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John RawlsA Theory of Justice
Nonfiction | Reference/Text Book | Adult | Published in 1971A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapter 9Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 3
Chapter 9, Section 78 Summary: “Autonomy and Objectivity”
Rawls states that “the moral conception adopted is independent of natural contingencies and accidental social circumstances” (451). Therefore, moral sense conforms to fair principles, and when acting from such principles, persons act autonomously: “[T]hey are acting from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free and equal rational beings” (452). The principles of moral psychology are agencies persons utilize to reach a complete understanding, but a person’s conception of right is ultimately set independently for themselves.
Under the contract view and in the original position, autonomy and objectivity are compatible. Justice as fairness does not dictate that the conscientious judgments of a person always be respected or that persons may form whatever moral convictions they desire. Actions based on conscious directives may violate the principles: “[A] person’s conscience is misguided when he seeks to impose on us conditions that violate the principles to which we would each consent in [the original] situation” (455). In this situation, the offending person’s conscience is not literally respected, but the person is respected by the limiting of the offender’s actions when necessary, as the mutually acknowledged principles permit.
When there is social doubt and a loss of faith in long-established values, there is a tendency to rely on the virtues of integrity, rather than the principles of justice. However, a moral view cannot be constructed from these virtues alone. Virtues are secondary and must join a conception of justice that allows for autonomy and objectivity.
Chapter 9, Section 79 Summary: “The Idea of Social Union”
The congruence of the right and the good depends on whether the well-ordered society produced achieves the good of the community. Social union is maintained by the individual calculations of its members; any changes would reduce their ability to pursue their ends. There exist too many ends for persons to pursue all, so a person must select which abilities and interests to cultivate. When a person is secure in the abilities they have chosen to cultivate, especially when their ends are accepted by other persons, they are disposed to appreciate the abilities of others. This creates a social union through which members can participate and share in the sum of the realized natural assets of others. Many acceptable forms of social union exist and justice as fairness does not rank them. A well-ordered society will contain a variety of social unions, and a well-ordered society is in fact itself a social union.
Chapter 9, Section 80 Summary: “The Problem of Envy”
For simplicity and moral theory, justice as fairness does not allow envy or knowledge of the special psychologies. The principles adopted hold, irrespective of these qualities, for the same reasons they hold irrespective of individual preferences and social circumstances. These qualities do, however, exist and must be addressed in some way. The principles of justice must ask “whether the well-ordered society corresponding to the conception adopted will actually generate feelings of envy and patterns of psychological attitudes that will undermine the arrangements it counts to be just” (465). Envy is a rational, collectively disadvantageous nonmoral feeling characterized as a vice, and it must be determined whether the principles of justice are likely to engender destructive envy. Envy can be characterized as “excusable envy” if it manifests from a reaction to loss of self-respect under reasonable circumstances. Excusable envy is allowable only to the extent that it comports with the principles of justice.
Chapter 9, Section 81 Summary: “Envy and Equality”
The primary psychological cause of envy is a lack of self-confidence in one’s own worth combined with a sense of impotence. Hostile outbreaks of envy arise when persons lacking confidence in their value experience pain and humiliation and believe their social position affords no alternative to opposing the circumstances of the more advantaged. In this way, social institutions cause envy. A well-ordered society based on the two principles of justice as fairness obviates the issue of hostile envious outbreaks by prioritizing equal liberties and conferring equal self-respect to all persons. Equality among persons eliminates envy: “[W]hat was originally jealousy and envy is transformed into a social feeling, the sense of justice that insists upon equality for all” (473).
Chapter 9, Section 82 Summary: “The Grounds for the Priority of Liberty”
Prioritizing liberty shows that participants in the original position have a hierarchy of interests that give precedence to their fundamental aims. This hierarchy creates the basic structure of a social union for persons and groups to achieve their ends.
The basis of self-respect in a just society is the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties, not the income share of an individual. A conception of justice that eliminates the significance of economic and social advantages requires the priority of liberty so that “excusable envy does not arise” (478).
Chapter 9, Section 83 Summary: “Happiness and Dominant Ends”
Happiness can be defined objectively as plans adjusted to the conditions of life and resting on sound beliefs, or subjectively as rooted in a person’s belief that they are successfully executing a rational plan. Happiness is self-contained (that is, it’s chosen for its own sake) and self-sufficient (that is, nothing further is demanded, once achieved).
Chapter 9, Section 84 Summary: “Hedonism as a Method of Choice”
Hedonism is traditionally interpreted either as “the contention that the sole intrinsic good is pleasurable feeling, or as the psychological thesis that the only thing individuals strive for is pleasure” (486). Hedonism can also be understood as an attempt to accomplish the dominant-end conception of deliberation by establishing that a rational choice is always possible. Hedonists reason that if human life is guided by reason, there must be a dominant end and, interpret pleasure narrowly as an agreeable feeling. A hedonist then, simply chooses what offers the greatest net balance of pleasure over pain. Articulated as such, hedonism does not define a reasonable dominant end, but rather offers a plurality of ends and no quantitative measurement to balance them.
Chapter 9, Section 85 Summary: “The Unity of the Self”
Rawls writes that “there is no one aim by reference to which all of our choices can reasonably be made” (491). If no single proper end exists, then there must be a proper method of choosing an aim within the class of appropriate aims: “[A] rational plan is one that would be chosen with deliberative rationality as defined by the full theory of the good” (491).
Moral personality is expressed by a rational plan of life and a regulative desire to act upon certain principles of right:
Thus a moral person is a subject with ends [they have] chosen, and his fundamental preference is for conditions that enable him to frame a mode of life that expresses his nature as a free and equal rational being as fully as circumstances permit (491).
The parties establish just and favorable conditions in the original position, so they are free to fashion their own unity. There can be no dominant end in justice as fairness, nor is one necessary. Once a structure of institutions is recognized, citizens may pursue their ends within the limits of the institutions to which they have been voluntarily bound.
Chapter 9, Section 86 Summary: “The Good of the Sense of Justice”
Rawls states that participating in a well-ordered society is a good itself. Mutual recognition and acceptance of the principles of justice are the basis of well-ordered societies. Further, acting justly is something persons want to do as free and equal rational beings, even if it ultimately leads to their suffering. Thus, “in a well-ordered society, being a good person (and in particular having an effective sense of justice) is indeed a good for that person” and “this form of society is a good society” (505).
Chapter 9, Section 87 Summary: “Remarks on Justification”
Justice as fairness establishes justice as the first virtue of institutions. The three parts of the theory of justice as fairness support each other to form one unified theory. The first part establishes the theoretical structure, the second part establishes the institutions of justice and duties imposed on individuals, and the third part establishes that the principles established in parts one and two create a feasible conception of justice.
Chapter 9 Analysis
Chapter 9 is concerned with the moral personality, including emotions like envy and happiness, and how the self is conceived within a just society. Most importantly, in a just society, individuals must be autonomous and rational. People act autonomously when they act according to principles that best express their nature as free and equal rational beings. This highlights the theme of Balancing Individual Rights with the Common Good. The original position and the two principles of justice as fairness foster such autonomy and objectivity in several ways by allowing persons to cultivate and achieve their chosen ends. This allows members of society to create a social union through which they participate and share in the sum of the natural assets realized by all.
Because justice as fairness permits persons to cultivate and achieve their chosen desired ends, and consequently also appreciate the ends other persons have cultivated, it will not generate envious feelings:
[A] companion principle to the Aristotelian Principle implies that men appreciate and enjoy these attributes in one another as they are manifested in cooperating to affirm just institutions,” and just institutions simultaneously encourage diverse associations in which individuals realize their ends […] Thus the public realization of justice is a value of community” (463).
The chapter focuses on envy as a quality that undermines the principles of justice as fairness. Envy is counterproductive in a just society because it undermines the social cohesion, trust, and sense of fairness that are essential for maintaining justice. In a society where justice prevails, individuals should have the opportunity to pursue their own conception of the good life while respecting the rights and well-being of others. Envy, however, fosters resentment and dissatisfaction, disrupting the social harmony necessary for justice to function effectively.
This folds into Rawls’s discussion of hedonism and maximizing pleasure over values. Envy leads individuals to focus on what others have rather than on their own opportunities and achievements. This comparison fosters distrust and suspicion, as people may begin to believe that others have unfair advantages or that the system is rigged against them. In a just society, trust in institutions and in the fairness of social arrangements is crucial, highlighting The Importance of Institutions in Maintaining Fairness. When envy takes hold, this trust is eroded, making it difficult for people to cooperate within institutions and work together toward common goals. Instead of working together to improve the common good, envious individuals may seek to undermine or outdo others, leading to conflict and competition rather than collaboration. This divisiveness can weaken the social fabric and make it harder to achieve justice as fairness.
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