A People's History of the United States

Zinn argues that the two decades of consensus, discussed in the previous chapter, were manufactured by American media and elites working to suppress dissent. In 1980, eight employees of a General Electric manufacturing plant in Pennsylvania used sledgehammers to destroy weapons components they had helped construct. When they were arrested, they claimed to have been following the Bible’s command to beat swords into plowshares and so were dubbed the Plowshare Eight. While these activists were ultimately convicted and sentenced to several years of prison, many of the jurors seemed sympathetic to their radical protest (602). Presidential Ronald Regan’s arms race with the Soviet Union stretched through the 1980s and included the construction of another generation of newer, more powerful nuclear weapons. In response, Americans around the country, including members of the old anti-Vietnam movement, mobilized to protest nuclear proliferation (603). After the US became involved in El Salvador’s civil war, Americans protested across the country. In Tucson, over 1,000 people marched in protest to government policy (608). Yet these protests often went uncovered by news media or were covered were portrayed in negative ways. Meanwhile, when Reagan was reelected in 1984 the press dubbed it “a landslide” and “the Reagan Revolution” (610). Despite real gains made in some sectors, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, many groups languished. While the media heralded victory over the Soviet Union in 1989, in 1991 one defense contractor claimed that the Iraq War had saved him from the “peace dividend,” meaning post-Cold War budget cuts.

This chapter serves as a conclusion of sorts for Zinn’s argument, although it is no longer the last chapter in the newest editions of the book. It offers a look at what might be ahead for America from the standpoint of the early 1990s. Zinn sees the American government as “the most ingenious system of control in world history” (632). It was possible, once the elite developed the will and the understanding, to share only what resources were necessary to mollify disadvantaged groups within American society. When necessary, the government turned instead to war to distract and discredit critics (633). Even American histories, written, funded, and curated by the establishment, were guilty of concealing the stories Zinn tries to elevate. These historians crafted comfortable narratives of great men saving society and pushing forward the procession of civilization, when they served only the interests of the establishment. Where American rebels won legislative or social victories, elites worked to undermine those rights and wipe them away. American society, Zinn suggests, is like the prison in Attica described in a previous chapter. Some are prisoners, abused and mistreated by a few guards. The guards, people like Zinn who found themselves uncomfortably within the American elite, had to learn from the mistakes made in that riot. Instead of resisting change and maintaining social hierarchies, the guards should join the revolt and support the prisoners in obtaining equality and dignity (635). 

The Election of Bill Clinton in 1992 seemed to herald, finally, a return to at least some governmental activism. This is what candidate Clinton had claimed on the campaign trail. But Clinton was another consensus candidate who governed in nearly the same way as his Republican predecessors (645). Instead of trying to reduce inequality and rebuild rights, he advanced a bellicose policy abroad threatening to attack Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba. And he demonized minorities at home, undermining welfare and painting Black offenders as monsters in American society (647). While the end of the Cold War had promised a peace dividend, large military commitments to Iraq and Korea demanded large expenditures. In addition, as the ex-Soviet bloc separated from its former overlord, the United States replaced the Soviet Union as the largest global arms exporter. Despite the lack of any war, the United States still produced substantial quantities of weapons and maintained a large standing army (653). Economically, the 1990s were a time of prosperity, but age old issues remained under the surface. Between 1980 and 1995, for example, American purchasing power declined 15%, while in 1998 it was estimated that one in three Americans had a job that paid below the federal poverty level (662). Clinton spoke of a “bold program of social reconstruction” but was neither willing to pay for one, nor supportive of anyone trying to create it (663). Protests continued, as they had throughout the age of consensus, but they failed to garner national attention. In 1994, a quarter million people in Los Angeles took to the streets to protest a law that removed heath care rights for the children of undocumented immigrants. And in 1999, eight pacifists blocked traffic to a US Naval base to commemorate the bombing of Nagasaki. Yet, protests remained scattered, uncoordinated, and ineffective (667).

The 2000 election is the focus of Zinn’s last, short chapter. Republicans, including candidate George W. Bush, painted Democratic nominee Al Gore as a radical. In reality, he and his vice presidential nominee were friends and supporters of American businesses (675). The only candidate who offered change was Ralph Nader, a longtime critic of the American government, who ran as a third-party candidate. The mass media protected the establishment and refused to give Nader equal airing. Most Americans had been disillusioned by elections that seemed to promise no real change or alternatives, and so few voted. Of those who did vote, the majority voted for Al Gore. But because of the Electoral College system, George Bush won the election. He governed as if he had won in a landslide, dramatically reshaping American policy. The terrorist attacks of 2001 gave the Bush administration the justification it wanted to start another war, based on the popular desire to punish those responsible for the attacks. However, as in other wars, this punishment was often inflicted on the people of targeted nations rather than the perpetrators of the attacks (681).