” 

At the present time, Haass sees few good options for the United States in the Middle East even as he considers it the greatest challenge. He emphasizes elsewhere that he does not advocate ignoring it; the United States needs to be a presence and play a role in all strategically important regions. However, this is just not the time to shoot for the moon. His stance is a fundamentally realistic one, and he sees no need to waste resources or efforts on large goals that are clearly unachievable.

“Up to this point, we have focused on what the United States needs to do in the world to promote order. That is what one would expect from a book about international relations and American foreign policy. But a focus on foreign policy is not enough. National security is a coin with two sides, and what the United States does at home, what is normally thought of as belonging to the domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy. It is best to understand the issue as guns and butter rather than guns versus butter.” 

The book’s final chapter is focused on what the United States needs to do internally to maintain its ability to conduct foreign policy in the manner it desires. Haass argues that a strong domestic policy is a requirement for a strong foreign policy. Economic issues are paramount so the country has sufficient money for both domestic and foreign programs. However, it’s also necessary to succeed economically, politically, and in other areas to act as a model for other nations to emulate and aspire to.